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General Abstract 
Embedded lies, the topic of investigation in this thesis, have been under researched 
within the deception detection literature. The overarching aim of this research was to 
examine how interviewees’ strategic inclusion of both truths and lies within a single 
account may affect statement quality, and the subsequent implications for verbal lie 
detection.   
Across three experimental studies and one exploratory survey, I (i) explored the 
deception strategies reported by people who claim to be good liars (Chapter 2), (ii) 
examined how the combination of truths and lies within a single account affects the 
verbal quality of statements (Chapters 3 and 4), and (iii) tested if embedded lies can 
be exploited to facilitate within-statement lie detection (Chapter 5). Chapter 2 (n = 
194) explored deception by investigating how laypeople’s self-reported ability to 
deceive was associated with their lie frequency, characteristics, and deception 
strategies. Of particular interest was whether the strategic inclusion of truthful details 
into lies corresponded to higher perceptions of deception ability. Results showed that 
self-reported good liars reported embedding lies as their most common strategy for 
deceiving successfully. Chapter 3 (n = 144), experimentally tested how interviewees 
strategically regulate the information they provide when their accounts contain both 
truthful and deceptive information. Results showed that interviewees calibrated the 
richness of detail provided in the first element of their statement to be consistent with 
the veracity of the second element, such that elements followed by a lie were less 
detailed than elements followed by a truth. Further examination revealed that 
participants also calibrated their lies according to both the preceding and the following 
element, with lies becoming more detailed when they were flanked by truthful 
information compared to when they were flanked by other lies. In light of these results, 
 
iv 
 
Chapter 4 (n = 111) examined whether embedded lies differed qualitatively from full 
fabrications. The results showed that the two types of lies did not differ on a number 
of content-based cues (e.g., detail richness), but that lies embedded in otherwise 
truthful statements could be distinguished from truths embedded in truthful statements 
on the basis of detail richness and statement quality (i.e., clarity and plausibility). 
Finally, Chapter 5 (n = 148) tested whether lie detection accuracy could be improved 
by using embedded lies as a within-statement baseline comparison. Contrary to the 
hypothesis, results showed that instructing participants to make a within-statement 
baseline comparison did not increase the accuracy of their veracity assessments.  
Taking the results of these studies together, it could be concluded that liars aim to 
strategically maintain consistency regarding the quality of information provided 
between truths and lies within their statements; however, content-based methods of 
verbal credibility assessment based on the cues measured in this research appear to be 
robust against this strategy. The results of this thesis emphasise that lie detectors should 
exploit liars’ attempts at maintaining consistency by utilising methods of verbal 
baselining that control for both the individual and the situation.  
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1.1 Introduction 
The main focus of this doctoral thesis was to investigate how the strategic 
embedding of lies influences the verbal behaviours of liars. In this chapter, I will 
broadly introduce the importance of studying deception detection for investigative 
purposes. Subsequently, I will discuss the theoretical foundations of verbal deception 
detection, emphasising the memory-based and strategy-based origins of several 
prominent verbal cues to deception. My discussion will also extend to the strategies of 
lying and truth-telling interviewees wherein I will highlight the strategy of embedding 
lies, an often-neglected aspect of deception research. From here, I will put forward the 
aims of the present research: (i) to explore the deception strategies of good liars, (ii) to 
examine the extent to which truthful and deceptive information interact to influence 
verbal quality, and (iii) to test whether embedded lies can be exploited to facilitate 
within-statement lie detection. Finally, the research conducted to address these aims 
will be described.  
1.1.1 Importance of Studying Deception  
Determining the credibility of an interviewee, be it a suspect, victim or witness, 
is a fundamental component of the investigative process. It is therefore not surprising 
that the scientific study of deception has already spanned over a century (Münsterberg, 
1908). Indeed, several hundred studies have measured people’s ability to distinguish 
between truthful and deceptive accounts. The most robust finding in this literature is 
that humans are poor lie detectors, accurately detecting lies at rates barely exceeding 
chance level (e.g., Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Levine, 2010; Vrij, 2008a). This finding 
also holds true for professionals whose job it is to make judgements of credibility, such 
as police officers (e.g., Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Vrij, 
2004; Luke et al., 2016).  
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One of the explanations for the poor lie detection performance is an 
overreliance on behavioural cues. No single behaviour, nor group of behaviours, is 
systematically and reliably indicative of deception (DePaulo et al., 2003; Hartwig & 
Bond, 2011; Wright & Wheatcroft, 2017), yet people continue to base their judgements 
on stereotypical nonverbal cues such as gaze aversion (Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij, & 
Merckelbach, 2016; Strömwall, Granhag, & Hartwig, 2004).  
1.1.2 Verbal Lie Detection 
The most diagnostic information is found in the content of liars’ speech. The 
accuracy of credibility assessments improves when judgements are based only on the 
verbal content of a statement (52% correct lie-truth classifications) versus through 
visual mediums (63% correct classifications; Bond & DePaulo, 2006). In fact, a review 
of over thirty studies showed that when observers’ judgements were guided by 
statement analysis, their accuracy rates increased to 72% (Vrij, 2005). Additionally, 
good lie detectors report a higher reliance on verbal cues when making credibility 
judgments, whereas poor lie detectors tend to rely primarily on non-verbal cues (Mann, 
Vrij, & Bull, 2004). It has therefore been advocated that for lie detection purposes, 
both in research and practice, it is more valuable to listen carefully to what 
interviewees say than to observe their nonverbal behaviour (Vrij, 2008b). 
One of the most consistent findings in the verbal lie detection literature is that liars’ 
statements are typically less richly detailed than those of their truth-telling counterparts 
(e.g., Amado, Arce, Fariña, & Vilarino, 2016; DePaulo et al., 2003; Luke, 2019). In 
fact, the estimated effect size of quantity of details is d = 0.55 (Amado et al., 2016), 
which is remarkably high for the social sciences (Funder & Ozer, 2019; Richard, Bond, 
& Stokes-Zoota, 2003). Additionally, meta-analytical findings support the usefulness 
of temporal, visual, and auditory details for differentiating truthful from false accounts 
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(Masip, Sporer, Garrido, & Herrero, 2005). Based on these types of variables, the 
accuracy rate of classifying truth-tellers and liars extends well beyond chance level 
(Masip et al., 2005; Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2017). 
1.1.2.1 Memory-based cues to deception. The use of content-based details as 
cues to deception stems from memory research. In particular, two commonly used 
methods of verbal credibility assessment have their foundations in theories of memory. 
Reality Monitoring (RM; Johnson & Raye, 1981) posits that memories derived from 
real experiences differ in quality from memories based on imagination, due to 
differences in the cognitive processes involved in externally versus internally 
generated memories. RM suggests that memories of real events are acquired through 
perceptual processes and therefore are more likely to contain details relating to 
sensory, spatial, temporal, and affective information, and to be generally more clear, 
sharp and vivid, compared to imagined events. Similarly, Criteria-Based Content 
Analysis (CBCA; Steller & Köhnken, 1989) is based on the hypothesis that memories 
of personally experienced events differ in both quality (e.g., the logical structure or 
plausibility) and content (e.g., unexpected complications) to memories of fabricated or 
imagined accounts (Undeutsch, 1967, 1989). These tools, in particular CBCA, are 
extensively used in forensic practice (e.g., Amado et al., 2016). Moreover, research 
supports these theoretical rationales within lie detection contexts: Liars lack the 
memory traces truth-tellers have, leaving them unable to provide as many rich details 
as honest individuals (Masip et al., 2005; Oberlader et al., 2016; Vrij, 2008). Though 
not without criticism, (see Masip et al., 2005; Vrij, 2005), CBCA and RM are 
favourable tools as, with appropriate training, evaluators’ accuracy rates increase from 
chance level to 65% - 80% (Vrij, 2008a). 
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1.1.2.2 Strategy-based cues to deception. More recently, scholars have 
developed deception detection techniques that aim to exploit interviewees’ strategies 
for appearing credible. One example is the Verifiability Approach (VA; Nahari, Vrij, 
& Fisher, 2014a, 2014b). The VA works on the assumption that liars, on the one hand, 
are inclined to provide detailed statements to be perceived as cooperative and credible, 
but, on the other hand, want to minimise the chances that investigators can falsify their 
statement (Masip & Herrero, 2013; Nahari et al., 2014a). A strategy that meets these 
contradictory aims is to provide information that cannot be verified.  
Another example of a deception detection measure that is sensitive to the verbal 
strategies of liars and truth-tellers relates to common knowledge details (i.e., strongly 
invoked stereotypical information about events; Vrij, Leal, Mann et al., 2017). 
Whereas truth-tellers have personal, unique experiences of an event (DePaulo, Kashy, 
Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996), liars typically lack such information and their 
reports tend to be characterised by more general, impersonal knowledge (Sporer, 
2016). Liars also tend to report fewer complications – occurrences that make a 
situation more difficult than necessary, often characterised by disrupted activity or 
failing efforts (e.g., missing the bus; Steller & Köhnken, 1989; Vrij, Leal, Jupe, & 
Harvey, 2018) – compared to truth-tellers. This makes sense given liars’ preference 
for simple stories (Hartwig et al., 2007). An additional strategy-based measure relates 
to self-handicapping strategies (i.e., justifications as to why someone is unable to 
provide certain information; Vrij, Leal, Mann et al., 2017). Liars are motivated to keep 
their stories simple; however, they also realise that admitting a lack of knowledge 
and/or memory may generate suspicion from investigators (Ruby & Brigham, 1998). 
A strategic solution then is to provide a justification for the failure to provide 
information. Taking these three cues together, investigators can calculate the 
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proportion of complications (complications / complications + common knowledge 
details + self-handicapping strategies), which represents the proportion of cues to 
truthfulness. This proportion score has theoretical advantages given that it is a within-
subjects comparison that is also sensitive to the different verbal strategies used by liars 
and truth-tellers (Vrij, Leal, Jupe, & Harvey, 2018). 
1.1.3 Liars’ and Truth-Tellers’ Strategies 
Strategy-based deception detection techniques derive from a larger body of 
research on interviewees’ counter-interrogation strategies. This work is premised on 
the idea that it may be possible to identify more reliable deception cues, and potentially 
improve lie-detectors’ ability to discriminate between liars and truth-tellers, by 
improving our understanding of how liars and truth-tellers try to tell a convincing story 
(e.g., Clemens, 2013). The fact that individuals, guilty or innocent, adopt particular 
strategies in their attempts to appear credible can be explained by the theory of self-
regulation: A social cognitive framework for understanding how people control their 
behaviour to move away from undesired outcomes and to reach desired goals (Carver 
& Scheier, 2012; Clemens, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2013; Fiske & Taylor, 2008; 
Hartwig, Granhag, & Luke, 2014). In legal contexts, this translates to a common goal 
among liars and truth-tellers, who both aim to convince the interviewer of their 
credibility. Importantly, the information management strategies by which they attempt 
to reach this goal will differ, largely due to differences in the mental state of liars and 
truth-tellers (Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Doering, 2010).  
1.1.3.1 Embedded lies. One strategy that may contribute to liars’ success is 
the embedding of lies into truthful information. Embedded lies can be defined as 
fragments of deceptive information integrated into truthful stories designed to mislead 
an investigator. When given the opportunity, liars will incorporate such embedded lies 
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into their accounts. Evidence for the prevalence of embedded lies comes from Leins, 
Fisher, and Ross (2013). In two studies, these authors found that the majority of liars 
– 67% in the first study and 86% in the second – chose to formulate their deceptive 
account based on a previously experienced event. Additionally, in their study 
evaluating the verifiability approach, Nahari et al. (2014b) found that of their 44 mock 
criminals who were instructed to provide deceptive statements, more than half 
indicated that over 20% of their statement was truthful. Further evidence comes from 
Hartwig and colleagues’ (2007) examination of guilty and innocent suspects’ 
strategies, which revealed that one of liars’ most endorsed strategies was to avoid lying 
by telling the truth as much as possible. In fact, liars will generally provide as much 
experienced or truthful information as possible, to the extent that they do not 
incriminate themselves (Nahari & Vrij, 2015). The use of embedded lies has been 
observed across various populations, such as research participants (Bell & DePaulo, 
1996; Leins, Zimmerman, & Polander, 2017), non-criminals engaging in deception 
(DePaulo et al., 2003), and even criminal suspects (Strömwall & Willén, 2011). It has 
been speculated that this strategy can enhance one’s credibility because lies of this 
type may be easier to deliver and more difficult for interviewers to detect, as compared 
to outright lies (Vrij, 2008a). 
1.1.4 New Research Directions 
Nearly all research to date treats deception as dichotomous. That is, statements 
are classified as either truthful or deceptive, and participants as either liars or truth-
tellers. This division is reflected in hypotheses, designs and experimental procedures 
(e.g., McCornack, Morrison, Paik, Wisner, & Zhu, 2014). Indeed, some researchers 
have acknowledged that liars prefer to embed lies into otherwise truthful statements 
(e.g., Leins et al., 2013; Nahari 2018a; Nahari & Vrij, 2015; Vrij, 2008a; Vrij, 
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Granhag, & Porter, 2010), though this has mostly been in the form of disclaimers 
within discussion sections. Few have explicitly acknowledged, nor systematically 
manipulated, the inclusion of both truthful and deceptive information within 
statements. Doing so would more accurately reflect real-world conditions in which 
suspects interweave truths and lies (e.g., Leins et al., 2017; Strömwall & Willén, 2011; 
Vrij, 2008a).  
There is variation in the extent to which deceptive information can be 
integrated into truthful stories. For instance, an arsonist who denies having set a fire 
yesterday can instead claim that he visited the gym. He can then describe an entirely 
truthful recollection of a previous visit to the gym, lying only about the day and time 
at which the visit occurred. It is also possible that liars embed more elaborate 
descriptions of deceptive events into their statements. For example, when providing 
an alibi statement, a burglar could report the majority of his day truthfully, but could 
lie about his activities during the window of time during which he committed the 
burglary. This latter type of embedded lie, whereby liars integrate descriptions of 
deceptive events into otherwise truthful stories, is the focus of the current dissertation. 
As it stands, we are largely unaware how such embedded lies may affect the 
verbal content of statements and subsequently, what implications this may have for 
verbal lie detection tools. This thesis aimed to address these gaps. My objectives were 
threefold. First, I aimed to advance our understanding of liars’ deception strategies, 
particularly those that help self-reported good liars evade detection. Second, I aimed 
to narrow in on how the strategic embedding of lies may affect statement quality. 
Third, I aimed to work towards a within-statement method for exploiting embedded 
lies to improve deception detection ability. These lines of inquiry are both highly 
warranted and long overdue, and will provide critical insights for credibility assessors 
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in both research and practice. What follows is a list of topics directly related to the 
scope of this thesis that warrant further investigation. 
1.1.4.1 Good liars. An interesting feature of the empirical literature on lie 
detection is that most studies have focused either on strategies and cues designed to 
improve discriminatory accuracy, or individual differences in lie detection ability (Vrij 
& Granhag, 2012). A growing body of evidence, however, indicates that the accuracy 
of detecting deception depends more on the skill or characteristics of the deceiver and 
less on the judges’ lie detection ability (Bond & DePaulo, 2008; Bond, Kahler, & 
Paolicelli, 1985; Law et al., 2018; Levine, 2016; Levine et al., 2011). Even so, only a 
handful of studies have attempted to determine individual differences in the ability to 
lie credibly (e.g., DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1979; Riggio, Tucker, & Throckmorton, 1987; 
Vrij, Granhag, & Mann, 2010; Wright, Berry & Bird, 2012, 2013). Little is known 
about what constitutes good liars, or what causes the variation in detectability. Some 
research, for example, has shown that sender demeanor explained up to 98% of the 
variance in detection accuracy (Levine et al., 2011). Other researchers have speculated 
that good liars use effective strategies to conduct their behaviour, by attempting to act 
in line with people’s beliefs about how truth-tellers behave while avoiding behaviour 
associated with liars (Vrij, Granhag, & Mann, 2010). Still, this field is in its infancy 
and additional research on what characterises those who escape detection (i.e., good 
liars) would be highly beneficial in investigative settings. In particular, digging deeper 
into good liars’ strategies could aid in the development of strategy-based interventions 
targeted at these individuals, who may be more likely to avoid detection.   
1.1.4.2 Embedded lies and the effect on statement quality. Research on 
beliefs about cues to deception and liars’ strategies suggests that the embedding of lies 
could affect their quality. Laypeople and legal professionals alike believe that 
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inconsistency is symptomatic of deception (Blair, Reimer, & Levine, 2018; 
Vredeveldt, van Koppen, & Granhag, 2014; Strömwall & Granhag, 2003). 
Accordingly, one of the main concerns of liars – and one of their most frequently 
reported strategies – is to maintain consistency (Deeb, Vrij, Hope, Mann, Granhag, & 
Lancaster, 2017; Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Doering, 2010). Moreover, liars 
tend to be more concerned with reducing the amount of within-statement inconsistency 
(i.e., inconsistencies between details within a single statement) than any other type of 
inconsistency, such as between-statement inconsistency (i.e., the level of consistency 
between different statements made by the same suspect) or statement-evidence 
inconsistency (i.e., the level of consistency between the suspect’s statement and the 
other evidence; Deeb et al., 2017, 2018). In one of the only studies to include 
statements that purposefully contained both truths and lies, Deeb et al. (2017) 
instructed liars to provide a statement containing reports about two events, one 
deceptive and the other truthful, during two interviews. When asked about their 
strategies for appearing credible, 45% of liars mentioned maintaining consistency for 
both events between statements. Moreover, many liars reported that they did so by 
strategically lowering their “baseline consistency” by including fewer repetitions when 
they reported truthfully to match the number of repetitions provided during their 
deceptive report. A plausible explanation is that liars do not want the deceptive 
component of their story to stand out from the remainder of their statement, as that 
would draw attention to their lies. Thus, if interviewees embed their lies in an 
otherwise truthful statement, their efforts to maintain consistency may also extend to 
the quality of details provided between the truthful and deceptive parts of their 
statement.  
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If liars are able to successfully maintain consistency regarding the quality of 
details provided between the lies and truths of their statement, it could mean that lies 
become, for example, more richly detailed when surrounded by truths. Embedded lies 
that are characterised by high-quality contextual and perceptual details could 
jeopardise the diagnostic accuracy and utility of verbal credibility assessment tools 
such as CBCA and RM, that are premised upon differences in the content of accounts 
based on experienced versus non-experienced events (e.g., Masip et al., 2005; Vrij, 
2005; Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010). This could be particularly problematic in 
investigative contexts given that guilty suspects who strategically embed their lies may 
go undetected by these tools.  
Despite concerns, little research has addressed how lies that are embedded into 
truthful accounts may differ from lies that are completely fabricated. One study that 
included comparisons between partially deceptive and truthful mock suspects found 
that partially deceptive statements had fewer details and were less coherent than truthful 
statements (Porter & Yuille, 1996). The authors speculated that the act of lying affected 
the quality and quantity of information provided, as opposed to the memories 
themselves. In fact, even when liars and truth-tellers carry out the same activities (but 
for either malevolent or benevolent reasons), verbal differences still occur with liars 
reporting their activities in less detail than truth-tellers (Vrij, Mann, Jundi, Hillman, & 
Hope, 2014). Additionally, research by Palena and colleagues (2018) required 
interviewees to tell the truth about one theme (event) but to lie about another, during 
one interview. Their results showed that truth-tellers reported the same amount of 
information about both themes, whereas liars reported fewer details for the theme they 
lied about compared to the theme they reported truthfully.  
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Few previous studies have also examined how lies differ when they are invented 
or based on past experiences, and to what extent this influences verbal lie detection 
tools. For instance, one previous study found that the content of liars’ and truth-tellers’ 
statements differed on RM criteria even when past experiences were used, but that RM 
was most effective when liars invented their stories rather than using previous 
experiences (Gnisci, Caso & Vrij, 2010). Similar results were also found in unpublished 
work by Valois and colleagues (2019). These authors examined whether CBCA and 
RM techniques could differentiate both fully and partially deceptive accounts from 
truthful accounts, finding that both tools were still effective even when interviewees 
incorporated truthful events into fabricated accounts. Given the scarcity of work on this 
topic, further research is warranted to understand the effects of embedded lies on 
statement quality and the subsequent consequences for the reliability of verbal 
credibility assessment tools. Such research could inform both researchers and 
practitioners whether or not the commonly used methods of credibility assessment (e.g., 
CBCA and RM) are robust against the embedding of deceptive events into otherwise 
truthful stories. 
1.1.4.3 Within-statement lie detection. On the one hand, embedded lies may 
pose a risk to the reliability of verbal credibility assessment tools, but on the other 
hand, lie detectors may be able to exploit these lies to benefit deception detection. One 
way to do so is by using the baseline technique. Baselining refers to the practice in 
which interviewers evaluate the veracity of a critical component of a statement relative 
to a baseline, or neutral, component of the interview (see Vrij, 2016 for an overview), 
and is reportedly used by some police in practice (Ewens, Vrij, Jang, & Jo, 2014; 
Frank, Yarbrough, & Ekman, 2006; Inbau et al., 2013; U.S. Department of the Army, 
2006). Previous research on baselining shows that to enhance diagnostic accuracy, the 
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baseline statement must be equivalent to the statement of interest in terms of content, 
time-frame, stakes, cognitive and emotional involvement, and questioning context 
(i.e., a comparable truth baseline; Caso, Palena, Vrij, & Gnisci, 2019; Ewens et al., 
2014; Palena, Vrij, Caso, & Orthey, 2018). Moreover, a comparable truth baseline can 
enhance truth-lie discrimination accuracy (e.g., Caso et al., 2019). It is also possible 
that, if portions of an interviewee’s statement can be verified as truthful, embedded 
lies could provide an opportunity for a within-statement baseline comparison. 
Investigators could theoretically derive a baseline statement from parts of an 
interviewee’s statement to successfully increase deception accuracy. This would have 
important implications for practitioners who may be inclined to draw such 
comparisons between corroborated and uncorroborated portions of an interviewee’s 
account. Within-statement comparisons also facilitate veracity decisions at the 
individual level, thereby overcoming common criticisms of deception research relating 
to generalisations of group-derived estimates to individual cases (e.g., Fisher, 
Medaglia, & Jeronimus, 2018). It is therefore unsurprising that researchers and 
practitioners alike have called for more research of this type (e.g., Vrij, 2016).  
1.2 The Current Thesis 
This PhD thesis provides an empirical examination of embedded lies, with the 
aim of answering three central questions: (i) which strategies do people who claim to 
be good liars report using to successfully evade detection, (ii) to what extent do 
embedded lies affect the verbal quality of statements, and (iii) can embedded lies be 
exploited to facilitate lie detection? To answer these questions, a mixed-
methodological approach was taken. Chapter 2 reports survey research examining the 
deception strategies of good liars, whereas Chapters 3, 4 and 5 contain experimental 
research testing the impact of embedded lies on the verbal quality of statements and 
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the potential for exploiting embedded lies using a within-statement lie detection 
approach. Additionally, in the general discussion (Chapter 6), an overview of the key 
findings is presented, followed by the theoretical and practical implications of my 
results for credibility assessments in academic and applied contexts. The studies are 
summarised in further detail below. 
Chapter 2 (Study I). Surveying liars as a source of insight into real-world 
deception remains an underdeveloped research avenue (e.g., Nahari et al., 2019). I 
conducted an international survey to explore the association between laypeople’s self-
reported ability to deceive and their lie frequency, characteristics, and deception 
strategies in daily life. I replicated the previous finding that a minority of individuals 
account for the majority of lies, and I found evidence that these prolific liars also 
consider themselves good liars. Additionally, my results showed that self-reported 
good liars attempt to strategically manipulate their verbal behaviour to embed lies 
within truthful information and to tell plausible, simple, and clear stories. This study 
highlights the importance of developing strategy-based interventions that account for 
the strategic embedding of lies, particularly by skilled liars.  
Chapter 3 (Study II). Although it has been acknowledged that liars prefer to 
embed lies into otherwise truthful statements, there is a scarcity of research on how 
truthful and deceptive information may interact within statements. I experimentally 
tested how interviewees strategically regulate the information they provide when their 
accounts contain both truths and lies. The findings of this study suggest that 
interviewees calibrate the richness of detail provided in the first element of their 
statement based on the veracity of the following element, with elements followed by a 
lie being less detailed than elements followed by a truth. I also found that lies become 
more detailed when they are flanked by truthful information compared to when they are 
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flanked by other lies, meaning that participants also calibrated their lies according to 
both the preceding and the following element. Liars’ strategic calibration of the detail 
richness of the truthful and deceptive components of their statements provides reason 
to believe that embedded lies could threaten the reliability of verbal credibility 
assessment tools.  
Chapter 4 (Study III). The extent to which embedded lies hinder the 
effectiveness of verbal credibility tools is largely unknown. In this study, I extended 
my paradigm to incorporate lies that were embedded into truthful information, to 
examine whether lies that were embedded into truthful stories were qualitatively 
different than lies that were part of entirely fabricated statements. Results showed that 
embedded lies did not differ from full fabrications in terms of, for example, detail 
richness and the verifiability of information, but that embedded lies could be 
distinguished from truthful statements based on detail richness and statement quality 
(i.e., clarity and plausibility). Based on the findings of this study, verbal credibility 
assessment tools based on the verbal content measured in this study appear to be robust 
against the embedding of lies. 
Chapter 5 (Study IV). Finally, I tested whether embedded lies could be 
exploited as a within-statement baseline comparison to facilitate lie detection. 
Participants read a mock suspect’s alibi statement and provided a veracity judgement 
regarding a critical two-hour period within the statement. This critical element was 
either deceptive or truthful and was embedded into an otherwise truthful story. Half of 
the participants received additional instructions to use to the surrounding truthful 
elements of the statement as a baseline. Contrary to my prediction, I found that 
instructing participants to make a within-statement baseline comparison did not 
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improve the accuracy of deception detection. These results have applied relevance 
given police officers’ potential reliance on similar techniques during investigations. 
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Chapter 2: Lie prevalence, lie 
characteristics and strategies of self-
reported good liars 
 
 
 
This chapter draws from the following manuscript: 
Verigin, B. L., Meijer, E. H., Bogaard, G., & Vrij, A. (2019). Lie prevalence, lie                
characteristics and strategies of self-reported good liars. PLoS ONE, 14, 
e0225566, doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0225566 
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2.1 Abstract 
Meta-analytic findings indicate that the success of unmasking a deceptive interaction 
relies more on the performance of the liar than on that of the lie detector. Despite this 
finding, the lie characteristics and strategies of deception that enable good liars to evade 
detection are largely unknown. I conducted a survey (n = 194) to explore the association 
between laypeople’s self-reported ability to deceive on the one hand, and their lie 
prevalence, characteristics, and deception strategies in daily life on the other. Higher 
self-reported ratings of deception ability were positively correlated with self-reports of 
telling more lies per day, telling inconsequential lies, lying to colleagues and friends, 
and communicating lies via face-to-face interactions. Results also showed that self-
reported good liars highly relied on verbal strategies of deception and they most 
commonly reported to i) embed their lies into truthful information, ii) keep the 
statement clear and simple, and iii) provide a plausible account. This study provides a 
starting point for future research exploring the meta-cognitions and patterns of skilled 
liars who may be more likely to evade detection. 
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2.2 Introduction 
Despite the importance of being able to detect deception, research has 
consistently found that people are unable to do so. In fact, the accuracy rates vary 
around chance level (e.g., Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Vrij, 2008). Lacking good lie 
detectors, a growing body of evidence indicates that the accuracy of detecting deception 
depends more on the characteristics of the deceiver and less on the lie detection ability 
of the judge (Bond & DePaulo, 2008; Bond, Kahler, & Paolicelli, 1985; Law et al., 
2018; Levine, 2016; Levine et al., 2011). The meta-analysis of Bond and DePaulo 
(2008) provided robust evidence that liars vary in their detectability. Their analysis 
showed that differences in detectability from sender to sender are more reliable than 
differences in credulity from judge to judge, with reliability coefficients of .58 and .30, 
respectively. This pattern of results was replicated by Law et al. (2018), lending support 
to the proposition that liar characteristics exert a powerful influence on lie detection 
outcomes. Moreover, Levine et al. (2011) showed that sender demeanour explained up 
to 98% of the variance in detection accuracy.  
Despite the above, only a handful of studies have attempted to determine 
individual differences in the ability to lie credibly (e.g., DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1979; 
Riggio, Tucker, & Throckmorton, 1987; Vrij, Granhag, & Mann, 2010; Wright, Berry 
& Bird, 2012, 2013). Research on what characterises those who escape detection (i.e., 
good liars) would be highly beneficial in investigative settings. Thus, a focus on the 
liar, in particular the skilled liar, was the aim of this study. Specifically, the present 
chapter reports an exploratory study addressing how self-reported deception ability is 
associated with lie prevalence and lie characteristics, and how self-reported good liars 
utilise strategies for deceiving. 
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First, the relationship between liars’ self-reported lie-telling frequency and self-
reported deception ability was investigated. The most widely cited research on 
deception prevalence estimates the frequency at an average of once or twice per day 
(DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996; see also George & Robb, 2008). 
More recent research, however, shows that the distribution of lies per day is 
considerably skewed. The majority of lies are told by only a handful of prolific liars 
(Serota & Levine, 2015; Serota, Levine, & Boster, 2010; Halevy, Shalvi, & Verschuere, 
2014). Specifically, Serota and Levine (2015) showed that in almost 3,000 participants, 
5% of people accounted for over 50% of all the lies reported within the past 24 hours, 
whereas the majority of subjects reported telling no lies at all. Several additional 
studies, as well as a reanalysis of the DePaulo et al.’s (1996) diary study, have validated 
that the majority of lies are told by a minority of people (e.g., George & Robb, 2008; 
Serota et al., 2010). These few prolific liars tend to tell more serious lies that carry 
significant consequences if detected (Serota & Levine, 2015). Also, people who self-
reported to lie more often were more prone to cheating in laboratory tasks for personal 
profit (Halevy et al., 2014). It is possible that these prolific liars also perceive 
themselves as more skilled at deceiving and tell more lies that they think will stay 
undetected, either because they believe the target will not try to find out or they believe 
they are good enough to fool the target. 
Second, this investigation examined whether characteristics of lies differ as a 
function of self-reported deception ability. The first of these characteristics is the type 
of lie. This can refer to the severity; at one end are white lies, which are relatively 
common (Feldman, Forrest, & Happ, 2002) and often used to ease social interactions 
(e.g., telling your mother-in-law that her baking is delicious when you actually dislike 
sweets; Vrij, 2007), while at the other end are bold-faced fabrications, which are less 
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common and typically serve to protect the liar (e.g., denying having had an affair; Craig, 
2003). The latter type of lies are also encountered more by the legal system (Vrij, 
Edward, Roberts, & Bull, 2000). Other variations of lies also exist, for example lies of 
omission or lies embedded into the truth; however, research has yet to explore how the 
types of lies could differ as a function of deception ability. Is it that, for example, good 
liars tend to utilise a certain type of lie which facilitates their success? The second 
characteristic is the receiver of the lie. Lies can be communicated to a variety of 
individuals ranging from family, romantic partners, and friends to strangers, colleagues, 
or authority figures. Previous research has shown that people lie less frequently in close 
relationships than in casual relationships (DePaulo & Kashy, 1998). A third 
characteristic of interest is the medium of deception, as this can also influence the 
success of one’s lie. Some liars, for instance, prefer online communication (Van Swol, 
Braun, & Kolb, 2015). This would fit the liars’ (erroneous) belief that their deception 
will leak out via behavioural cues (Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010). It is unknown, 
however, if or how good liars concentrate their lies to specific individuals or 
communicate via certain mediums. 
Finally, I examined the strategies that self-reported good liars utilise for 
successfully deceiving. The idea that liars adopt strategies to enhance the likelihood of 
successfully deceiving stems from research on impression and information 
management. Both forms of regulation relate to the idea that much of social behaviour 
is controlled for the purpose of interpersonal presentation (DePaulo, 1992; DePaulo et 
al., 2003). In legal contexts, both liars and truth-tellers are motivated to achieve a 
favourable impression and attempt to do so by regulating their speech and behaviour, 
albeit liars more so than truth-tellers (e.g., Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007). The 
topic of deceivers’ strategies has received some empirical attention (e.g., Colwell, 
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Hiscock-Anisman, Memon, Woods, & Michlik, 2006; Hartwig et al., 2007; Hartwig, 
Granhag, Strömwall, & Doering, 2010; Strömwall, Hartwig, & Granhag, 2006). For 
example, it was found that among the principal strategies of criminal offenders were 
“Staying close to the truth,” and “Not giving away information” (Strömwall, & Willén, 
2011). Researchers have also capitalised on this increased awareness of liars’ and truth-
tellers’ strategies by developing strategy-based lie detection tools. For instance, the 
Verifiability Approach (VA; Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2014a, 2014b) exploits liars’ 
strategy of providing detailed statements that are embellished with unverifiable 
information. Still, surveying expert liars as a source of insight into real-world deception 
remains a highly underdeveloped research avenue (e.g., Nahari et al., 2019).  
The purpose of this survey was to shed light on the association between self-
reported deception ability and lie prevalence and lie characteristics. Given the 
exploratory nature of this research objective, a-priori hypotheses were not specified. 
2.3 Method 
2.3.1 Participants  
The sample consisted of 194 participants (97 females; 95 males; 2 preferred not 
to say; Mage = 39.12 years, SDage = 11.43) recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(mTurk). Most participants reported being U.S. citizens (n = 175), whereas the 
remainder (n = 19) reported Indian citizenship. Participants who completed the study 
were paid 1.75 USD. Participants could participate in the study if they reported to be 
able to understand and write English at an advanced level. To ensure data quality, 
participants were required to have the mTurk Masters Qualification that is awarded to 
those who have demonstrated continual excellence across a wide range of mTurk 
projects. An additional 133 participants began the questionnaire but did not complete 
it, therefore their data were discarded. Data from nine participants were also removed 
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because of insufficient responses. The sample size (n = 194) was reached after these 
exclusions. The study was approved by the standing ethical committee. 
2.3.2 Procedure 
The online questionnaire was created on Qualtrics online platform. After 
providing informed consent, participants were provided definitions of lying and 
deception modelled from previous research (DePaulo et al., 1996; Vrij, 2008a; see 
Appendix A). Participants were asked to read these definitions carefully and to consider 
them while making responses throughout the questionnaire. In the first part of the 
questionnaire, participants reported their experience with telling lies in daily life. 
Participants reported the estimated number of lies told during the past 24 hours. 
Participants then responded to multiple-response questions about i) the types of lies told 
during the past 24 hours (options: white lies, exaggerations, lies of 
omission/concealment, lies of commission/fabrications, embedded lies; see Appendix 
A for the definitions provided to participants); ii) the receivers of their deception 
(options: family, friend, employer, colleague, authority figure, or other); and iii) the 
mediums of their deception (options: face-to-face, over the phone, social media, text 
message, email, or other). Participants also rated on a 10-point Likert scale (1 – very 
poor to 10 – excellent) “How good are you at successfully deceiving others (i.e., getting 
away with lies)?” 
The second part of the questionnaire probed the deceivers’ strategies. 
Participants provided an open-ended response to explain “In general, what strategy or 
strategies do you use when telling lies?” They were then asked to rate on a 10-point 
Likert scale (1 – not important to 10 – very important) how important they consider 
verbal strategies of deception and nonverbal strategies of deception to be for getting 
away with lies (for the definitions provided to participants, see Appendix A). Finally, 
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participants indicated which verbal strategies they use when telling lies in general from 
a predetermined set (options: reporting from previous experience, providing details the 
person cannot check [i.e., unverifiable details], telling a plausible story, etcetera). The 
options included in this list were drawn from empirical findings regarding liars’ 
strategies and cues to deception (e.g., DePaulo et al., 2003; Leins, Fisher, & Ross, 2013; 
Nahari et al., 2014a)1. After rating the predetermined set of strategies, participants were 
unable to modify their previous open-ended responses. Participants then provided 
demographic information regarding their age, sex, citizenship, ethnicity and education.2  
Qualitative analysis. To code the participants’ self-reported strategies into 
data-driven categories, the Principal Investigator performed a content analysis on the 
open-ended responses to the question probing their use of strategies. First, each 
participant’s strategy or strategies was identified, then all overlapping responses were 
combined, and these strategies were condensed into several dominant categories with 
theoretical similarities (i.e., relating to behavioural control or verbal control, etcetera). 
The Principal Investigator completed each stage of this process and the other members 
of the research team verified the final decisions by confirming the conceptual basis for 
each category. Seven categories emerged from this coding method, for example 
omitting certain information, relating to truthful information, or controlling behaviour 
(see Table 2.1). 
 To establish inter-rater reliability, the Principal Investigator, who has expertise 
with qualitative coding, extensively trained a Research Assistant. Both individuals then 
                                                 
1 Given the theme of this doctoral research, I was particularly interested in how liars might maintain 
consistency in their statements if they chose to interweave lies and truths. To tease apart how 
individuals could manipulate their statements to maintain consistency, I included two categories related 
to the strategic matching of the type and amount of details between lies and truths within statements. 
2 An additional section of the questionnaire probed laypeople’s opinions on the types of lies and 
strategies used by guilty and innocent suspects in an investigative context. Given the conceptual 
differences, this section was retained for use in a separate manuscript beyond this thesis. 
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coded a randomly selected 20% of the participants’ open-ended responses into the 
appropriate categories. A two-way mixed effects model measuring consistency (e.g., 
Koo & Li, 2016) showed that coders were highly consistent across all categories (Single 
Measures ICCs ranged from .79 to 1.00). After confirming that the coders were 
consistent, the Principal Investigator completed the remaining sample of participant 
responses and only these scores were used in the analysis.  
2.4 Results 
 This survey sought to i) replicate previous findings regarding the distribution 
skewness of lie-telling frequency; ii) isolate lie characteristics as a function of deception 
ability; and iii) explore the strategies of deception used by self-reported good liars. 
2.4.1 Lie Prevalence and Characteristics 
First, I investigated how laypeople lie in daily life by examining the frequency 
of lies, types of lies, receivers and mediums of deception within the past 24 hours. 
Overall, participants indicated telling a mean of 1.61 lies during the last 24 hours (SD 
= 2.75; range: 0-20 lies), but the distribution was non-normally distributed, with a 
skewness of 3.90 (SE = 0.18) and a kurtosis of 18.44 (SE = 0.35). The six most prolific 
liars, less than 1% of the participants, accounted for 38.5% of the lies told. Thirty-nine 
percent of the participants reported telling no lies. Figure 2.1 displays participants’ lie-
telling prevalence.  
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Figure 2.1. 
Scatterplot of participants’ self-reported lie-telling frequency during the past 24 hours. 
The distribution curve represents the mean and standard deviation of the total sample. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
I also explored participants’ endorsement of the type, recipient, and medium of 
their lies (see Figure 2.2). Participants mostly reported telling white lies, to family 
members, and via face-to-face interactions. All lie characteristics displayed non-normal 
distributions.  
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Figure 2.2. Bar charts displaying the frequency of the types, receivers, and mediums 
of deception endorsed by participants for their reported lies during the past 24 hours. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. For deception recipients, “other” refers 
to individuals such as intimate partners or strangers; for deception mediums, “other” 
refers to online platforms not included in the provided list.  
  
 
Lie prevalence and characteristics as a function of deception ability. Next, 
correlational analyses were conducted to examine the association of participants’ lie 
frequency and characteristics with their self-reported deception ability. An increase in 
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self-reported ability to deceive was positively correlated to a greater frequency of lies 
told per day, r(192) = .22, p = .002, and with higher endorsement of telling white lies 
and exaggerations within the last 24 hours (r(192) = .16, p = .023 and r(192) = .16, p = 
.027, respectively). There were no significant associations between self-reported 
deception ability and reported use of embedded lies, r(192) = .14, p = .051; lies of 
omission, r(192) = .10, p = .171; or lies of commission, r(192) = .10, p = .161. Higher 
self-reported deception ability was significantly associated with telling lies to 
colleagues, r(192) = .27, p < .001, friends, r(192) = .16, p = .026, and “other” receivers 
of deception, r(192) = .16, p = .031; however, there were no significant associations 
between self-reported ability to lie and telling lies to family, employers, or authority 
figures (r(192) = .08, p = .243; r(192) = .04, p = .558; and r(192) = .11, p = .133, 
respectively). Finally, higher values for self-reported deception ability were positively 
correlated to telling lies via face-to-face interactions, r(192) = .26, p < .001. All other 
mediums of communicating the deception were not associated with a higher reported 
ability, as follows: Via phone conversations, text messaging, social media, email, or 
“other” sources (r(192) = .13, p = .075; r(192) = .13, p = .083; r(192) = .03, p = .664; 
r(192) = .05, p = .484; r(192) = .10, p = .153, respectively).  
2.4.2 Deception Strategies of Self-Reported Good Liars3 
I was also interested in exploring the strategies of deception, particularly those 
of good liars. To test this, categories representing participants’ self-reported deception 
ability were created, using their scores from the question asking about their ability to 
deceive successfully, as follows: Scores of three and below were combined into the 
category of “Poor liars” (n = 51); scores of 4, 5, 6, and 7 were combined into the 
                                                 
3 Please note that the deception ability of liars was analysed in two ways, first as a continuous score to 
allow for more statistically powerful (correlational) analyses, and second as a categorical variable to 
allow for analysis of variance (ANOVA) testing. 
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category of “Neutral liars” (n = 75); and scores of eight and above were combined into 
the category of “Good liars” (n = 68).  
Table 2.1 provides an overview of the exact values regarding the endorsement 
of each deception strategy that emerged from the qualitative coding. To examine 
whether there were associations between the reported strategies and varying deception 
abilities, a series of chi square tests of independence were conducted on participants’ 
coded responses to the question regarding their general strategies for deceiving. No 
statistically significant associations were observed between self-reported deception 
ability and the endorsement of any strategy categories (see Table 2.1), apart from one 
exception. There was a significant association between Poor, Neutral and Good liars 
and the endorsement of using “No strategy”. Pairwise comparisons were performed 
using Dunn’s (1964) procedure with a corrected alpha level of .025 for multiple tests. 
This analysis revealed a significant difference in endorsing “No strategy” only between 
the Good and Poor liars, p = .004. However, the assumption of all expected cell 
frequencies being equal to or greater than five was not met and as such these data may 
be skewed. Based on Cohen’s (1988) guidelines, all associations were small to 
moderate (all Cramer’s Vs < .206).  
Table 2.1 
 
Endorsement of general qualitative deception strategies and descriptive statistics as 
a function of deception ability  
Interview Strategies N M SD X2 
 
Omitting certain 
information 
 
76 
 
0.39 
 
0.49 
 
χ2(2) = 3.00, p = .223, V = 
.124 
Poor liars 25 0.49 0.51  
Neutral liars 28 0.37 0.49  
Good liars 23 0.34 0.48  
 
Providing certain 
information 
 
49 
 
0.25 
 
0.44 
 
χ2(2) = 5.49, p = .064, V = 
.168 
Poor liars 7 0.14 0.35  
Neutral liars 20 0.27 0.45  
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Good liars 22 0.32 0.47  
 
Relating to truthful 
information 
 
49 
 
0.25 
 
0.44 
 
χ2(2) = 5.02, p = .081, V = 
.161 
Poor liars 7 0.14 0.35  
Neutral liars 23 0.31 0.46  
Good liars 19 0.28 0.45  
 
Behavioural control 
 
39 
 
0.20 
 
0.40 
 
χ2(2) = 2.69, p = .260, V = 
.118 
Poor liars 9 0.18 0.39  
Neutral liars 12 0.16 0.37  
Good liars 18 0.26 0.44  
 
Miscellaneous strategies 
 
44 
 
0.23 
 
0.42 
 
χ2(2) = 1.29, p = .524, V = 
.082 
Poor liars 9 0.18 0.39  
Neutral liars 17 0.23 0.42  
Good liars 18 0.26 0.44  
 
No strategy  
 
10 
 
0.05 
 
0.22 
 
χ2(2) = 8.26, p = .016, V = 
.206  
Poor liars 6 0.12 0.33  
Neutral liars 4 0.05 0.23  
Good liars 0 0 0  
 
Not Applicable 
 
15 
 
0.08 
 
0.27 
 
χ2(2) = 1.23, p = .540, V = 
.080 
Poor liars 4 0.08 0.27  
Neutral liars 4 0.05 0.23  
Good liars 7 0.10 0.31  
Note. The N column represents the number of participants who endorsed each 
strategy, both in the total sample and for Poor, Neutral and Good liars, respectively. 
The total number of endorsed strategies surpasses the sample size of 194 because 
each participant could report multiple strategies that may have fallen into more than 
one category. Higher mean values indicate a more frequent endorsement of the 
respective strategy, whereas lower mean values indicate a less frequent 
endorsement of the respective strategy. The bolded numbers represent the group 
with the highest endorsement of each strategy. 
 
Verbal and nonverbal strategies. To investigate whether participants differed 
in their endorsement of the importance of verbal versus nonverbal strategies based on 
their self-reported deception ability, two between-subjects ANOVAs were conducted 
with deception ability (Poor, Neutral, Good) on participants’ Likert scale ratings of the 
general importance of verbal and nonverbal strategies. Additionally, the data were 
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examined by calculating Bayesian ANOVAs with default prior scales, using JASP 
software. The Bayesian factors (BF; for interpretation, see Jarosz & Wiley, 2014; Lee 
& Wagenmakers, 2013) are reported in line with the guidelines by Jarosz and Wiley 
(2014), adjusted from Jeffreys (1961). For ease of interpretation, BF10 is used to 
indicate the Bayes factor as evidence in favour of the alternative hypothesis, whereas 
BF01 is used to indicate the Bayes factor as evidence in favour of the null hypothesis. 
First, there was a significant effect of self-reported deception ability on 
participants’ endorsement of the importance of verbal strategies, F(2, 191) = 5.62, p = 
.004, ηP
2 = .056; BF10 = 7.11. Post hoc comparisons indicated that Good liars rated 
verbal strategies as significantly more important than Neutral liars (Mdiff = -0.82, 95% 
CI [-1.47, -0.18], p = .009), and Poor liars (Mdiff = -0.83, 95% CI [-1.54, -0.11], p = 
.018). Participants across deception ability groups did not differ with respect to their 
endorsement of the importance of nonverbal strategies, F(2, 191) = .003, p = .997, ηP
2 
< .001; BF01 = 18.55.  
 Next, the specific verbal strategies participants reported to use when lying were 
examined. Participants were asked to indicate, from a list of ten options, which 
strategies they use. Table 2.2 provides an overview of the strategies endorsed by Poor, 
Neutral, and Good liars. Across all groups, the most frequently reported strategies were 
“Keeping the statement clear and simple” (endorsed by 17.6% of participants), “Telling 
a plausible story” (15.1% of participants), “Using avoidance/being vague about 
details” (13.2% of participants) and “Embedding the lie into an otherwise truthful 
story” (13.1% of participants). To examine differences in the endorsement of each of 
the predetermined verbal strategies across Poor, Neutral, and Good liars, a series of 
one-way between-subjects ANOVAs were conducted. Significant differences emerged 
for eight of the strategies, as follows: “Embedding the lie,” F(2, 191) = 11.97, p < .001, 
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ηP
2 = .111; BF10 = 1438.20; “Matching the amount of details in the deceptive 
component of the statement to the truthful component,” F(2, 191) = 4.77, p = .010, ηP
2 
= .048; BF10 = 3.32; “Matching the type of details of the deceptive component of the 
statement to the truthful component,” F(2, 191) = 3.56, p = .030, ηP
2 = .036; BF10 = 
1.15; “Keeping the statement clear and simple,” F(2, 191) = 5.07, p = .007, ηP
2 = .050; 
BF10 = 4.15; “Telling a plausible story,” F(2, 191) = 5.48, p = .005, ηP
2 = .054; BF10 = 
5.98; “Providing unverifiable details,” F(2, 191) = 4.95, p = .008, ηP
2 = .049; BF10 = 
3.78, and “Avoidance,” F(2, 191) = 3.79, p = .024, ηP
2 = .038; BF10 = 1.43. 
Interestingly, Good liars reported using all of the above strategies significantly more 
than Poor liars (all p’s < .025). The only exception was that Poor liars reported using 
the avoidance strategy significantly more than Good liars (p = .026). Finally, there were 
no significant differences between Good, Neutral, and Poor liars in endorsing 
“Reporting from previous experience/memory” (F(2, 191) = 1.32, p = .268, ηP
2 = .014; 
BF01 = 5.96), “Using complete fabrication” (F(2, 191) = 0.57, p = .565, ηP
2 = .006; 
BF01 = 11.36), and “Using other strategies” (F(2, 191) = 0.51, p = .600, ηP
2 = .005; 
BF01 = 11.96). See Table 2.2 for the exact values and applicable post hoc comparisons.  
Table 2.2 
 
Endorsement of predetermined deception strategies and descriptive statistics as a 
function of deception ability  
 
Interview Strategies N M SD Bonferroni 
Comparisons  
    Poor Neutral 
Keeping the statement clear 
and simple 
112     
Poor liars 20 0.39 0.49   
Neutral liars 49 0.65 0.48 .010  
Good liars 43 0.63 0.49 .025 1.00 
 
Telling a plausible story  
 
96 
    
Poor liars 17 0.33 0.48    
Neutral liars 36 0.48 0.50 .302  
Good liars 43 0.63 0.49 .004 .195 
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Avoidance 
 
84 
    
Poor liars 28 0.55 0.50   
Neutral liars 35 0.47 0.50 1.00  
Good liars 21 0.31 0.47 .026 .167 
 
Embedding the lie 
 
83 
    
Poor liars 13 0.26 0.44   
Neutral liars 26 0.35 0.48 .850  
Good liars 44 0.65 0.48 < .001 < .001 
 
Providing unverifiable 
details 
 
76 
    
Poor liars 12 0.24 0.43   
Neutral liars 29 0.39 0.49 .251  
Good liars 35 0.52 0.50 .006 .338 
 
Matching the type of details 
between lies and truths 
 
 
71 
    
Poor liars 12 0.24 0.43   
Neutral liars 27 0.36 0.48 .453  
Good liars 32 0.47 0.50 .025 .503 
 
Reporting from previous 
experience 
 
55 
    
Poor liars 10 0.20 0.40   
Neutral liars 23 0.31 0.46 .535  
Good liars 22 0.32 0.47 .387 1.00 
 
Matching the amount of 
details between lies and 
truths 
 
 
38 
    
Poor liars 5 0.10 0.30   
Neutral liars 12 0.16 0.37 1.00  
Good liars 21 0.31 0.47 .012 .072 
 
Using complete fabrication 
 
14 
    
Poor liars 2 0.04 0.20   
Neutral liars 6 0.08 0.27 1.00  
Good liars 6 0.09 0.29 .930 1.00 
 
Using other strategies 
 
7 
    
Poor liars 3 0.06 0.24   
Neutral liars 2 0.03 0.16 1.00  
Good liars 2 0.03 0.17 1.00 1.00 
Note. The N represents the number of participants who endorsed each strategy per 
group. Post hoc comparisons were conducted with the Bonferroni correction, and 
the p-values are displayed in the table. Higher mean values indicate a more frequent 
endorsement of the respective strategy, whereas lower mean values indicate a less 
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frequent endorsement of the respective strategy. The bolded numbers represent the 
significant cell comparisons. 
 
2.5 Discussion 
The results showed that self-reported good liars i) may be responsible for a 
disproportionate amount of lies in daily life, ii) tend to tell inconsequential lies, mostly 
to colleagues and friends, and generally via face-to-face interactions, and iii) highly 
rely on verbal strategies of deception, most commonly reporting to embed their lies into 
truthful information, and to keep the statement clear, simple and plausible.  
Lie Prevalence and Characteristics 
First, I replicated the finding that people lie, on average, once or twice per day, 
including its skewed distribution. Nearly 40% of all lies were reported by a few prolific 
liars. Furthermore, higher self-reported ratings of individuals’ deception ability were 
positively correlated with self-reports of: i) telling a greater number of lies per day, ii) 
telling a higher frequency of white lies and exaggerations, iii) telling the majority of 
lies to colleagues and friends or others such as romantic partners, and iv) telling the 
majority of lies via face-to-face interactions. Importantly, skewed distributions were 
also observed for the other lie characteristics, suggesting that it may be misleading to 
draw conclusions from sample means, given that this does not reflect the lying 
behaviours of the average person. A noteworthy finding is that prolific liars also 
considered themselves to be good liars.  
The finding that individuals who consider themselves good liars report mostly 
telling inconsequential lies is somewhat surprising. This deviates from the results of a 
previous study, which showed that prolific liars reported telling significantly more 
serious lies, as well as more inconsequential lies, compared to everyday liars (Serota & 
Levine, 2015). However, small, white lies are generally more common (e.g., Feldman 
et al., 2002) and people who believe they can get away with such minor falsehoods may 
Chapter 2 
35 
 
be more inclined to include them frequently in daily interactions. It is also possible that 
self-reported good liars in this sample had inflated perceptions of their own deception 
ability because they tell only trivial lies versus lies of serious consequence.  
Regarding the other lie-characteristics, a positive correlation was found between 
self-reported deception ability and telling lies to colleagues, friends and others (e.g., 
romantic partners). This variation suggests that good liars are perhaps less restricted in 
who they lie to, relative to other liars who tell more lies to casual acquaintances and 
strangers than to family and friends (e.g., DePaulo & Kashy, 1998). The results also 
showed that good liars tended to prefer telling lies face-to-face. This fits the findings of 
one of the only other studies to examine characteristics of self-reported good versus 
poor liars, which found that self-perceived good liars most commonly lied via face-to-
face interactions versus through text chat (Van Swol & Paik, 2017). This could be a 
strategic decision to deceive someone to their face, since people may expect more 
deception via online environments (e.g., Whitty & Carville, 2008). As researchers 
continue to examine the nature of lying and to search for ways of effectively detecting 
deception, it is important to recognise how certain lie characteristics may influence 
individuals’ detectability as liars.  
Deception Strategies 
I also isolated the lie-telling strategies of self-reported good liars. People who 
identified as good liars placed a higher value on verbal strategies for successfully 
deceiving. Additional inspection of the verbal strategies reported by good liars showed 
that commonly reported strategies were embedding lies into truthful information and 
keeping their statements clear, simple and plausible. In fact, good liars were more likely 
than poor liars to endorse using these strategies, as well as matching the amount and 
type of details in their lies to the truthful part/s of their story, and providing unverifiable 
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details. A common theme among these strategies is the relation to truthful information. 
This fits with the findings of previous literature, that liars typically aim to provide as 
much experienced information as possible, to the extent that they do not incriminate 
themselves (e.g., Leins et al., 2013; Nahari & Vrij, 2015). Additionally, good liars used 
plausibility as a strategy for succeeding with their lies. This reflects the findings of the 
meta-analysis by Hartwig and Bond (2011) that implausibility is one of the most robust 
correlates of deception judgements, and the results of DePaulo et al. (2003) that one of 
the strongest cues to deception is liars’ tendency to sound less plausible than truth-
tellers (d = -0.23).  
I also found that self-reported poor liars were more likely than good liars to rely 
on the avoidance strategy (i.e., being intentionally vague or avoiding mentioning certain 
details). Previous research suggests that this is one of the most common strategies used 
by guilty suspects during investigative interviews (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). 
Additionally, all liars in this study expressed behavioural strategies as being important 
for deceiving successfully. This could be explained by the widespread misconceptions 
about the associations between lying and behaviour, for example that gaze aversion, 
increased movement or sweating are behaviours symptomatic of deception (e.g., 
Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij, & Merckelbach, 2016; Vrij, 2008).  
There was inconsistency in the data between the responses to the qualitative 
strategy question and the multiple-response strategy question. Based on the qualitative 
strategy data it seems that Good, Neutral, and Poor liars do not differ in their use of 
strategies. However, robust differences emerged when participants’ endorsement of the 
predetermined strategies was evaluated. One explanation for this finding is that the task 
of generating deception strategies was too demanding for participants and they were 
unable to articulate their tactics, whereas it was a simpler task to select strategies from 
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a provided list. Ericsson and Simon (1980) suggest that inconsistencies can occur when 
asking participants to make retrospective judgements about their behaviour. This is 
particularly likely when the question posed is too vague to elicit the appropriate 
information, which might have been the case in this study. It could also be that the 
results from the multiple-response strategy question were the effect of inattentive or 
careless responding by participants, since selecting items from a list is a simple task 
(e.g., Meade & Craig, 2012). Future research should continue exploring the deception 
strategies of good liars using a variety of methodological approaches.  
2.5.1 Limitations and Future Research 
 Some methodological considerations should be addressed. First, the results of 
the present study are drawn from participants’ self-reports about their patterns of 
deception in daily life. Sources of error associated with such self-report data limit the 
ability to draw strong inferences from this study. For example, there may have been 
socially desirable responding or underreporting within the survey, given that lying is 
often perceived as a taboo behaviour. However, previous research has validated the use 
of self-report to measure lying prevalence by correlating self-reported lying with other 
measures of dishonesty (Halevy et al., 2014). Moreover, self-report data may not be as 
untrustworthy as critics argue, and in some situations, it may be the most appropriate 
methodology (Chan, 2009). This study was intended as an initial examination of the 
strategies and preferences of good liars, and surveying liars for their own perspectives 
provided a novel source of insight into their behaviour. A constraint to the 
generalisability of this research is that this survey did not establish the ground truth as 
to whether self-reported good liars are indeed skilled deceivers. Future research could 
attempt to extend these findings by examining deceivers’ lie frequency, characteristics, 
and strategies after testing their lie-telling ability within a controlled laboratory setting.  
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 Second, one of the most frequent concerns about using Amazon MTurk relates 
to low compensation and resulting motivation (e.g., Landers & Behrend, 2015). I took 
measures to ensure that the remuneration to participants was above the fair price for 
comparable experiments. Importantly, data collected through MTurk produces 
equivalent results as data collected from online and student samples (Casler, Nickel, & 
Hackett, 2013; Feitosa, Joseph, & Newman, 2015; Landers & Behrend, 2015). It speaks 
to the validity of these data, for example, that the self-reported prevalence of lies, and 
the endorsement of nonverbal deception strategies, replicates previous research.  
2.5.2 Conclusion 
In sum, this study yields new insights into the deception prevalence, 
characteristics, and strategies used by self-reported good liars. I replicated the finding 
that a minority of individuals account for the majority of lies told in daily life, and I 
provide evidence that these prolific liars also consider themselves good liars. I unveiled 
several lie characteristics of good liars: They lean towards telling inconsequential lies, 
mostly to colleagues and friends, and generally via face-to-face interactions. 
Additionally, the results showed that self-reported good liars may attempt to 
strategically manipulate their verbal behaviour to stay close to the truth and to tell a 
plausible, simple, and clear story. This study provides a starting point for further 
research on the meta-cognitions and patterns of skilled liars who may be more likely to 
evade detection in investigative settings. 
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Chapter 3: The interaction of truthful and 
deceptive information 
 
 
 
This chapter draws from the following manuscript: 
Verigin, B. L., Meijer, E. H., Vrij, A., & Zauzig, L. (2019). The interaction of truthful 
and deceptive information. Psychology, Crime and Law. 
doi: 10.1080/1068316X.2019.1669596 
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3.1 Abstract 
Research consistently shows that truthful accounts are richer in detail than deceptive 
accounts. It is unknown, however, how interviewees strategically regulate the 
information they provide when their accounts contain both truthful and deceptive 
information. This study examined how truths and lies interact, and whether 
interviewees’ self-reported strategies reflect such interactions. Participants (n = 144) 
provided one statement consisting of two elements. The veracity of these elements was 
manipulated, with participants allocated to either both truthful, both deceptive, or one 
truthful and the other deceptive conditions. Results indicated that interviewees calibrate 
the richness of detail provided in the first element of their statement based on the 
veracity of the following element. Moreover, the exploratory tests revealed that lies 
become more detailed when they are flanked by truthful information relative to when 
they are flanked by other deceptive information. The finding that truthful and deceptive 
information interacts to influence detail richness provides insight into liars’ strategic 
manipulation of information when statements contain a mixture of truths and lies. 
Strategic manipulations of this kind could potentially threaten the reliability of 
commonly used verbal lie detection tools. This study also offers insight to legal 
practitioners who rely on baseline deviations to assess credibility.  
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3.2 Introduction 
In the legal arena, ascertaining the credibility of an interviewee remains an 
integral component of the investigative process. However, credibility assessment is a 
challenging task. Decades of research indicate that humans are poor lie detectors, rarely 
achieving accuracy rates above chance level (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). One of the 
explanations for the poor lie detection performance is an overreliance on behavioural 
cues. No single behaviour, nor group of behaviours, is systematically and reliably 
indicative of deception (DePaulo et al., 2003; Hartwig & Bond, 2011; Wright & 
Wheatcroft, 2017), yet people continue to base their judgements on non-diagnostic 
behavioural cues such as gaze aversion or fidgeting (Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij, & 
Merckelbach, 2016; Strömwall, Granhag, & Hartwig, 2004).  
Research regarding verbal deception detection is more promising. A stable 
finding within the literature is that liars’ statements contain significantly fewer details 
than truth-tellers’ statements (Amado, Arce, Fariña, & Vilarino, 2016; DePaulo et al., 
2003; Vrij, 2008a). More specifically, liars’ statements contain less perceptual, spatial, 
and temporal details than truth-tellers’ statements (Vrij, 2008a, 2008b). Much of these 
findings stem from research on Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA; Steller & 
Köhnken, 1989) and Reality Monitoring (RM; Alonso-Quecuty, 1992, 1995; Johnson, 
Bush, & Mitchell, 1998; Johnson & Raye, 1981). Both CBCA and RM assume that 
recollections of personally experienced events are more detailed and coherent than 
statements about unexperienced or fabricated events (Johnson & Raye, 1981; 
Undeutsch, 1967, 1989; Vrij, 2005, 2008a) because memories of external origin (i.e., 
truthful reports) are based on perceptual processes whereas memories of internal origin 
(i.e., deceptive reports) are based on individuals’ imagination and reasoning. In 
particular, it can be reasoned that truths represent experienced memories and are more 
Chapter 3 
42 
 
likely to include perceptual, contextual and affective information and to be more clear 
and plausible than lies, which are based on imagination (Johnson & Raye, 1981).  
Statements often consist of a mixture of both truths and lies. When given the 
opportunity, liars will incorporate their deception into descriptions of previous 
experiences, so called embedded lies. Evidence for the prevalence of embedded lies 
comes from Leins, Fisher, and Ross (2013). In two studies, these authors found that the 
majority of liars – 67% in the first study and 86% in the second – chose to formulate 
their deceptive account based on a previously experienced event. Additionally, Nahari 
et al. (2014) found that of their 44 mock criminals who were instructed to provide 
deceptive statements, more than half indicated that over 20% of their statement was 
truthful. The use of embedded lies has been observed across various populations, 
whether it is research participants (Bell & DePaulo, 1996; Leins, Zimmerman, & 
Polander, 2017), non-criminals engaging in deception (DePaulo et al., 2003), or 
criminal suspects (Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007).  
The embedding of lies into otherwise truthful statements is also reflected in the 
findings from research examining the strategies interviewees adopt to appear credible 
(Clemens, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2013; Fiske & Taylor, 2008). For example, Hartwig 
and colleagues’ (2007) examination of guilty and innocent suspects’ strategies revealed 
that one of liars’ most endorsed strategies was to avoid lying by telling the truth as 
much as possible. Interviewees’ strategic attempts to be perceived as credible can be 
explained by the theory of self-regulation, a framework for understanding how people 
are motivated to control their behaviour to move away from undesired outcomes and to 
reach desired goals (Carver & Scheier, 2012; Hartwig, Granhag, & Luke, 2014). Liars 
strategically attempt to edit reality to create a plausible, logical story (Granhag, 
Strömwall, & Jonsson, 2003; Vrij, Granhag, & Mann, 2010) that may have its 
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foundations in truthful previous experiences. In contrast, innocent interviewees are 
generally forthcoming and aim to provide full, candid accounts (Hartwig et al., 2007) 
using their memory to reconstruct what happened. 
In the present study, I investigated to what extent truthful and deceptive 
information interacts to influence detail richness. The rationale for expecting truths and 
lies to interact is based on research into beliefs about cues to deception. Several studies 
have shown that people believe inconsistencies are a sign of deception (Blair, Reimer, 
& Levine, 2018; Vredeveldt, van Koppen, & Granhag, 2014). Consequently, it is not 
surprising that liars report to try to maintain consistency as a strategy to appear credible. 
In general, liars tend to be most concerned with reducing the amount of inconsistencies 
within the details of their statement compared to any other type of inconsistency (e.g., 
between-statement or statement-evidence inconsistencies; Deeb et al., 2017, 2018). As 
a result of their efforts to maintain consistency, liars tend to be equally or more 
consistent than truth-tellers (Granhag & Strömwall, 2002; Granhag et al., 2003; 
Vredeveldt et al., 2014), who – as a normal function of memory – may appear 
inconsistent as information is naturally added or forgotten (e.g., Fisher, Brewer, & 
Mitchel, 2009).  
In one of the only studies to include statements that purposefully contained both 
truths and lies, Deeb et al. (2017) instructed liars to provide a statement containing 
reports of a deceptive event and a truthful event during two interviews. When asked 
about their strategies for appearing credible, nearly half of the liars (45%) reported an 
attempt to maintain consistency across the interviews for both events. Moreover, many 
liars reported that they did so by strategically lowering their “baseline consistency” by 
including fewer repetitions in non-critical portions of the interview. In contrast, only 
8% of truth-tellers reported using the consistency strategy (Deeb et al., 2017). Given 
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liars’ focus on consistency, it is plausible that when their statements contain both 
truthful and deceptive information their efforts to maintain consistency may extend to 
the richness of information provided. 
In sum, lies are rarely complete fabrications. Yet, this is often how they are 
treated in research (Vrij, 2008a), leaving a significant gap within the deception 
literature. Examination of statements consisting of both truths and lies could account 
for individual differences in deceiving (see Vrij, 2016) and provide insight into liars’ 
verbal behaviour. As such, the objective of the current experiment was twofold. First, I 
extended the findings of Deeb et al. (2017) to examine how truths and lies interact to 
influence the consistency of detail richness across elements of a statement. Second, I 
examined to what extent such interactions are reflected in deceivers’ self-reported 
strategies. To examine this, the participants in this study provided a statement 
consisting of two elements. I manipulated the veracity of these elements, with 
participants either delivering both truthful, both deceptive, or one truthful and the other 
deceptive element. Based on the general verbal deception literature, I predicted that 
truthful elements would be richer in detail than deceptive elements (Hypothesis 1). 
There are two ways in which participants could maintain consistency. First, by 
calibrating the content of the second element of their statement to that of the first 
element. This would imply that elements preceded by a lie would be less detailed than 
elements preceded by a truth (Hypothesis 2). Second, it is also possible that participants 
would anticipate the second element, and calibrate the content of the first element to 
that of the second. The next prediction was therefore that elements followed by a lie 
would be less detailed than those followed by a truth (Hypothesis 3). Finally, the 
interaction between lies and truths was expected to be, at least in part, reflected in the 
participants’ self-reported strategies (Hypothesis 4).    
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3.3 Method 
3.3.1 Participants  
The sample consisted of 144 native-German speaking undergraduate students 
(116 females; 28 males) who participated in exchange for either course credit or a €7.50 
voucher. Participants described their ethnicity as Caucasian (n = 116), Asian (n = 5), 
Hispanic (n = 2), or ‘Other’ (n = 21). A-priori power analysis suggested that to achieve 
an 85% likelihood of detecting a true difference given a medium effect size (f = .25; 
Cohen, 1988), 146 participants were required. To allow for an equal distribution across 
conditions, 144 participants were recruited. All participants were between 18 and 26 
years old (M = 20.81, SD = 1.70), and had not yet received any information on lie-
detection or interviewing techniques in their curriculum. The study was approved by 
the standing ethical committee.  
3.3.2 Design 
The present study used a 2 (Veracity of the first element [truth, lie]) by 2 
(Veracity of the second element [truth, lie]) between-subjects factorial design. The 
primary dependent measure was the richness of detail (i.e., quantity of perceptual, 
spatial, and temporal information combined) in each of the elements separately.  
3.3.3 Procedure 
Upon arriving to the lab and providing informed consent, participants 
completed a demographic questionnaire measuring their age, sex, race, native language 
and education. Afterwards, they received a sealed envelope that contained a letter 
instructing them to complete no task, one task, or two tasks. The envelope was labelled 
only by participant number to ensure the researcher was blind to conditions during the 
interview. Task A consisted of helping to develop a promotional flyer for a café located 
at the University campus. Participants were instructed to walk across campus to the café 
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and to use the camera provided to take photos that could be included on a flyer to 
promote the café. In Task B, participants were requested to walk across campus to the 
bus stop located at the University Medical Centre. Upon arrival, they had to look for a 
woman named Michelle, of whom they were provided with a photo and informed she 
would be arriving by bus at some time that day. They were asked to wait for a minimum 
of five minutes, and to use the notepad and pen provided to write down the information 
of any buses that arrived or departed during their time. Participants were told to take a 
photo of Michelle using the camera provided, if they saw her arrive. In reality, Michelle 
was a fictitious character and participants did not encounter her during the task. 
Participants were given up to thirty-five minutes to complete their task/s. Both tasks 
were designed to ensure comparable duration and difficulty, as well as similarities 
regarding participants’ familiarity with the routes and locations. 
Participants were randomly assigned to complete no task, one task, or two tasks. 
For the participants who completed two tasks, the order was counter-balanced. Upon 
returning to the laboratory after completing their assigned task/s, participants received 
a second sealed envelope explaining they would be interviewed by the researcher about 
Tasks A and B and that they were to report and answer questions as if they had 
completed both tasks. As a result, four (between-subject) veracity conditions were 
created: Lie-Lie (participants who completed neither of the tasks), Lie-Truth and Truth-
Lie (participants who completed either Task A or Task B), and Truth-Truth 
(participants who completed both tasks). The instruction letter contained a brief 
description of what Tasks A and B entailed to allow those who did not complete one or 
both of the tasks to familiarise themselves with what they would be reporting (see 
Appendix B). This also allowed liars to know, in advance of providing their statement, 
during which element/s of their statement they were required to lie. Participants were 
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told it was important to be convincing because (i) it would prevent them from having 
to stay an additional twenty minutes to provide a written account and (ii) it would earn 
them a chance to win a €50 raffle prize. After receiving these instructions, participants 
were given ten minutes alone to prepare.  
 Next, participants underwent a structured, information-gathering style interview 
(see Appendix B). The interviews were audio recorded. At the outset of the interview, 
the researcher stated that her goal was to obtain as much information as possible, and 
to determine the participant’s credibility. The researcher also reminded participants that 
she was blind to the veracity condition, and instructed them to report as many details 
as possible, even if they did not think they were important. Each interview began with 
the elicitation of a free narrative of the participants’ activities during the first task. The 
researcher then asked a series of questions such as “What else can you tell me about 
this task?”, “How long did this task take you?”, “Did anything unexpected happen?” 
The same procedure was repeated for the second task. Afterwards, the researcher gave 
participants an opportunity to provide any missing information regarding either task. 
 Following the interview, participants completed the Post-Interview 
Questionnaire. They were asked to rate several items on 5-point Likert scales (1 – 
strongly agree to 5 – strongly disagree): (i) I felt motivated to convince the interviewer 
that I completed both tasks, (ii) I had enough time to prepare for the interview, (iii) I 
prepared my statements strategically4, (iv) I was successful in convincing the 
interviewer that I completed both tasks, (v) I think I will have to stay longer to provide 
a written statement. Participants then responded to two open-ended questions regarding 
their strategies for convincing the interviewer of their credibility and their strategic 
                                                 
4 One participant’s response to this question was not recorded via Qualtrics and therefore the results to 
this specific question are based on N = 143. 
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preparation. As well, participants responded to two multiple-response questions that 
asked them to select the verbal strategies (e.g., forthcomingness, avoidance, telling a 
plausible or clear statement, providing unverifiable details; see Table 3.5) and 
nonverbal strategies (e.g., maintaining eye contact, not fidgeting, appearing calm) they 
used when reporting each of the tasks separately. After completing the questionnaire, 
participants were debriefed and the experiment was concluded. None of the participants 
were asked to stay longer to provide a written statement and all participants were 
included in the raffle. The experiment lasted approximately one hour.  
Coding5. Verbal content analysis. The audio recorded interviews were 
transcribed verbatim. The Principal Investigator, who has expertise with verbal 
statement analysis, extensively trained two independent coders, both of whom were 
blind to the veracity of the statements. These coders assessed the statements for detail 
richness, represented by the sum of three types of detail; specifically, (1) perceptual 
details: Information about what the interviewee saw (e.g., “She wore a red blouse”), 
heard (e.g., “He talked loudly”), smelled (e.g., “It smelled like fresh cookies”), tasted 
(e.g., “It was bitter), or felt (e.g., “The sunshine was warm”) during their activities; (2) 
spatial information: Information about locations (e.g., “On the elevator”) or the spatial 
arrangement of people and/or objects (e.g., “The cups were on the bar”); and (3) 
temporal information: Information about when the activities or event happened (e.g., 
“It was 10:00am”), duration of an activity (e.g., “It took me six minutes to walk there”), 
or an explicit description of a sequence of events (e.g., “After getting my coffee, I left”). 
For each participant, the coders marked all perceptual, spatial, and temporal details 
individually in the text, and tallied the frequency of occurrence of each of these details 
                                                 
5 The primary dependent variables in this study were selected based on previous research, which has 
found that the richer an account is perceived to be in spatial, temporal and perceptual information, the 
more likely it is to be truthful (e.g., Johnson, 2006).  
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for the element of the statement dealing with Task A and Task B individually. This 
coding scheme is publically available on the Open Science Framework.  
The main coder and the second coder coded a randomly selected 20% of the 
statements in order to establish reliability. Inter-rater reliability between the two coders 
for each of the criteria in the total statements, using the two-way random effects model 
measuring consistency (e.g., Vrij, Leal, Jupe, & Harvey, 2018; Koo & Li, 2016), was 
high for perceptual information (Single Measures, Intraclass correlation coefficient, 
ICC = .91), spatial information (ICC = .89), and temporal information (ICC = .75). 
After confirming the reliability between the two coders, the second coder rated an 
additional 17 statements, and the main coder completed the remaining sample of 
participants’ statements.  
For the analyses, a total richness of detail score was calculated by summing the 
number of perceptual, spatial, and temporal details for the elements of the statement 
relating to Task A and Task B separately.  
Finally, the clarity of statements was also coded (i.e., relating to RM; Johnson 
& Raye, 1981; Vrij, 2008a)6. This criterion was scored as present (1) if the statement 
was clear, sharp and vivid and scored as absent (0) if the statement was vague and dim. 
As well, I coded for the plausibility of statements and for the presence of unexpected 
complications. The latter two variables are not reported in the manuscript because floor 
effects were observed for each variable and therefore reliable data cannot be reported.  
Strategies. To code the participants’ self-reported strategies, one main coder 
examined the open-ended responses to establish data-driven categories (see Masip & 
Herrero, 2013). This entailed a multi-stage process that began by identifying each 
                                                 
6 Inter-rater reliability between the two coders for the clarity of the total statements, using the two-way 
random effects model measuring consistency, was excellent (Single Measures, ICC = .91). 
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participant’s strategy or strategies, then grouping together overlapping responses, and 
gradually condensing these responses into key categories based on conceptual 
similarities. The Principal Investigator oversaw each stage of this process and decided 
upon the final categories. A total of eight categories emerged from this coding method 
(see Table 3.4).  
 The main coder and a second coder then coded a randomly selected 20% of the 
participants’ open-ended responses in order to establish inter-rater reliability regarding 
the classification of responses into the appropriate categories. Both coders were 
extensively trained in qualitative content analysis by the Principal Investigator. After 
confirming that the raters were consistent (Single Measures ICCs ranging from .55 to 
1.00)7, the main coder completed the remaining sample of participant responses and 
only these scores were used in the analysis.  
In addition to coding participants’ interview strategies, their self-reported 
methods of interview preparation were also examined. The same qualitative coding 
method as above was used for preparation coding. Inter-rater reliability was excellent 
(Single Measures ICCs ranging from .95 to 1.00). The main coder’s scores for the entire 
sample were used in the analyses. 
3.3.4 Analysis 
To test whether the participants calibrated the richness of details of the elements 
according to the veracity of the preceding or following element, I conducted two 2 X 2 
ANOVAs. First, I tested the effect of the first element on the second by submitting the 
richness of details in the second element to a 2 (veracity of the second element: [truth, 
lie]) X 2 (veracity of the first element: [truth, lie]) between-subjects ANOVA. Second, 
                                                 
7 The average ICC across the eight strategies categories was .80. Two categories, relating to general 
linguistic control and behavioural control had low to moderate inter-rater reliability. 
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I tested the effect of the second element on the first element by submitting the richness 
of details in the first element to a 2 (veracity of the first element: [truth, lie]) X 2 
(veracity of the second element: [truth, lie]) between-subjects ANOVA. Additionally, 
the data were examined by calculating a Bayesian ANOVA with default prior scales 
(i.e., r scale fixed effects at 0.5), using JASP. The Bayesian factors (BF; e.g., Lee & 
Wagenmakers, 2013) are reported in line with the guidelines by Jarosz and Wiley 
(2014), adjusted from Jeffreys (1961). The approximate evidence categories are as 
follows: Positive values between 1 and 3 indicate weak evidence for the alternate or 
null hypothesis, values between 3 and 10 indicate substantial evidence, values between 
10 and 20 constitutes strong or very strong evidence, and values above 20 are 
considered very strong or decisive evidence. Evidence for the interaction term was 
calculated by dividing the interaction model by the main factors (e.g., Wagenmakers et 
al., 2016). For ease of interpretation, BF10 is used to indicate the Bayes factor as 
evidence in favor of the alternative hypothesis, whereas BF01 is used to indicate the 
Bayes factor as evidence in favor of the null hypothesis. 
3.4 Results 
Motivation, Preparation, & Self-Perceived Success 
To test participants’ motivation, preparation, and self-perceived success I 
conducted a series of 2 (veracity of the first element: [truth, lie]) X 2 (veracity of the 
second element: [truth, lie] between-subjects ANOVAs. Participants reported to have 
been highly motivated (M = 1.16, SD = 0.48), with no significant differences for the 
veracity of the first or the second element, F(1, 140) = 0.03, p = .864 and F(1, 140) = 
0.27, p = .607, respectively. Participants overall endorsed that they had enough time to 
prepare for the interview (M = 1.03, SD = 0.28), with no significant differences for the 
veracity of the first or second element, F(1, 140) = 0.09, p = .763 and F(1, 140) = 0.09, 
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p = .763, respectively. Additionally, participants reported to have prepared their 
statements strategically (M = 2.45, SD = 1.08). A significant main effect emerged for 
the veracity of the first element, F(1, 140) = 5.20, p = .024, with participants who told 
deceptive first elements reporting more strategic preparation (M = 2.26, SD = 0.96) than 
participants who told truthful second elements (M = 2.65, SD = 1.16). The veracity of 
the second element also significantly affected the strategic preparation, F(1, 140) = 
11.69, p < .001, with participants who told deceptive second elements reporting more 
strategic preparation (M = 2.17, SD = 0.96) than participants who told truthful second 
elements (M = 2.75, SD = 1.12). Regarding self-perceived success, participants were 
somewhat convinced they would be required to stay longer to provide a written 
statement (M = 3.33, SD = 0.97). There was a significant effect for the veracity of the 
first element, F(1, 140) = 6.98, p = .009, meaning that participants who reported 
deceptive first elements were more likely to believe they would have to stay longer (M 
= 3.13, SD = 0.95) relative to participants who reported truthful second elements (M = 
3.54, SD = 0.11). I did not observe a significant effect of the veracity of the second 
element, F(1, 140) = 1.99, p = .161. There were no significant interaction effects (all 
p’s > .105).  
Interview Preparation Techniques 
Table 3.1 provides an overview of the data derived from the qualitative coding 
of participants’ open-ended interview preparation techniques. Across veracity 
conditions, 40.38% of the mentioned preparation techniques related to “Using 
imagination to prepare the statement” (e.g., “imagine yourself doing the tasks and/or 
walking the routes”; “visualise the locations of the tasks”; and “imagine the sequence 
of events”). Roughly one quarter of the mentioned techniques related to “Strategically 
preparing the statement and/or responses for the interview” (23.46%; e.g., “anticipate 
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the interview structure and/or questions and prepare responses accordingly”; “practice 
the interview by yourself”; “construct the chronological order of events”), and 
approximately another quarter of techniques fell into the category of “Purposefully 
manipulating the content (quantity/type of details) of the statement” (22.31%; e.g., 
“fabricate specific details to be convincing”; “relate to memory and/or previous 
experiences”; “create a plausible and/or convincing story”). An additional 13.85% of 
mentioned techniques fell into an “Other or miscellaneous” category (e.g., “control the 
quantity of preparation time”; “use information provided in the instructions”; “be 
spontaneous”). As shown in Table 3.1, participants in the Lie-Lie condition reported 
the most techniques whereas those in the Truth-Truth condition reported the least. In 
general, the frequencies of reported preparation techniques were relatively consistent 
across the different veracity conditions. 
Table 3.1 
 
  
Frequency and percentage of interview preparation techniques across veracity 
conditions  
 
  Condition  
Preparation Techniques Truth-
Truth 
Lie-Lie Truth-
Lie 
Lie-
Truth 
     
Use imagination to prepare the 
statement 
 
17 
(29.82) 
38 
(50.67) 
27 
(40.91) 
23 
(37.10) 
 
Strategically prepare the statement 
and/or responses for the interview 
16 
(28.07) 
13 
(17.33) 
15 
(22.73) 
17 
(27.42) 
     
Purposefully manipulate the content 
(quantity/type of details) of the 
statement  
 
15 
(26.32) 
12 
(17.33) 
14 
(21.21) 
16 
(25.81) 
 
Other/Miscellaneous 
 
9 
(15.79) 
11 
(14.67) 
10 
(15.15) 
6 
(9.68) 
 
Total frequency count per condition 57 75 66 62 
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Statement Clarity  
I also examined whether veracity influenced the clarity of participants’ 
accounts. A chi-square test of independence was first conducted between the clarity of 
element one and veracity condition. All expected cell frequencies were greater than 
five. There was a statistically significant association between the clarity of element one 
and veracity condition, χ2(3) = 8.89, p = .031. The association was moderately strong, 
φc = 0.25, p = .031. Crosstabulation results are presented in Table 3.2. The proportion 
of individuals whose first element of the statement was scored as clear was significantly 
higher for those in the Truth-Truth condition than for those in the Lie-Lie condition. 
Specifically, for individuals whose statement elements were both deceptive, 55.56% 
had their first element scored as unclear, whereas for individuals whose statement 
elements were both truthful, only 22.22% had their first element scored as unclear. 
Individuals whose statements contained a mixture of truthful and deceptive information 
were not significantly different in the evaluation of the clarity of their first element, 
regardless of the veracity. Thus, it appears that veracity significantly influenced the 
perceived clarity of interviewees’ first elements of statements only when they were 
reporting entirely truthfully or entirely deceptively. 
Table 3.2 
 
  
Crosstabulation of clarity score and condition for element one 
 
  Condition  
Clarity Score Truth-
Truth 
Lie-Lie Truth-
Lie 
Lie-
Truth 
     
Unclear (0) 8 20 14 12 
Note. The frequencies and percentages are reported for N = 142 as two participant’s 
scores were not recorded from the Qualtrics survey report for this question. The 
bolded numbers represent the category with the largest percentage per veracity 
condition.  
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 (-2.20) (2.60) (0.20) (-0.60) 
 
Clear (1)  28 
(2.20) 
16 
(-2.60) 
22 
(-0.20) 
24 
(0.60) 
 
Note. Adjusted residuals appear in parentheses below observed frequencies. 
Adjusted residuals in bold are those that exceed +/- 2.  
 
Next, I conducted a second chi-square test of independence between the clarity 
of element two and condition, to examine the influence of veracity on the second 
element of participants’ statements. All expected cell frequencies were greater than 
five. There was a statistically significant association between the clarity of element two 
and veracity condition, χ2(3) = 10.36, p = .016. The association was moderately strong, 
φc = 0.27, p = .016. The crosstabulation is presented in Table 3.3. The proportion of 
individuals whose second element was scored as clear was significantly higher for those 
in the Truth-Truth condition than for those in the Lie-Lie condition. Specifically, for 
individuals whose statement elements were both deceptive, 36.54% had their second 
elements scored as unclear, whereas for individuals whose elements were both truthful, 
only 15.38% had their second element scored as unclear. Individuals whose statements 
contained a mixture of truthful and deceptive information were not significantly 
different in the evaluation of the clarity of their second element. Similarly, veracity 
significantly influenced the perceived clarity of interviewees’ second elements only 
when they were reporting entirely truthfully or entirely deceptively. Thus, statements 
were not more or less clear when they were preceded by a lie versus preceded by a truth, 
unless the statement was entirely truthful or deceptive. 
 
Table 3.3 
 
  
Crosstabulation of clarity score and condition for element two 
 
  Condition  
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Clarity Score Truth-
Truth 
Lie-Lie Truth-
Lie 
Lie-
Truth 
     
Unclear (0) 
 
8 
(-2.20) 
19 
(2.40) 
16 
(1.20) 
9 
(-1.60) 
 
Clear (1)  28 
(2.20) 
17 
(-2.40) 
20 
(-1.20) 
27 
(1.60) 
 
Note. Adjusted residuals appear in parentheses below observed frequencies. 
Adjusted residuals in bold are those that exceed +/- 2.  
3.4.1 Richness of Detail 
3.4.1.1 Confirmatory analyses. To test whether elements preceded by a lie 
would be less detailed than elements preceded by a truth (Hypothesis 2) a 2 (veracity 
of the second element: [truth, lie]) X 2 (veracity of the first element: [truth, lie]) 
between-subjects ANOVA was conducted on the richness of details in the second 
element. This analysis revealed a main effect of veracity of the second element, F(1, 
140) = 10.98, p = .001, ηP
2 = .073; BF10 = 22.00, with truthful elements (M = 34.76, SD 
= 18.26, 95% CI [31.00, 38.53]) scoring higher on richness of details than deceptive 
elements (M = 25.85, SD = 14.11, 95% CI [22.09, 29.61]). The main effect of the 
veracity of the first element was not significant, F(1, 140) = 3.01, p = .085, ηP
2 = .021; 
BF01 = 1.57, meaning that the elements preceded by a lie (M = 27.97, SD = 17.07, 95% 
CI [24.21, 31.73]) were not significantly less rich in detail than elements preceded by a 
truth (M = 32.64, SD = 16.45, 95% CI [28.88, 36.40]). Finally, the interaction effect 
was also not significant, F(1, 140) = 2.00, p = .160, ηP
2 = .014; BF01 = 1.74, indicating 
the veracity of the first element had no differential effect on the richness of detail score 
of the second element. Taken together, these data support Hypothesis 1, that truthful 
elements are richer in detail than deceptive elements; however, there was no support 
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for the second hypothesis, that interviewees would calibrate the content of the second 
element to that of the first. See Figure 3.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Mean richness of details in element two as a function of veracity 
condition. Standard errors are represented by the error bars attached to each symbol. 
 
To investigate whether participants calibrated the first element according to the 
second element (Hypothesis 3) a 2 X 2 (veracity of the first element: [truth, lie] X 
veracity of the second element: [truth, lie]) between-subjects ANOVA was conducted 
on the richness of details in the first element. The main effect of veracity of the first 
element was significant, F(1, 140) = 9.45, p = .003, ηP
2 = .063; BF10 = 10.79, with 
truthful elements (M = 35.71, SD = 14.42, 95% CI [32.75, 38.67]) being richer in detail 
than deceptive elements (M = 29.19, SD = 11.27, 95% CI [26.23, 32.16]). The main 
effect of veracity of the second element was also significant, F(1, 140) = 5.60, p = .019, 
ηP
2 = .038; BF10 = 1.95, with the elements followed by a lie (M = 29.94, SD = 13.48, 
95% CI [26.98, 32.91]) scoring lower on richness of details than the elements followed 
by a truth (M = 34.96, SD = 12.73, 95% CI [32.00, 37.92]). Lastly, the interaction effect 
was not statistically significant, F(1, 140) = 1.50, p = .222, ηP
2 = .011; BF01 = 2.12, 
indicating the veracity of the second element had no differential effect on the richness 
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of detail score of the first element. Overall, there was additional support for Hypothesis 
1, that truthful elements are richer in detail than deceptive elements, and these data 
supported the third hypothesis, that interviewees would calibrate the content of the first 
element to that of the second. See Figure 3.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Mean richness of details in element one as a function of veracity 
condition. Standard errors are represented by the error bars attached to each symbol. 
 
3.4.1.2 Exploratory analyses. As I was specifically interested in how lies are 
influenced by truthful information, I also carried out two exploratory independent-
samples t-tests comparing the richness of details of lies only. I corrected for inflated 
type 1 error probability by applying a Bonferroni correction dividing the alpha of .05 
by two, resulting in a significance level of .025. I found a statistically significant 
difference in mean richness of detail score of the deceptive second element between 
those preceded by a truth versus by a lie, t(70) = -2.66, p = .010; BF10 = 4.64, with those 
preceded by a lie (M = 21.61, SD = 10.45, 95% CI [14.80, 28.42]) being significantly 
less rich in detail than those preceded by a truth (M = 30.08, SD = 16.05, 95% CI [23.27, 
36.89]). There was also a statistically significant difference in mean richness of detail 
score between deceptive first elements followed by a truth versus by a lie, t(66.34) = -
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3.03, p = .004; BF10 = 10.81, indicating that a lie followed by another lie (M = 25.39, 
SD = 9.34, 95% CI [21.20, 29.58]) was significantly less detailed than a lie followed 
by a truth (M = 33.00, SD = 11.86, 95% CI [28.81, 37.19]).  
3.4.2 Interviewees’ Strategies   
The vast majority of interviewees reported using strategies to enhance the 
likelihood that they would be perceived as credible: 95.49% of participants reported 
using one or more verbal strategies (e.g., telling a plausible story, keeping the statement 
clear and simple, reporting from previous memory; see Table 3.5) and 92.02% indicated 
using at least one nonverbal strategy (e.g., maintaining eye contact, not fidgeting, 
appearing confident, etcetera) during their interview. In this section, I will concentrate 
my reports primarily on the verbal strategies relating to my consistency hypotheses.  
Overall interview strategies. Table 3.4 provides an overview of the data 
derived from the coding of participants’ open-ended responses regarding their overall 
interview strategies. Across all veracity conditions, the most frequently mentioned 
verbal interview strategy was to “Provide a detailed and plausible account” (36.68% 
of all reported strategies). Only 7.34% of the reports fell into the category of 
“Manipulating the verbal content by maintaining consistency between the statement 
elements” (e.g., matching the type and quantity of details provided in both elements, 
adapting the deceptive story to the truthful story or vice versa, etcetera). As shown in 
Table 3.4, only participants in the Truth-Lie and Lie-Truth conditions reported 
strategies relating to maintaining consistency between their statements, with no 
significant difference in mean scores for endorsing the consistency strategy between 
these two conditions, t(70) = 0.70, p = .486; BF01 = 3.33. Thus, participants in the mixed 
veracity conditions reported similarly (albeit infrequent) strategic attempts to match the 
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consistency of their reports, whereas participants who fully lied or fully told the truth, 
did not report to use such a strategy. 
 
Table 3.4  
 
  
Frequency and percentage of overall interview strategies across veracity conditions  
 
  Condition  
Interview Strategy Truth-
Truth 
Lie-Lie Truth-
Lie 
Lie-
Truth 
     
Provide a detailed, plausible account 21 
(40.38) 
22 
(30.99) 
27 
(38.03) 
25 
(38.46) 
 
Strategic control of behaviour  5 
(9.62) 
18 
(25.35) 
12 
(16.90) 
9 
(13.85) 
 
Manipulate verbal content:  
General linguistic control 
 
1 
 (1.92) 
9 
(12.68) 
8 
(11.27) 
7 
(10.77) 
 
Manipulate verbal content:  
Include truthful details  
 
5 
 (9.62) 
11 
(15.49) 
2 
 (2.82) 
5 
 (7.69) 
Use imagination to deliver the 
statement 
 
2 
 (3.85) 
5 
 (7.04) 
5 
 (7.04) 
9 
(13.85) 
 
Manipulate verbal content:  
Maintain consistency between 
elements 
 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
11 
(15.49) 
8 
(12.31) 
No strategy 
 
7 
(13.46) 
6 
(8.45) 
4 
(5.63) 
1 
(1.54) 
 
Provide a truthful account 11 
(21.15) 
0 
(0) 
2 
 (2.82) 
1 
 (1.54) 
 
Total frequency count per condition 52 71 71 65 
     
Note. The numbers reported represent the frequency occurrence of each strategy. 
The respective percentage within each condition is presented in brackets. 
Frequencies may add up to over 36 (the number of participants in each condition) 
because each participant could report multiple strategies that may have fallen into 
one or more categories. The bolded numbers represent the categories with the two 
largest percentages per veracity condition.  
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Interview strategies for individual statement elements. I was also interested 
in interviewees’ strategies, relative to each element of the statement individually. 
Participants were asked to indicate which strategies they used for their reports of each 
Task A and Task B separately from a predetermined response set of multiple verbal 
strategies (see Table 3.5). Regarding the strategies for the second element of their 
statements, one of the most frequently endorsed strategies by participants in the Truth-
Lie condition was “Matching the amount of details in statements” (13.82% of the 
endorsed strategies among this condition). Similarly, the same matching strategy was 
the most frequently endorsed strategy by participants in the Lie-Truth condition 
(17.89% of the endorsed strategies among this condition). This provides partial support 
for the prediction that interviewees in the mixed veracity conditions would report 
having strategically calibrated their verbal content based on the veracity of the 
preceding element. Taken together, these findings contribute partial support to 
Hypothesis 4, which predicted that the interaction between lies and truths would be, at 
least in part, reflected in participants’ self-reported strategies.  
Table 3.5  
 
   
Frequency of verbal strategy endorsement for element one and two across conditions  
 
  Condition   
Interview Strategy Truth-
Truth 
Lie- 
Lie 
Truth-
Lie 
Lie-
Truth 
Total  
Strategies for Element One      
Forthcomingness 30 8 29 11 78 
Telling a plausible story 13 24 12 23 72 
Providing details the investigator cannot check 10 21 15 25 71 
Keeping the statement clear and simple 17 21 11 15 64 
Reporting from previous experience/ memory 6 22 7 19 54 
Outright fabrication 1 11 2 18 32 
Avoidance 3 12 5 10 30 
Other 2 0 0 1 3 
None 1 0 0 0 1 
Total frequency counts 83 119 81 122 405 
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Strategies for Element Two       
Telling a plausible story 8 26 29 12 75 
Providing details the investigator cannot check 10 21 21 15 67 
Keeping the statement clear and simple 13 22 13 18 66 
Forthcomingness 28 7 9 21 65 
Matching the amount of details in statements 9 13 21 22 65 
Matching the type of details in statements 8 12 19 16 55 
Reporting from previous experience/ memory 8 12 19 8 47 
Outright fabrications 5 9 13 1 28 
Avoidance 2 14 8 7 31 
Other 1 1 0 1 3 
None 2 1 0 2 5 
Total frequency counts 94 138 152 123 507 
Note. The numbers reported represent the frequency of participants who endorsed each 
strategy.  
 
3.5 Discussion 
In line with previous research (e.g., Amado et al., 2016; DePaulo et al., 2003; 
Vrij, 2008a), I found support for my hypothesis that truthful elements are richer in detail 
than deceptive elements (Hypothesis 1). I also found evidence that truthful and 
deceptive information interacts to influence detail richness: (i) Elements followed by a 
lie were less detailed than elements followed by a truth (Hypothesis 3), and (ii) 
deceptive elements became more detailed when flanked by a truth than when flanked 
by a lie.  
Participants only calibrated the detail richness of the first element based on the 
veracity of the second element. An explanation for this could be that participants knew, 
prior to the interview, whether they would be deceptive or honest about each element 
of the statement. When participants anticipated having to tell a lie in the second element 
of their statement, they may have already focused their efforts on this from the 
beginning of their interview (Jundi, Vrij, Hope, Mann, & Hillman, 2013). The directed 
attention of their cognitive resources towards ensuring the latter element of the 
statement was perceived as credible may have impaired the detail richness of the former 
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element of the statement. This directed attention could even provide an alternative 
explanation for the differences in detail richness between lies and truths. Given that 
these lies are most likely to actually consist of a mixture of truths and lies, it may not 
be memory processes, but directed attention that can account for the typical finding that 
lies are less detailed than truths.  
I did not find support for the prediction that elements preceded by a lie would 
be less detailed than elements preceded by a truth (Hypothesis 2). Yet, the exploratory 
tests of lies only did reveal that participants calibrated their lies according to both the 
preceding and the following element, with deceptive elements becoming more detailed 
when flanked by a truth than when flanked by a lie. The discrepancy between these two 
findings may mean I had insufficient power to detect the main effect and/or interaction 
in the omnibus test. This is supported by the Bayes factors of 1.57 and 1.74, supplying 
only weak evidence for the absence of such effects. However, the results of the 
exploratory tests suggest that liars were intentionally calibrating the detail richness of 
their lies to that of the truths, perhaps to avoid noticeable inconsistencies between the 
truthful and deceptive elements of the statement. Future studies could examine whether 
this effect replicates, and if so, how lies become richer in detail.  
From a motivational perspective, participants in the mixed veracity conditions 
had the same task: Providing a statement with one truthful element and one deceptive 
element. As a strategy, they could either i) boost the richness of details within the 
deceptive element making it resemble the truthful part, or ii) reduce the detail richness 
within the truthful element to make it resemble the deceptive element. My exploratory 
findings – that participants in the Truth-Lie and Lie-Truth conditions provided more 
details than participants in the Lie-Lie condition – suggest that interviewees applied the 
first strategy, increasing the detail richness of the deceptive element to match that of 
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the truthful element. More broadly, the order of presenting the truths and lies within 
statements, and not solely the veracity, could have influenced the richness of details 
provided by participants in the mixed veracity conditions. Specifically, interviewees 
may have preferred to begin by telling the truth and to integrate their lie midway 
through the statement, a pattern previously observed in a study examining deception 
within an insurance claim setting (Leal, Vrij, Nahari, & Mann, 2016). The tendency for 
insurance claimants to begin by reporting truthfully and to tell their lies as the interview 
progressed may have been an attempt to gain the investigator’s trust or to become more 
comfortable with the interview setting and investigator. There may also have been a 
cognitive reason: Beginning with a lie increases cognitive demand meaning that 
interviewees have to formulate and intentionally activate a plausible lie while 
suppressing the truth (e.g., Vrij, 2015), during an unfamiliar situation. Real-world liars 
may not be obliged to report their lie during a specific component of the interview, and 
instead could opt to strategically incorporate their lie at the beginning, middle, or end 
of their free narrative account. Future research exploring when liars choose to 
incorporate their deception could provide insight into the production of embedded lies, 
which could, more broadly, inform interviewers on how to focus their investigative 
efforts at strategically important times during interviews.  
I found only limited support for the prediction that the differences in the richness 
of details in statements would be reflected in participants’ strategies (Hypothesis 4). 
Participants in the mixed veracity conditions reported similar, albeit infrequent, 
attempts to match the consistency of their statements, and participants who fully lied or 
fully told the truth, did not utilise such a strategy. The relatively low number of 
participants reporting to have used a consistency strategy corresponds to the modest 
effect sizes found in the quantitative analyses. As argued by Ericsson and Simon (1980), 
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when asking participants to make retrospective judgements regarding their behaviour, 
inconsistencies can arise because of the experimental procedures, particularly when 
using questions that are too general to prompt the information actually sought. Since 
broad strategy questions were asked, this could have led to less accurate responses.  
This research was not without limitations. First, I examined the effect of two 
elements immediately following each other. This is appropriate to establish whether an 
effect appears, but future research could utilise a less artificial paradigm that better 
translates to applied contexts; for example, examining statements with lies and truths 
dispersed throughout. Similarly, my results may not generalise to situations in which 
the liar is unable to anticipate the exact topic or direction of the interview, such as when 
unexpected questions are asked. Perhaps in such situations, participants’ strategic 
attempts to maintain consistency would not calibrate predominantly in the direction of 
the following element. Third, I cannot conclude that participants, who were instructed 
to lie, provided lies that were entirely untruthful. In fact, in the current study, 
participants across veracity conditions reported to have strategically included truthful 
details they had drawn from previous experiences and/or memory. Hence, I am left with 
deceptive statements that may be, realistically, a combination of truths and lies, which 
may have weakened the strength of the observed effects. Indeed, participants in the 
mixed veracity conditions may have easily borrowed truthful details from their 
experience of the completed task for their descriptions of the fabricated task, whereas 
complete liars may not have experienced any event rich in detail during the allotted 
time. This strengthens the argument that liars in the mixed veracity conditions draw on 
recent truthful previous memories to calibrate their statements whereas liars who 
provide entirely deceptive accounts may not. Fourth, the focus of this study was on one 
particular aspect of statement consistency: Consistency in detail richness. It is also 
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possible that the elements of participants’ statements were consistent, or inconsistent, 
on other dimensions than detail richness, such as linguistic characteristics.  
Another consideration is that the emotional pressure experienced by liars during 
actual investigative interviews is conceivably much higher than during psychological 
experiments. Additionally, nearly 80 percent of this sample was female, a disproportion 
that may also impact the generalisability of these findings since the majority of 
perpetrators that come to the attention of the criminal justice system are male (e.g., 
Heimer & Lauritsen, 2008; U.S. Department of Justice, 2009). However, it is unlikely 
that stakes or gender robustly influenced the results since the same theoretical 
assumptions and strategies should apply across low and high stakes contexts and for 
males and females.  
I observed floor effects for the variables regarding unexpected complications 
and plausibility. One potential explanation is that the presence of complications may be 
situation-related. The low rate of reported complications in this sample could be 
because the reports were about short encounters scripted by the researcher, as opposed 
to longer activities initiated by the participant (e.g., Vrij et al., 2018). Additionally, the 
statements may have been judged as implausible since they were about unique 
experimental tasks as opposed to more believable day-to-day activities. 
The research presented in this manuscript has two practical implications. First, 
the results show that liars are able to calibrate the detail richness of their lies to that of 
their truths. This presents a possible threat to the diagnostic accuracy and utility of 
verbal credibility assessment tools if liars are able to provide lies that mirror the 
richness of detail in the truthful components of their statement (e.g., Gnisci et al., 2010; 
Leins et al., 2017; Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2012).  
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A second practical implication relates to the baseline technique. Baselining 
refers to the practice in which interviewers evaluate the veracity of a critical component 
of a statement relative to a baseline, or neutral, component of the same statement (see 
Vrij, 2016 for an overview). Baselining is frequently used by police in practice (Ewens, 
Vrij, Jang, & Jo, 2014; Frank, Yarbrough, & Ekman, 2006; Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & 
Jayne, 2013). This approach encourages starting an interview with a neutral – and often 
truthful – part. My findings indicate that interviewees calibrate the detail richness of 
the initial component of their statement based on the veracity of the following 
component. Therefore, if suspects manipulate the richness of details provided in their 
initial baseline statement to be consistent with the detail richness provided in their 
subsequent reports, then potential truth-lie differences may disappear. A possible 
preventative measure is for lie detectors to control for the event and to ask about the 
same event multiple times in different formats (e.g., first obtaining an oral account and 
then a sketch), using the first statement as a baseline (Vrij, 2016). 
3.5.1 Conclusion  
In sum, the current study addressed if and how truthful and deceptive 
information interacts to influence the richness of details in statements, and how this is 
reflected in individuals’ strategies. The results indicate that interviewees calibrate the 
richness of detail provided in the first element of their statement based on the veracity 
of the following element, however, this effect was not robustly reflected in 
interviewees’ self-reported strategies. Moreover, it seems that participants calibrate 
their lies according to both the preceding and the following element, with lies becoming 
more detailed when flanked by truthful information.  
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Chapter 4: Embedding lies into truthful 
stories  
 
 
 
This chapter draws from the following manuscript: 
Verigin, B. L., Meijer, E. H., & Vrij, A. (2019). Embedding lies into truthful stories 
does not affect their quality. Revisions submitted to Applied Cognitive 
Psychology. 
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4.1 Abstract 
When given the opportunity, liars will embed their lies into otherwise truthful statements. 
In what way this embedding affects the quality of lies, however, remains largely 
unknown. This study investigated whether lies that are embedded into truthful stories 
contain more and higher quality details than lies that are part of entirely fabricated 
statements. Participants (N = 111) were asked to provide a statement that was either 
entirely truthful, entirely fabricated, or had the fabricated element of interest embedded 
into an otherwise truthful story. Results indicated that lies embedded in a fabricated 
statement are not qualitatively different from lies embedded in an otherwise truthful 
statement. Supporting Bayes factors provided moderate to strong evidence for this 
conclusion. Accordingly, verbal credibility assessment tools based on the verbal content 
measured in this study may be robust against the embedding of lies. 
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4.2 Introduction 
Determining the credibility of a statement is a fundamental component of 
investigative and judicial decision-making, and it is therefore not surprising that 
numerous studies have examined how deceptive and truthful statements can be 
distinguished. This body of research has revealed that the accuracy of credibility 
assessments improves when judges rely only on the verbal content of a statement (Bond 
& DePaulo, 2006). Additionally, research has shown that good lie detectors report a 
higher reliance on verbal cues when making credibility judgments, whereas poor lie 
detectors tend to rely primarily on non-verbal cues (Mann, Vrij, & Bull, 2004).  
A consistent finding in the deception literature is that truthful statements contain 
more details than deceptive ones (e.g., Amado, Arce, Fariña, & Vilarino, 2016; DePaulo 
et al., 2003), with a recent meta-analysis estimating the effect size of quantity of detail 
at d = 0.55 (Amado et al., 2016). Additionally, meta-analytical findings support the 
usefulness of temporal, visual, and auditory details for differentiating truthful from false 
accounts (Masip, Sporer, Garrido, & Herrero, 2005). On the basis of these variables, 
the accuracy rate of classifying truth-tellers and liars extends well beyond chance level 
(Masip et al., 2005; Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2017). The use of details as a cue to deception 
traces back to memory research. Reality Monitoring (RM; Johnson & Raye, 1981) 
theorises that memories derived from real experiences differ in quality from memories 
based on imagination, due to differences in the cognitive processes involved in 
externally versus internally generated memories. RM suggests that memories of real 
events are acquired through perceptual processes and therefore are more likely to 
contain details relating to sensory, spatial, temporal, and affective information, and to 
be generally more clear, sharp and vivid, compared to imagined events. Similarly, 
Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA; Steller & Köhnken, 1989) is based on the 
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hypothesis that memories of personally experienced events differ in both quality (e.g., 
the logical structure or plausibility) and content (e.g., unexpected complications) to 
memories of fabricated or imagined accounts (Undeutsch, 1967, 1989). Research 
supports these theoretical rationales within lie detection contexts: Liars lack the 
memory traces truth-tellers have, leaving them unable to provide as many rich details 
as honest individuals (Masip et al., 2005; Oberlader et al., 2016; Vrij, 2008). 
More recently, researchers have designed deception detection techniques based 
on the strategies interviewees report to try to deceive successfully. An example of such 
a strategy-based technique is the Verifiability Approach (VA; Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 
2014a, 2014b). The VA works on the assumption that liars, on the one hand, are inclined 
to provide detailed statements to be perceived as cooperative and credible, but, on the 
other hand, want to minimise the chances that investigators can falsify their statement 
(Masip & Herrero, 2013; Nahari et al., 2014a). A strategy that meets both aims is to 
provide information that cannot be verified. Another example of a deception detection 
measure that is sensitive to the verbal strategies of liars and truth-tellers relates to 
common knowledge details (i.e., strongly invoked stereotypical information about 
events; Vrij, Leal, Mann et al., 2017). Whilst truth-tellers have personal, unique 
experiences of an event (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996), liars 
typically lack such information and their reports tend to be characterised by more 
general, impersonal knowledge (Sporer, 2016). An additional strategy-based measure 
relates to self-handicapping strategies (i.e., implicit or explicit justifications as to why 
someone is unable to provide certain information; Vrij, Leal, Mann et al., 2017). Liars 
are inclined to keep their stories simple; however, they are also aware that admitting a 
lack of knowledge and/or memory may generate suspicion from investigators (Ruby & 
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Brigham, 1998). A strategic solution then is to provide a justification for the failure to 
provide certain information.  
Although it has been widely acknowledged that liars prefer to embed lies into 
otherwise truthful statements (e.g., Leins, Fisher, & Ross, 2013; Nahari, 2018a; Nahari 
& Vrij, 2015; Vrij, 2008; Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010), it has not been addressed yet 
how telling embedded lies influences the verbal quality of those lies. One of the only 
previous studies to examine how lies differ when they are invented or based on past 
experiences found that the diagnostic accuracy of RM decreased when liars reported 
from previous experiences, yet liars and truth-tellers were still distinguishable even 
when such past experiences were used (Gnisci, Caso & Vrij, 2010). It remains 
unknown, however, how embedded lies are influenced by surrounding truthful 
information. Reasons to believe that the embedding of lies affects their quality stem 
from research on beliefs about cues to deception and liars’ strategies. Previous research 
suggests that laypeople and legal professionals alike believe that inconsistency is 
symptomatic of deception (Blair, Reimer, & Levine, 2018; Vredeveldt, van Koppen, & 
Granhag, 2014; Strömwall & Granhag, 2003). Accordingly, one of the main concerns 
of liars – and one of their most frequently reported strategies – is to maintain 
consistency (Deeb, Vrij, Hope, Mann, Granhag, & Lancaster, 2017; Hartwig, Granhag, 
Strömwall, & Doering, 2010). For instance, Deeb et al. (2017) instructed liars to 
provide a statement containing reports of a deceptive event and a truthful event during 
two interviews. When asked about their strategies for appearing credible, 45% of liars 
mentioned maintaining consistency for both events between statements. Specifically, 
Deeb and colleagues (2017) found that many liars reported to have maintained 
consistency by strategically lowering their “baseline consistency” by including fewer 
repetitions in specific portions of the interview.  
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It is also possible that for interviewees who embed their lies into an otherwise 
truthful statement, efforts to maintain a consistent account may extend to the type and 
richness of details provided, causing their lies to become more richly detailed when 
surrounded by truthful information. Indeed, when a fragment of deception is 
incorporated into a truthful account, the liar may be able to borrow high quality 
information, such as perceptual, contextual and verifiable details, by drawing on the 
memory traces of their truthful experience to concoct their lie. The result would be that 
the content of embedded lies more closely resembles externally generated (i.e., truthful) 
memories, as opposed to internally generated (i.e., invented) memories (e.g., Leins et 
al., 2013; Nahari et al., 2014b). Recent research compared how interviewees 
strategically regulate the information they provide when their accounts contain both 
truths and lies, finding that lies became more richly detailed when flanked by truthful 
information compared to when flanked by other lies (Chapter 3 of this thesis). If liars 
are able to effectively blend together the deceptive and truthful aspects of their story to 
provide an account consistent in the quality of information, then tools such as RM and 
CBCA may be rendered less effective. 
The present study aimed to examine the extent to which the embedding of lies 
affects their quality. Based on the different cognitive processes and strategic concerns 
of liars versus truth-tellers, I hypothesised that – in line with previous research (e.g., 
Amado et al., 2015; Masip et al., 2005; Nahari et al., 2014a, 2014b; Vrij, 2008) – 
completely truthful and completely fabricated statements would differ in number of 
details and the other characteristics outlined in Table 4.1 (Hypothesis 1). Based on my 
consistency assumption, I also predicted that lies embedded into an otherwise truthful 
statement would differ on those characteristics from lies embedded into an entirely 
fabricated statement. I anticipated that lies surrounded by truthful information would 
Chapter 4 
74 
 
be characterised by more detail richness. In addition, I expected more verifiable details, 
higher ratings of statement clarity and plausibility, and a higher proportion of 
complications (relative to common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies) 
in lies embedded in truthful information relative to lies surrounded by deceptive 
information (Hypothesis 2; see Table 4.1).  
Table 4.1 
Previous research findings regarding the content cues of liars’ and truth-tellers’ 
statements  
Veracity Cue Direction of Support Evidence Base 
Richness of Details  
 
More prevalent in truthful 
statements 
Amado et al., 2016; 
DePaulo et al., 2003; 
Masip et al., 2005; 
Nahari, 2016; 
Oberlader et al., 2016; 
Vrij, 2005, 2008. 
 
Verifiability of Details More prevalent in truthful 
statements 
Nahari, 2018b; 
Harvey, Vrij, Nahari, 
& Ludwig, 2016; 
Nahari et al., 2014a, 
2014b. 
 
Complications More prevalent in truthful 
statements  
Vrij, Leal, et al., 2017; 
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, et 
al., 2018; Vrij, Leal, 
Jupe, & Harvey, 2018; 
Vrij, Leal, Mann, et 
al., 2018. 
 
Self-handicapping    
Strategies 
More prevalent in deceptive 
statements 
Vrij, Leal, et al., 2017; 
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, et 
al., 2018; Vrij, Leal, 
Jupe, & Harvey, 2018; 
Vrij, Leal, Mann, et 
al., 2018. 
 
Common Knowledge 
Details 
More prevalent in deceptive 
statements  
Sporer, 2016; Volbert 
& Steller, 2014; Vrij, 
Leal, et al., 2017. 
 
Statement Clarity More prevalent in truthful 
statements 
Johnson and Raye, 
1981; Sporer and 
Küpper, 1995. 
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Statement Plausibility  More prevalent in truthful 
statements  
DePaulo et al., 2003; 
Leal et al., 2015; 
Zhou, Burgoon, 
Nunamaker, & 
Twitchnell, 2004. 
 
4.3 Method 
4.3.1 Participants  
The sample consisted of 111 undergraduate students, graduate students and staff 
members who were all naïve to forensic psychology (92 females; 19 males; Mage = 
21.91 years; SDage = 4.25). Participants described their ethnicity as Caucasian (n = 63), 
Black (n = 6), Asian (n = 6), or ‘Other’ (n = 36). An a-prior power analysis indicated 
that this number of participants was required to achieve an 80% likelihood of detecting 
a true difference given a medium effect size. All subjects participated in exchange for 
course credit or a £5 voucher and the opportunity to win a £50 raffle prize. Eligible 
participants were native-English speakers, aged 18 years or older. The study was 
approved by the standing ethical committee, and was pre-registered and approved via 
the Open Science Framework (OSF): http://j.mp/2D60QWu. 
4.3.2 Procedure 
Upon arriving to the lab and providing informed consent, participants 
completed a Pre-Interview Questionnaire followed by a demographic form measuring 
their age, sex, ethnicity, education and native-language. Participants then received a 
letter instructing them to imagine that they had been called into a police interview as a 
suspect in a burglary investigation, and that they must provide an alibi for their 
whereabouts during the day of the crime. Three conditions were created by providing 
participants with additional instructions. First, truth-tellers were told that they were 
innocent, and their task was to convince the interviewer of their innocence by providing 
a completely truthful alibi. In addition, two lie conditions were created. Liars were told 
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to imagine they were guilty of the hypothetical crime in question, and that they must lie 
about their whereabouts during the time of the burglary, that took place between 
1:00pm and 3:00pm. Embedded liars were instructed to embed the critical 1:00pm to 
3:00pm period in an otherwise truthful account, whereas in the Complete lie condition, 
liars were asked to fabricate the entire account (see Appendix C for the instructions). 
All participants were told it was important to be convincing because it would earn them 
a chance to win a £50 voucher and it would prevent them from having to stay an 
additional twenty minutes to provide a written account. After receiving these 
instructions, participants were given up to ten minutes alone to prepare. 
The assignment to either the Truthful, Embedded lie, or Complete lie condition 
was done in a pseudo-random manner. The first five of every fifteen participants were 
assigned to the Truth-Teller condition, whereas the remaining participants (e.g., 
participants 6 to 15, 21 to 30, etcetera) were assigned to either the Embedded lie or 
Complete lie conditions. This was done so I could match the content of the critical 
period in the two lie conditions to that in the truthful condition. Specifically, the alibi 
activity that participants were instructed to lie about was generated based on the truth-
tellers’ responses to the Pre-Interview Questionnaire that asked them to briefly 
describe, in approximately one sentence, their activities between 1:00pm to 3:00pm on 
the previous three days. The Principal Investigator  selected the activity that had the 
most unique, contextual detail and this selected activity was used for all three 
conditions, while making sure the assigned alibi activity differed from any of the liars’ 
reported events.  This pseudo-randomised design allowed us to experimentally control 
the type of activity reported and length of time between the experience and reporting 
(i.e., one, two or three days) across participants, thereby minimising confounding.  
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Next, a second researcher (blind to participants’ conditions) began the interview 
by stating that her goal was to obtain as much information as possible, and to determine 
how credible the participant’s account was. The interviewer instructed the participant 
to report as many details as possible, even if s/he did not think they were important. 
Each interview followed a structured format (see Appendix C) and was video-recorded. 
The interview began with the elicitation of a free narrative of the participants’ activities 
from morning to evening on the day in question. The researcher then asked several 
questions, such as “What else can you tell me about that day?”, “Did anything 
unexpected happen or perhaps something that did not go as planned?” Interviewees 
were also asked to report their activities during the 1:00pm to 3:00pm period 
specifically, and were given the opportunity to provide any forgotten or missing 
information at the end of the interview. 
Following the interview, participants were informed that the experimental 
portion of the study had ended, that their answers to the following questionnaire would 
not influence how their statement would be assessed, and that they should answer the 
next questions honestly. Participants then completed the Post-Interview Questionnaire, 
where they were asked to rate several items on 5-point Likert scales (1 – strongly agree 
to 5 – strongly disagree): (i) The instructions clearly explained what I needed to do, (ii) 
I had enough time to prepare for the interview, (iii) I was motivated to convince the 
interviewer that I was innocent, (iv) I was successful in convincing the interviewer that 
I was innocent, (v) I prepared my statements strategically, (vi) The interviewer was 
friendly. Next, participants evaluated the truthfulness of both the critical and general 
components of their alibi using a 10-point scale (1 – not at all truthful to 10 – completely 
truthful). Finally, participants were debriefed and the experiment was concluded. None 
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of the participants were asked to stay longer and all participants were included in the 
raffle. Participation in the study took approximately one hour.   
Coding8. Statements were assessed for the presence of spatial information (e.g., 
“Sitting in the row behind my friend”), temporal information (e.g., “It was 6:00pm”) 
and perceptual information (e.g., “I saw him sitting at the bar”; richness of detail), the 
verifiability of detail (e.g., a receipt of purchase), the clarity and plausibility of the 
statement (statement quality), and the presence of complications (e.g., missing the bus), 
common knowledge details (e.g., “We went to pick up food at the store”) and self-
handicapping strategies (e.g., “My friend did all of the planning, so I can’t remember”). 
The exact description of the verbal content coding can be found in Appendix C. Two 
scores were created for each dependent measure; the first was the sum of all occurrences 
in the entire statement, the second constituted the sum within the time period from 
1:00pm to 3:00pm. To establish reliability, the Principal Investigator and a trained 
Research Assistant evaluated a randomly selected 20% of the statements. Using the 
two-way random effects model measuring consistency (see Koo & Li, 2016), inter-rater 
reliability was high for spatial information (Single Measures, Intraclass correlation 
coefficient, ICC = .79), temporal information (ICC = .93), and perceptual information 
(ICC = .78). The combined richness of detail variable thus had excellent reliability (ICC 
= .97), as did the verifiable details variable (ICC = .91). The ICC’s were high for 
statement clarity (.90) and adequate for statement plausibility (.51), leading to a high 
reliability score for the combined statement quality variable (ICC = .87). The reliability 
                                                 
8 The primary dependent variables in this study were selected based on previous research, which has 
found that the richer an account is perceived to be in spatial, temporal and perceptual information, the 
more likely it is to be  truthful (e.g., Johnson, 2006). Moreover, I expanded my coding scheme from 
typical memory-based cues to also include recently developed variables relating to the verifiability of 
information and the proportion of complications. The latter two variables are strategy-based and have 
seen success in discriminating truths from lies (e.g., Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2014a; Vrij, Leal, Jupe, & 
Harvey, 2018). 
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for coding the presence of complications, common knowledge details and self-
handicapping strategies was also adequate (ICC’s = .60, .51, and .71, respectively). 
After confirming the reliability between the two coders, the Principal Investigator 
completed the remaining sample of participants’ statements, and only these scores were 
used in the analyses.  
4.3.3 Deviations from Preregistration 
The analyses reported here deviate from the preregistration in several ways. All 
deviations were decided upon prior to analysing the data. First, I preregistered two 
separate analyses, one based on ‘quantity of details’ (e.g., particular information 
regarding places, times, persons, objects and events) and one based on ‘the richness of 
detail’. Instead, I limit my analysis to ‘richness of detail,’ a combination of all spatial, 
temporal and perceptual information. Second, I preregistered predictions based on a 
measure combining the frequency of complications, self-handicapping strategies, and 
common-knowledge details. Instead, I coded the frequency of each cue separately and 
calculated the proportion of complications score (complications/ [complications + 
common knowledge details + self-handicapping strategies]). This is in line with 
previous literature (see, for example, Vrij, Leal, Jupe et al., 2018) and has theoretical 
advantages given that it is a within-subjects comparison that is also sensitive to the 
different verbal strategies used by liars and truth-tellers.  
4.4 Results 
Motivation, Preparation, and Self-Perceived Success 
Participants reported to have been highly motivated (M = 4.65, SD = 0.72), that 
they had enough time to prepare for the interview (M = 4.90, SD = 0.45), and that they 
had prepared their statements somewhat strategically (M = 3.85, SD = 1.08). There were 
no significant differences in motivation and preparedness between veracity conditions, 
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F(2, 108) = 0.15, p = .858, ηP
2 = .003, F(2, 108) = 1.27, p = .284, ηP
2 = .023, and F(2, 
108) = 2.31, p = .104, ηP
2 = .041, respectively. There were significant differences 
between the veracity conditions for reported success in convincing the interviewer that 
participants were innocent, F(2, 108) = 4.74, p = .011, ηP
2 = .081. Truth-tellers reported 
being the most successful (M = 4.14, SD = 0.82), followed by liars in the Embedded lie 
condition (M = 3.78, SD = 0.82), and lastly liars in the Complete lie condition (M = 
3.51, SD = 0.96). Post hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni procedure indicated that 
the mean difference in self-perceived success was only statistically significant between 
the truth-tellers and liars in the Complete lie condition (p = .008).  
4.4.1 Truthfulness Measures 
Participants were asked to rate, on a scale of one to ten (one being not at all 
truthful and ten being completely truthful) how truthful the 1:00pm to 3:00pm 
component of their alibi statement was. Significant differences emerged between the 
conditions, F(2, 108) = 136.21, p < .001, ηP
2 = .716. Truth-tellers reported that the 
critical component of their alibi was almost completely truthful (M = 9.59, SD = 0.90), 
whereas liars in the Complete lie (M = 2.46, SD = 2.57) and Embedded lie (M = 2.62, 
SD = 2.48) conditions indicated that only a small portion of their critical alibi 
component was truthful. Post hoc comparisons showed that the mean difference in 
reported truthfulness was statistically significant only between the truth-tellers and liars 
in the Complete lie condition (p < .001) and between the truth-tellers and liars in the 
Embedded lie condition (p < .001). Thus, the self-reported truthfulness of the critical 
component of interviewees’ alibi statements conformed to the instructions they 
received across conditions. 
Similarly, participants were asked to rate, on the same ten-point scale, how 
truthful their general alibi statement was, excluding the period from 1:00pm to 3:00pm. 
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Significant differences emerged between the conditions, F(2, 108) = 75.82, p < .001, 
ηP
2 = .584. Truth-tellers reported that the majority of their general alibi was truthful (M 
= 9.32, SD = 0.88). Liars in the Complete lie condition reported that a portion of their 
general alibi was truthful (M = 3.32, SD = 2.76), whereas liars in the Embedded lie 
condition reported that the majority of their general alibi was truthful (M = 7.92, SD = 
2.45). Post hoc comparisons indicated that the mean difference in reported truthfulness 
was significant between truth-tellers and liars in the Embedded lie condition (p = .002), 
between truth-tellers and liars in the Complete lie condition (p < .001) and between 
liars in the Embedded lie and liars in the Complete lie conditions (p < .001). As above, 
the self-reported truthfulness of the general component of interviewees’ alibi statements 
mostly corresponded to the instructions they received across conditions. 
My primary analyses focused on examining the characteristics between entirely 
truthful statements versus entirely fabricated statements, and between the deceptive 
1:00pm to 3:00pm period embedded in lies and embedded in truths. Additionally, two 
exploratory analyses were conducted9. I compared the characteristics of the deceptive 
1:00pm to 3:00pm period embedded in truths with the truthful 1:00pm to 3:00pm period 
also embedded into truths, and compared the truthful parts of the statement flanking the 
deceptive 1:00pm to 3:00pm period to the truthful parts of the statement flanking the 
truthful 1:00pm to 3:00pm period.  
4.4.2 Statement Characteristics  
4.4.2.1 Confirmatory hypothesis testing. Statement characteristics were 
analysed using a series of univariate between-subjects ANOVAs. Additionally, the data 
                                                 
9An alternative analysis would be to run within-participant analyses to compare truth-lie 
differences. Such analyses are methodologically inappropriate as these comparisons 
potentially confound truth-lie differences with duration and activity; specifically, the critical 
period spanned two hours, whereas a morning and evening can describe a more variable 
period, and will likely describe different activities. 
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were examined by calculating a Bayesian ANOVA with default prior scales (i.e., r scale 
fixed effects at 0.5), using JASP software. The Bayesian factors (BF; see Jarosz & 
Wiley, 2014; Lee & Wagenmakers, 2013) are reported in line with the guidelines by 
Jarosz and Wiley (2014), adjusted from Jeffreys (1961). The approximate evidence 
categories are as follows: Positive values between 1 and 3 indicate weak evidence for 
the alternate or null hypothesis, between 3 and 10 indicate substantial evidence, 
between 10 and 20 constitutes strong or very strong evidence, and scores above 20 are 
considered very strong or decisive evidence. For ease of interpretation, BF10 is used to 
indicate the Bayes factor as evidence in favour of the alternative hypothesis, whereas 
BF01 is used to indicate the Bayes factor as evidence in favour of the null hypothesis. 
I first tested Hypothesis 1 by comparing the completely truthful to the 
completely fabricated statements on i) the richness of details (i.e., amount of spatial, 
temporal, and perceptual information combined), ii) the amount of verifiable details, 
iii) the quality of statements (i.e., the clarity/plausibility), iv) the number of 
complications, common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies and v) the 
total proportion of complications (i.e., complications/[complications + common 
knowledge details + self-handicapping strategies]). Truthful statements (M = 56.46, SD 
= 27.85) scored higher on richness of details than fabricated statements (M = 41.38, SD 
= 15.66), F(1, 72) = 8.24, p = .005, ηP
2 = .103, BF10 = 7.51. Additionally, truthful 
statements (M = .30, SD = .62) contained significantly fewer self-handicapping 
strategies than fabricated statements (M = .65, SD = .86), F(1, 72) = 4.09, p = .047, ηP
2 
= .054, BF10 = 1.34. I did not observe significant effects of Veracity on the remaining 
dependent variables: The amount of verifiable details, F(1, 72) = 1.76, p = .189, ηP
2 = 
.024, BF01 = 1.96; the quality of statements, F(1, 72) = .70, p = .407, ηP
2 = .010, BF01 
= 3.08; the number of complications, F(1, 72) = 1.54 p = .219, ηP
2 = .021, BF01 = 2.15; 
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the number of common knowledge details, F(1, 72) = 2.88, p = .094, ηP
2 = .038, BF01 
= 1.22; the proportion of complications, F(1, 72) = 2.65, p = .108, ηP
2 = .036, BF01 = 
1.34.  
Next, I tested Hypothesis 2 by conducting a second series of univariate between-
subjects ANOVAs to compare the 1:00pm to 3:00pm period between the Embedded lie 
and Complete lie conditions. The exact values can be found in Table 4.2. Only one 
significant difference emerged: Liars in the Complete lie condition provided some self-
handicapping strategies (M = .11, SD = .32) during the critical portion of the alibi, 
whereas those in the Embedded lie condition did not provide any, F(1, 72) = 4.36, p = 
.040, ηP
2 = .057, BF10 = 1.53. I did not observe a significant effect for the remaining 
variables: The richness of detail, F(1, 72) = .21, p = .648, ηP
2 = .003, BF01 = 3.80; the 
amount of verifiable details, F(1, 72) = 1.26, p = .265, ηP
2 = .017, BF01 = 2.42; the 
quality of statements, F(1, 72) = .17, p = .685, ηP
2 = .002, BF01 = 3.88; the number of 
complications, F(1, 72) = 1.13, p = .292, ηP
2 = .015, BF01 = 2.57; the number of common 
knowledge details, F(1, 72) = 3.22, p = .077, ηP
2 = .043, BF01 = 1.05; the proportion of 
complications, F(1, 72) = 0.77, p = .382, ηP
2 = .011, BF01 = 2.98. In sum, my analysis 
revealed no differences between lies embedded in truths and lies embedded in lies, with 
Bayes Factors demonstrating weak to substantial evidence in favour of the null 
hypothesis. The only exception was self-handicapping strategies. 
4.4.2.2 Exploratory hypothesis testing. Having found that lies embedded in 
otherwise truthful statements did not differ from lies embedded in an otherwise 
deceptive statement, I was also interested to what extent these embedded lies could be 
distinguished from truths. I therefore conducted an exploratory analysis of the 1:00pm 
to 3:00pm period between the Embedded lie condition (lie embedded into a truthful 
statement) and the Truth-Teller condition (truth also embedded into a truthful 
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statement). The embedded truths (M = 21.22, SD = 12.33) were significantly richer in 
detail than the embedded lies (M = 15.22, SD = 9.65), F(1, 72) = 5.43, p = .023, ηP
2 = 
.070, BF10 = 2.39. Embedded truths (M = 2.95, SD = 1.10) were also rated as having 
higher statement quality than embedded lies (M = 2.35, SD = 1.25), F(1, 72) = 4.69, p 
= .034, ηP
2 = .061, BF10 = 1.76. I did not find significant differences for the remaining 
variables: The amount of verifiable details, F(1, 72) = 3.74, p = .057, ηP
2 = .049; BF01 
= 0.85; the number of complications, F(1, 72) = 0.25, p = .616, ηP
2 = .004, BF01 = 3.73; 
the number of common knowledge details, F(1, 72) = 3.12, p = .082, ηP
2 = .042, BF01 
= 1.10; the number of self-handicapping strategies, F(1, 72) = 2.06, p = .156, ηP
2 = .028, 
BF01 = 1.72; the total proportion of complications, F(1, 72) = 1.00, p = .321, ηP
2 = .014, 
BF01 = 2.71. Exact values can be found in Table 4.2. These results indicate that lies 
embedded into otherwise truthful accounts can be differentiated from truths based on 
detail richness and statement quality, although the Bayes factors indicate the evidence 
for this is weak at best. 
Table 4.2 
Exact values of dependent measure scores in the critical and general statement components 
as a function of veracity condition  
Dependent 
Variable 
Veracity 
Condition 
Statement 
Component 
Mean 
Value 
Confidence Intervals    
(95% CI) 
Richness of 
Detail*+ 
Truth-teller*+ 1:00 – 3:00pm* 21.22 [17.10, 25.33] 
  General statement+ 56.46 [47.17, 65.75] 
 Embedded liar* 1:00 – 3:00pm* 15.22 [12.00, 18.43] 
  General statement 51.68 [43.68, 59.67] 
 Complete liar+ 1:00 – 3:00pm 14.24 [11.39, 17.09] 
  General statement+ 41.38 [36.16, 46.60] 
Verifiability of 
Details 
Truth-teller 1:00 – 3:00pm 3.14 [2.29, 3.98] 
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  General statement 9.57 [7.75, 11.38] 
 Embedded liar 1:00 – 3:00pm 2.14 [1.51, 2.76] 
  General statement 8.14 [6.68, 9.60] 
 Complete liar 1:00 – 3:00pm 2.70 [1.89, 3.52] 
  General statement 8.00 [6.43, 9.57] 
Statement 
Quality* 
Truth-teller* 1:00 – 3:00pm* 2.95 [2.58, 3.31] 
  General statement 2.73 [2.37, 3.09] 
 Embedded liar* 1:00 – 3:00pm* 2.35 [1.93, 2.77] 
  General statement 2.35 [2.00, 2.70] 
 Complete liar 1:00 – 3:00pm 2.46 [2.12, 2.80] 
  General statement 2.54 [2.25, 2.83] 
Complications Truth-teller 1:00 – 3:00pm 0.22 [0.04, 0.39] 
  General statement 0.89 [0.41, 1.37] 
 Embedded liar 1:00 – 3:00pm 0.16 [0.04, 0.29] 
  General statement 1.08 [0.26, 1.90] 
 Complete liar 1:00 – 3:00pm 0.08 [-0.01, 0.17] 
  General statement 0.54 [0.23, 0.85] 
Common 
Knowledge 
details  
Truth-teller 1:00 – 3:00pm 1.41 [0.95, 1.86] 
  General statement 6.14 [4.91, 7.36] 
 Embedded liar 1:00 – 3:00pm 2.00 [1.49, 2.51] 
  General statement 7.76 [6.37, 9.14] 
 Complete liar 1:00 – 3:00pm 1.43 [1.04, 1.82] 
  General statement 7.57 [6.37, 8.77] 
Self-
handicapping 
strategies+ 
Truth-teller+ 1:00 – 3:00pm 0.05 [-0.02, 0.13] 
  General statement+ 0.30 [0.09, 0.50] 
 Embedded liar 1:00 – 3:00pm 0.00 [0.00, 0.00] 
  General statement 0.43 [0.22, 0.65] 
 Complete liar+ 1:00 – 3:00pm 0.11 [0.00, 0.21] 
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I preregistered my hypothesis that lies embedded in truths would be richer in 
detail than lies incorporated into fully fabricated accounts. It is, however, also possible 
that embedded lies affected the flanking truthful component. To investigate this, I 
conducted a series of independent samples t-tests on the dependent measures between 
the truthful portions flanking the embedded lies, and the same components flanking the 
truths. Embedded liars (M = 36.46, SD = 17.91) and truth-tellers (M = 35.24, SD = 
20.74) provided similar richness of detail in the truthful components of their statements, 
t(72) = -.27, p = .788, d = -.06, BF01 = 4.03. Similarly, I did not find significant 
differences for the remaining variables: The amount of verifiable details, t(72) = .34, p 
= .735, d = .08, BF01 = 3.96; the number of complications, t(72) = -.47, p = .639, d = -
.11, BF01 = 3.78; the number of self-handicapping strategies, t(72) = -1.15, p = .253, d 
= -.27, BF01 = 2.35; the number of common knowledge details, t(72) = -1.40, p = .165, 
d = -.33, BF01 = 1.79. These results indicate that the truthful components of statements 
were consistently rich in detail, and included similar types of detail, regardless of 
whether the statement was entirely truthful or contained an embedded lie.  
4.5 Discussion 
  General statement+ 0.65 [0.36, 0.93] 
Proportion of 
complications 
Truth-teller 1:00 – 3:00pm 0.13 [0.02, 0.23] 
  General statement 0.15 [0.06, 0.24] 
 Embedded liar 1:00 – 3:00pm 0.07 [0.00, 0.13] 
  General statement 0.13 [0.04, 0.21] 
 Complete liar 1:00 – 3:00pm 0.03 [-0.01, 0.07] 
  General statement 0.07 [0.02, 0.11] 
Note. The asterisks (*) indicate the dependent variables with statistically significant 
differences for the 1:00 to 3:00pm critical component and where these differences 
occurred. The plus signs (+) indicate the dependent variables with statistically significant 
differences for the general component and where these differences occurred. 
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This experiment investigated how the verbal content of lies was affected by 
embedding them into otherwise truthful statements. My primary hypothesis, that lies 
embedded in truthful information would be richer in details and other truth-associated 
criteria than lies that are part of completely fabricated statements, was not supported 
(Hypothesis 2). Consequently, lies embedded in otherwise truthful statements and lies 
embedded in deceptive statements could be distinguished from truths equally well. My 
finding that lies embedded in truthful statements can be differentiated from truths that 
are part of fully truthful accounts is comparable to that of Gnisci and colleagues (2010). 
It is encouraging that in both studies, even when liars incorporate truthful, previously 
experienced information into their fabrications, differences still exist between these 
deceptive and truthful elements. This has important implications for practice, as it 
means that tools used in in the field such as CBCA may be robust to the influence of 
embedded lies.  
Compared to being entirely truthful or entirely deceptive, telling a mixture of 
truths and lies could have resulted in reporting more details about the deceptive parts 
of their statement, fewer details about the truthful parts of their statement, or a 
combination of both. The lack of difference between the two types of lies suggests that 
embedded liars were not able to maintain consistency between the truthful and 
fabricated components of their statements, given that their lies did not become more 
detailed to mirror the truths. A potential explanation could be that, without specific 
knowledge of the criteria indicative of truthfulness, it would be difficult for liars to 
produce a fabricated element that is comparable in detail and quality to the truthful 
component. The only observable difference between the two types of lies was with 
regard to the presence of self-handicapping strategies; however, the observed 
significance can be explained by a floor effect meaning this result should be interpreted 
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with caution. Additionally, I found that interviewees provided similar types and 
richness of detail in the truthful components of their accounts, regardless of whether 
this component was flanked by truthful or deceptive information. This provides 
interesting insight into the high quality of statements that could potentially be provided 
by embedded liars. 
When comparing the entire statement, completely truthful accounts differed 
from fully fabricated accounts, though only with regard to the richness of detail and 
self-handicapping strategies (Hypothesis 1). Importantly, richness of detail is the most 
empirically supported cue from the literature and therefore contributes strong insights 
to my pattern of results. I failed to replicate previous findings that truthful accounts 
contain more verifiable details than deceptive ones. A potential explanation for the 
discrepancy between my findings and the general verifiability literature is that I did not 
employ the entire VA procedure (see also Bogaard, Meijer, & Van der Plas, 2019). 
Research suggests that the VA approach is most effective when, prior to their interview, 
interviewees are requested to include details that the investigator can check – what is 
known as the information protocol (Harvey et al., 2016; Nahari et al., 2014b). I opted 
not to use this protocol because this instruction may have affected liars’ and truth-
tellers’ responses and influenced the dependent measures of this experiment. 
I did not find the proportion of complications to be a diagnostic cue to veracity 
in any of the three comparisons. This may have been due to floor effects in the sample 
(truthful interviewees in this study reported on average, less than one complication, 
relative to other studies in which truthful reports typically produce an average of ten or 
more complications; e.g., Vrij, Leal, Jupe, et al., 2018; Vrij, Leal, Mann, et al., 2017). 
Regarding common knowledge details, it has been suggested that truthful interviewees 
sound scripted in their reports if they underestimate the amount and type of detailed 
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information they are required to report (Vrij, 2018). A potential reason for not observing 
significant differences with regard to the proportion of complications was due to the 
reduced time period, as well as the events, that participants were reporting in their alibi 
statement. If participants had reported longer, more dynamic statements, perhaps after 
exposure to a model statement, then the proportion of complications may have been a 
more effective cue. 
I also did not observe differences regarding the statement quality between 
completely truthful statements and completely fabricated statements when comparing 
the entire accounts, yet I did replicate this effect when comparing only the embedded 
1:00pm to 3:00pm component of the alibis. Reporting truthfully involves retrieving and 
reconstructing one’s memory, whereas constructing a lie involves fabricating a story 
based on scripted knowledge about comparable situations and events (Schank & 
Abelson, 1977). Considering that liars in this study admitted having included some 
truthful information in their statements, it is possible that this allowed their overall 
statements to come across equally as clear and plausible as honest interviewees.   
4.5.1 Limitations and Future Research 
The goal of this study was to examine embedded lies and I did so by isolating a 
critical statement of interest while manipulating the veracity of the surrounding 
components. However, the period for which the liars came up with spanned two hours. 
In real-life, liars may stay as close to the truth as possible, only fabricating or omitting 
a few key, incriminating details. Future research could extend this paradigm to 
accommodate for the dispersion of truths and lies throughout a statement and 
particularly how interviewees’ verbal content may be inconsistent when they lie and 
tell the truth in a single account. Moreover, future research should continue this research 
line to explore the verbal quality of whole statements that contain an embedded lie, 
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particularly in terms of how they may differ from entirely fabricated or truthful stories. 
Such comparisons would more likely mirror the real-world circumstances of 
investigators, who typically are not privy to the specific point within a statement at 
which an interviewee will incorporate their lie.  
A second limitation is that the self-reported truthfulness ratings revealed that 
liars instructed to fabricate their entire account reported still including some truthful 
information, and the embedded liars reported that their general statement was mostly 
truthful, but still included some lies. This may be methodologically somewhat awkward 
but it does reflect what liars typically do: Providing statements that contain a mixture 
of truths and lies (Leins et al., 2013, Leins, Zimmerman, & Polander, 2017). As such, 
the finding is high in ecological validity. Using self-report, I checked that liars did not 
engage in the assigned activity on the day in question nor on any adjacent days. 
However, this does not exclude the possibility that they engaged in the activity on an 
earlier occasion and could have drawn from this truthful experience, simply displacing 
it in time. Future research that manipulates the type of lie that interviewees provide, 
such that it cannot be readily drawn from a potential previous experience, may produce 
a different pattern of results. Another methodological adjustment that may yield 
different findings would be allowing participants to choose the topic of their report, 
rather than constraining their reports to an activity scripted by the experimenter. This 
would more appropriately reflect the circumstances of real-world liars, who are 
typically not forced to report any particular event (e.g., Leins et al., 2013).  
Another important consideration relates to ground truth. This study involved 
interviewees reporting self-generated stories within a naturalistic alibi scenario. I 
established partial ground truth via my truthfulness measures, which indicated that 
participants largely conformed to the experimental instructions. I was unable to further 
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corroborate participants’ accounts, however. Although the current experiment ensured 
that participants were emotionally engaged with the experimental process and similar 
paradigms have been used extensively by deception researchers (e.g., Elntib, Wagstaff, 
& Wheatcroft, 2015; Masip et al., 2005; Sporer & Sharman, 2006), future research 
would benefit from attempting to establish ground truth. A possible way to do so 
without having to resort to artificial mock crime procedures would be to require 
participants to wear a video-recording device for a certain duration of hours over a 
period of several days. Then, the researcher could verify the veracity of the 
interviewees’ reports in the subsequent interview (e.g., Meixner & Rosenfeld, 2014). A 
drawback of this design, however, is the requirement for extensive resources.  
4.5.2 Conclusion 
In sum, I showed that truthful statements could be distinguished from fabricated 
ones, and that lies embedded in otherwise truthful statements did not differ from lies 
embedded in deceptive statements. I also showed that lies embedded in otherwise 
truthful statements could be distinguished from truths embedded in truthful statements. 
Accordingly, verbal credibility assessment tools based on verbal content measured in 
this study may be robust against the embedding of lies.  
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Chapter 5: A within-statement baseline 
comparison for detecting lies 
 
 
 
 
This chapter draws from the following manuscript: 
Verigin, B. L., Meijer, E. H., & Vrij, A. (2019). A within-statement baseline 
comparison for detecting lies. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
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5.1 Abstract 
The comparable baseline technique can increase observers’ ability to distinguish truth-
tellers from liars. This study further investigated whether a within-statement verbal 
baseline comparison could enhance discriminatory accuracy. Participants (n = 148) 
read an alibi statement of a mock suspect and provided a veracity judgement regarding 
a critical two-hour period within the alibi statement. This critical element was either 
deceptive or truthful and was embedded into an otherwise truthful story. Half of the 
participants received additional instructions to use the surrounding truthful elements 
of the statement as a baseline. Instructing participants to make a within-statement 
baseline comparison did not improve the accuracy of credibility assessments. The 
finding that a within-statement verbal baseline comparison may not be an effective lie 
detection tool has applied relevance given police officers’ potential reliance on this 
type of technique during investigations. Future research should prioritise verbal 
baselining techniques that control for both the individual and the situation. 
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5.2 Introduction 
Deception researchers typically report their results at group level. For example, 
research shows that, on average, liars’ statements are typically less richly detailed than 
those of their truth-telling counterparts (e.g., Amado, Arce, Fariña, & Vilarino, 2016; 
DePaulo et al., 2003; Luke, 2019). Legal practitioners, in contrast, are rarely interested 
in group level statistics. They need to know if an interviewee in the case at hand is being 
deceptive or honest. However, group-derived estimates do not always reliably 
generalise to individual cases (Fisher, Medaglia, & Jeronimus, 2018; Faigman, 
Monahan, & Slobogin, 2014). 
One option that facilitates decisions at the individual level is to include a within-
individual comparison (see Vrij, 2016 for a discussion). One such method, reportedly 
used in practice by some North American police (Ewens, Vrij, Jang, & Jo, 2014; Frank, 
Yarbrough, & Ekman, 2006; Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & Jayne, 2013; U.S. Department of 
the Army, 2006) is the baseline technique. With this technique, interviewers evaluate 
an interviewee’s “statement of interest” (i.e., part of the statement for which veracity is 
being assessed) relative to a baseline statement (i.e., part of the interview which is 
known to be truthful). Deception is then determined by looking for deviations from this 
established baseline. In fact, 71% of experienced U.S. human intelligence interviewers 
reported to rely on deviations from baseline to detect deception (Russano, Narchet, 
Kleinman, & Meissner, 2014).  
A reason to believe in the efficacy of baselining as a lie detection technique 
derives from early research on the relationship between familiarity and deception. A 
handful of studies from the late 20th century examined how the level of familiarity 
between a liar and an observer affects lie detection outcomes (e.g., Brandt, Miller, & 
Hocking, 1980a, 1980b, 1982; Comadena, 1982; Ekman & Friesen, 1974; Feeley, 
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deTurck, & Young, 1995; Hayano, 1980; McComack & Parks, 1986). Collectively, this 
research showed that veracity judgements were most accurate when observers had the 
opportunity to become familiar with the respondents’ truthful communication style. For 
example, Feeley et al. (1995) had participants judge the veracity of truthful and 
deceptive communicators after viewing between zero to four exposures of the sender. 
They found a positive linear relationship between the amount of familiarity with the 
sender and judges’ accuracy. In their meta-analysis, Bond and DePaulo (2006) 
compared deception detection accuracy between judges who had, versus those who had 
not, been previously exposed to the individual they were evaluating. Their results 
showed that when judges had been previously exposed to a target, this baseline 
exposure or baseline familiarity significantly improved their detection accuracy from 
52% to 56%. These results offer important insights for the benefit of baseline familiarity 
when the sender is familiar to the receiver, such as in personal relationships. 
In police interviews, interviewer and target are more likely to be strangers, and 
another option is to use part of the same interview as a statement. Ewens and colleagues 
(2014) examined the behavioural patterns of interviewees in response to non-
threatening “small-talk” baseline questions prior to an interview compared to their 
responses during target periods of an investigative interview. The results indicated no 
effect of the baseline: Both truthful and deceptive interviewees behaved equally 
different between the small-talk baseline and investigative part of the interview. Palena, 
Vrij, Caso, and Orthey (2018) examined two types of baselines: An initial small-talk 
baseline and a comparable truth baseline (i.e., a set of questions designed to be 
comparable with the investigative phase). They compared similarities in participants’ 
nonverbal and verbal behaviours when responding to baseline and investigative 
questions, using the two types of baselines. They found that liars and truth-tellers in the 
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small-talk baseline condition did not differ in their level of similarly between the 
baseline and investigative questions, adding further evidence to the ineffectiveness of 
this approach. Their results did, however, reveal that truth-tellers showed significantly 
more similarity than liars in the comparable baseline condition, though only in terms of 
spatial details. Finally, Caso, Palena, Vrij, and Gnisci (2019) looked at the effects of 
small-talk and comparable truth baselines on observers’ deception detection accuracy. 
This study revealed that i) participants in the comparable truth condition outperformed 
those in the small-talk condition in terms of total accuracy rates (d = .49), and ii) only 
observers who used a comparable truth baseline performed significantly better than 
chance levels in their total accuracy for distinguishing truth-tellers from liars (d = .34).  
Taken together, previous research on baselining shows that to enhance 
diagnostic accuracy, a comparable truth baseline should be used. That is, the baseline 
statement must be equivalent to the statement of interest in terms of content, time-
frame, stakes, cognitive and emotional involvement, and questioning context (Caso et 
al., 2019; Ewens et al., 2014; Palena et al., 2018; Vrij, 2008). Despite the importance 
of the baseline statement being equivalent to the target portion of the statement, each 
of the previous studies compared the effect of an initial, separate baseline statement to 
a target portion of an investigative interview. Investigating whether a baseline statement 
could be derived from parts of the interviewee’s statement could have important 
implications for practitioners who may be inclined to draw such comparisons between 
corroborated and uncorroborated portions of an interviewee’s account. 
5.2.1 The Present Study 
The objective of the present study was to investigate whether introducing a 
within-statement baseline comparison could improve the accuracy of participants’ 
veracity judgements. Participants read the alibi statement of a mock suspect and 
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provided a veracity judgement regarding a critical two-hour period within the alibi 
statement. This critical element was either deceptive or truthful and was embedded into 
an otherwise truthful story. I examined if providing an instruction to use a comparable 
baseline (i.e., informing participants that all information, with the exception of the 
critical statement, has been confirmed to be truthful) could enhance judges’ detection 
accuracy. I hypothesised that participants who received the baseline instruction would 
have more accurate veracity judgements than participants who did not receive the 
baseline instruction.  
5.3 Method 
5.3.1 Participants  
The sample consisted of 148 adult participants (120 females; 28 males) between 
the ages of 17 and 45 years (Mage = 20.53 years, SDage = 3.17). The nationality of 
participants was German (n = 80), Dutch (n = 27), British (n = 1), or ‘Other’ (n = 40). 
The sample size was calculated prior to data collection by multiplying the total number 
of statements (n = 74) by two, ensuring that each statement was evaluated twice. Given 
this sample size, and an α of .05, I had an 85.6% chance of rejecting the null hypothesis 
if there was a medium effect size (f = .25; Cohen, 1988). Only participants who were 
proficient in reading and writing English were eligible for the study. They were 
compensated with either course credit or a €5 voucher. The study was approved by the 
standing ethical committee. The study was pre-registered and approved via the Open 
Science Framework (http://j.mp/2IjvL51).  
5.3.2 Statements 
The statements that participants evaluated were previously collected by the 
Principal Investigator (see Chapter 4). These statements represent accounts provided 
by student research participants who were instructed to provide alibi statements to 
Chapter 5 
98 
 
convince an interviewer that they were innocent of a hypothetical crime. For the present 
study, I incorporated the statements that were entirely truthful recollections of an 
interviewee’s events on a particular day (n = 37), and the statements that were truthful 
accounts containing a lie from 1:00pm to 3:00pm (n = 37). For the latter group, 
interviewees truthfully reported their events on the day in question, before 1:00pm and 
after 3:00pm; however, during the critical element (i.e., between 1:00pm and 3:00pm) 
they were instructed to fabricate a particular activity. Thus, participants in the current 
study assessed one transcript that contained a critical element that was either deceptive 
(i.e., embedded into an otherwise truthful account) or truthful (i.e., part of an entirely 
truthful account). Each of the 74 statements was evaluated twice by two independent 
participants. 
Ground truth. I attempted to establish partial ground truth of the statements by 
asking participants to self-report the truthfulness of both components of their statement 
(on a scale of one to ten, one being not at all truthful and ten being completely truthful). 
Truth-tellers reported that both their general alibi (M = 9.32, SD = 0.88) and the critical 
component (M = 9.59, SD = 0.90) were almost completely truthful. Those who provided 
the embedded lie reported that their general alibi was almost entirely truthful (M = 7.92, 
SD = 2.45) whereas the critical component was mostly deceptive (M = 2.62, SD = 2.48). 
The complete statistical analyses are reported in Chapter 4 (pp. 80-81). Overall, 
interviewees appeared to have largely conformed to the instructions they received 
across conditions.  
5.3.3 Design  
The experiment followed a between-subjects factorial design: 2 (Baseline 
instruction: Present vs. Absent) x 2 (Veracity of the critical element: Truth vs. Lie). 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. To mimic real-life 
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cases in which investigators typically only have one statement to assess, each 
participant judged only one statement. The dependent measure was the accuracy of 
participants’ deception judgements. Two accuracy scores were created by recoding 
participants’ binary and Likert scale truth-lie judgements with the ground truth of the 
veracity of the critical element.  
5.3.4 Procedure 
 Participants arrived at the lab and provided informed consent. Afterwards, they 
received a detailed instruction letter (see Appendix D) explaining that their task was to 
imagine themselves in the role of a police detective who was investigating a violent 
burglary that occurred recently. Participants were told that the prime suspect was 
interviewed by police and had provided an alibi statement for the entire day in question, 
from morning to evening. They were informed that the critical element of the alibi was 
from 1:00pm to 3:00pm on this day. The critical element within each transcript was 
highlighted yellow to ensure this was clearly understood. Participants were instructed 
to read the entire statement carefully, but to make an assessment regarding the veracity 
of only the highlighted critical element. All participants were told that it was important 
to make the correct decision because it would earn them a chance to win €50 from a 
raffle. 
Participants who were assigned to the Baseline-present condition received 
additional instructions prior to reading the transcript. They were informed that as the 
lead investigator, they had access to other sources of information for the case and this 
collateral evidence confirmed that the “general” alibi statement, before 1:00pm and 
after 3:00pm was truthful. Participants were instructed to use this knowledge to 
compare the “general” portion of the interviewees’ alibi to the “critical element from 
1:00pm to 3:00pm”. They were asked to try to identify any patterns or changes in the 
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verbal content between the general alibi and the critical element that may indicate how 
credible the suspect’s account was during the highlighted critical element.  
After reading the instructions, all participants received one written transcript of 
a suspect’s alibi statement and they were given up to ten minutes to read it. 
Subsequently, participants were prompted to provide a binary deception judgement (lie 
or truth) regarding the highlighted critical element. They also rated their deception 
judgment on a 7-point Likert scale (1 – completely truthful to 7 – completely deceptive). 
Once completed, participants responded to a short questionnaire that included a 
motivation check, general study experience questions10, and demographics information 
(i.e., age, sex, race, native language and education). Upon finishing, participants were 
debriefed and the study was concluded. All participants were entered into the €50 raffle, 
regardless of the accuracy of their veracity judgments. Participation in the study took 
approximately thirty minutes. 
 To evaluate the accuracy of participants’ veracity judgements, their scores were 
recoded in two ways. First, I recoded the binary truth-lie judgements with the ground 
truth of the veracity of the critical element. A score of 0 was assigned to incorrect 
veracity decisions whereas a score of 1 represented correct veracity decisions. Second, 
the Likert scale truth-lie judgements were organized based on the ground truth of the 
veracity of the critical element. Specifically, I mirrored the Likert values between 
conditions such that the following values were equal: one and seven, two and six, three 
and five, and four was neutral. In this way, all lower scores indicated more correct 
veracity judgements and all higher scores indicated less correct judgements.  
                                                 
10 The general study experience questions were included as part of a larger multi-laboratory study on 
the subjective experience of psychology experiments.   
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Lastly, I also investigated participants’ self-reported cues to perceived 
deception. The complete report of this coding and analysis can be found in Appendix 
D, and a brief overview of the findings will be provided in the Results section below. 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Motivation, Experimental Realism, and Self-Perceived Lie Detection Ability 
 On a series of 7-point Likert scales (1 = not at all, 7 = very), participants reported 
that they were highly motivated (M = 6.29, SD = 0.87), they answered the questions 
honestly (M = 6.82, SD = 0.45), the instructions were very clear (M = 6.49, SD = 0.80), 
and the alibi statements were realistic (M = 5.39, SD = 1.24), with no significant 
differences between baseline and veracity conditions (F(3, 144) = 1.07, p = .366, ηP
2 = 
.022; F(3, 144) = 0.29, p = .830, ηP
2 = .006; F(3, 144) = 1.26, p = .290, ηP
2 = .026; and 
F(3, 144) = 0.35, p = .789, ηP
2 = .007, respectively). Additionally, participants self-
reported to be average lie detectors (M = 4.10, SD = 1.14), with no significant 
differences between baseline and veracity conditions, F(3, 144) = 1.11, p = .345, ηP
2 = 
.023. 
5.4.2 Accuracy of Deception Judgements 
The accuracy of participants’ deception judgements was analysed using two-
way between subjects ANOVAs. In addition, I conducted Bayesian ANOVAs with 
default prior scales, using JASP software. The Bayesian factors (BF; for interpretation, 
see Jarosz & Wiley, 2014; Lee & Wagenmakers, 2013) are reported in line with the 
guidelines by Jarosz and Wiley (2014), adjusted from Jeffreys (1961). The approximate 
evidence categories are as follows: Values between 1 and 3 indicate weak evidence for 
the alternate or null hypothesis, between 3 and 10 indicate positive/substantial evidence, 
between 10 and 20 constitutes strong/very strong evidence, and scores above 20 are 
considered very strong/decisive evidence. The interaction model within JASP combines 
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both main effects and the interaction effect; therefore, evidence for the interaction term 
individually was calculated by dividing the interaction model by the main factors (e.g., 
Wagenmakers et al., 2016). For ease of interpretation, BF10 is used to indicate the Bayes 
factor as evidence in favor of the alternative hypothesis, whereas BF01 is used to indicate 
the Bayes factor as evidence in favor of the null hypothesis.  
Overall, the accuracy of participants’ binary deception judgements, where 0 
represents incorrect and 1 represents correct judgements, did not differ significantly 
from chance level (M = 0.53, SD = 0.50, t(147) = 0.82, p = .413, d = .06). To examine 
whether the baseline instruction increased judges’ ability to accurately discriminate 
between lies and truths, I conducted a 2 (Baseline instruction: [present, absent]) X 2 
(Veracity of the critical element: [truth, lie]) between-subjects ANOVA on the accuracy 
of participants’ binary deception judgements. Contrary to my hypothesis, the main 
effect of the Baseline instruction was not significant (F(1, 144) = 0.26, p = .613, ηP
2 = 
.002; BF01 = 5.06), meaning that participants who received the Baseline-present 
instructions (M = 0.55, SD = 0.50, 95% CI [0.44, 0.67]) were not more accurate in their 
deception judgements than participants who received the Baseline-absent instructions 
(M = 0.51, SD = 0.50, 95% CI [0.40, 0.63]). This analysis revealed a main effect of the 
Veracity of the critical element (F(1, 144) = 10.33, p = .002, ηP
2 = .067; BF10 = 18.49), 
with lies (M = 0.66, SD = 0.48, 95% CI [0.55, 0.77]) being judged more accurately than 
truths (M = 0.41, SD = 0.49, 95% CI [0.29, 0.52]). Finally, the Veracity of the critical 
element by Baseline instruction interaction effect was also not significant (F(1, 144) = 
1.40, p = .238, ηP
2 = .010; BF01 = 2.36), indicating that the baseline instruction had no 
differential effect on the accuracy of participants’ deception judgements for lies and 
truths.  
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 The overall mean accuracy of participants’ lie-truth Likert judgements, where 
lower numbers indicate more correct judgements and higher numbers indicate more 
incorrect judgements, was 3.89 (SD = 1.54), and did not differ statistically from chance 
level, t(147) = 1.81, p = .240, d = .10. I conducted a 2 (Baseline instruction: [present, 
absent]) X 2 (Veracity of the critical element: [truth, lie]) between-subjects ANOVA 
on the accuracy of participants’ Likert scale deception judgements. No significant 
differences emerged. I did not observe a significant main effect of the Baseline 
instruction, F(1, 144) = 3.80, p = .053, ηP
2 = .026; BF01 = 1.01 (MBaseline-present = 3.65, 
SD = 1.52, 95% CI [3.30, 4.00] versus MBaseline-absent = 4.14, SD = 1.52, 95% CI [3.79, 
4.48]). Nor did I find a significant main effect of the Veracity of the critical element, 
F(1, 144) = 1.42, p = .236, ηP
2 = .010; BF01 = 2.99 (MLies = 3.74, SD = 1.50, 95% CI 
[3.39, 4.09] versus MTruths = 4.04, SD = 1.57, 95% CI [3.69, 4.39]). Finally, the Veracity 
X Baseline interaction effect was not significant, F(1, 144) = 0.95, p = .332, ηP
2 = .007; 
BF01 = 2.85. 
Cues to Deception 
 The majority of participants’ open-ended responses regarding their cues to 
deception related to contradictions or inconsistencies, the presence of filler words, and 
the overall number of details. Participants across baseline conditions did not 
significantly differ in their use of cues related to differences between the baseline and 
critical period in terms of the amount of details or the type of details. I further examined 
participants’ cue endorsement from a predetermined list of cues, finding that 
‘Consistency within the statement’ was the most commonly reported cue (reported by 
nearly 68% of participants); however, there was no statistically significant difference 
between the instruction groups regarding the endorsement of this cue. The complete 
analyses can be found in Appendix D. 
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5.5 Discussion 
It is well-documented that observed lie detection rates hover around 50% (e.g., 
Bond & DePaulo, 2006). I replicated this finding. Contrary to my hypothesis, I found 
that participants who were instructed to use a within-statement comparable baseline did 
not outperform the control group in terms of lie-truth discrimination accuracy. 
Additionally, I observed that participants across groups were significantly better, and 
above chance level, at detecting lies than truths. 
The only previous study to examine how the comparable truth baseline affects 
observers’ judgement accuracy found an enhanced detection ability with this technique 
(Caso et al., 2019). A possible explanation for these diverging findings lies in how the 
statements were generated. In Caso et al. (2019) interviewees reported about 
experimental tasks they had just completed. This study, in contrast, used statements 
about participants’ experienced activities on the day in question. Consequently, my 
participants were mostly unconstrained in their reports. These paradigms differ 
systematically in the source of deception, which was either scripted by the researcher 
(Caso et al., 2019, i.e., a scripted task; Vrij, 2008) or drawn freely from the participant’s 
own experience (current study, i.e., an autobiographical task; Sporer & Sharman, 2006). 
When lies are self-generated, the deceiver can elaborate with personal experience, 
whereas lies designed by the researcher cannot be so easily embellished. As a 
consequence, it is possible that the statements resulting from the different sources of 
deception were perceived differently by the lie-detectors. Scripted tasks, relative to 
autobiographical tasks, may have been more straightforward to evaluate, which perhaps 
contributed to the incongruent findings between the present study and that of Caso et 
al. (2019). A second explanation for these results could be derived from my ground 
truth manipulation check. Compared to interviewees who reported entirely truthful 
recollections of their day, interviewees who embedded a lie reported lower ratings of 
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truthfulness for the general, truthful portion of their statement (Mean difference 
significant at p = .002). Thus, the truthful baseline of liars’ statements may have been 
more comparable with their lies, which could have weakened lie-detector’s ability to 
make accurate decisions.  
The analysis of the binary deception judgements allows for a direct comparison 
to the results of previous work (Caso et al., 2019). This analysis revealed no effect of 
the baseline instruction with a Bayes Factor indicating substantial evidence. To directly 
compare to previous research, I also calculated a Cohen’s d effect size, which 
reaffirmed a very small effect (d = 0.08) of the baseline instruction on participants’ 
binary judgements. The finding from the Likert judgements are, however, more 
ambiguous. This measure also indicated no effect of the baseline instruction, with a p 
value of .053 and was accompanied by an inconclusive Bayes Factor. This pattern 
suggests that although I did not find evidence that the within-statement baseline 
comparison was an effective lie detection tool, I also cannot rule out that it may have 
an effect that was too small for my study to pick up. Future research should replicate 
this study with an increased sample size. Although my power analysis indicated that I 
had sufficient power to detect an effect size of similar nature of Caso et al. had it been 
present, I may have been underpowered to detect a smaller effect size.  
Contrary to previous research (e.g., Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Vrij, 2008), 
participants in this study did not display a tendency towards truthful decisions in their 
binary veracity judgements. In fact, participants showed a lie bias; participants were 
significantly better at classifying lies compared to truths. This lie bias could be related 
to my study being advertised as a police investigation and lie detection experiment, 
which may have biased the sample into expecting deceptive accounts. Similar lie biases 
have been observed among police officers (e.g., see Meissner & Kassin, 2002 for a 
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review). It is also worth mentioning that participants in this study made only one 
veracity judgement and therefore could not calibrate their decisions to truth-lie base 
rate expectancies (e.g., Street & Richardson, 2015), also potentially explaining the lie 
bias.  
5.5.1 Limitations and Future Research 
In this study, I examined the efficacy of a comparable truth baseline derived 
from different parts within an interviewees’ statement. This paradigm may accurately 
reflect real-world conditions in which interviewees interweave truths and lies (e.g., Vrij, 
2008), but it tests only one specific type of baselining. This type of baselining employs 
a within-subjects comparison, which is already superior to other between-subjects lie 
detection comparisons (Vrij, 2016) since it controls for individual variation in reporting 
(e.g., some people talk more than others; Merckelbach, 2004; Nahari & Pazuelo, 2015; 
Vrij, Akehurst, Soukara, & Bull, 2002). A limitation, however, is that this type of 
baselining fails to control for the situation. Some events are richer in detail than others, 
which could explain the null findings observed in the present study.  
Future research should establish baselines that control for both the individual 
and the situation. Examples of this type of baselining already exist (Vrij, 2016; Vrij, 
Leal, & Fisher, 2018). For instance, the Model Statement (MS) technique can be used 
as a within-subjects technique, as done by Leal and colleagues (2018). With this 
approach, the interviewee first provides a freely recalled report about the event under 
investigation (the baseline statement). Then, they receive a MS, after which they again 
provide a free recall account, this time considering the amount of detail within the MS. 
Investigators can then look for deviations in the types of details (e.g., complications or 
peripheral information) provided in the second statement, relative to the initial, baseline 
statement (Vrij et al., 2018). Another example is to use the reverse order technique. 
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That is, investigators could invite interviewees to first freely report what they have 
experienced, and afterwards ask them to again report the event again but in reverse 
order. Investigators can then pay attention to any reminiscences or contradictions 
between the two statements (e.g., Vrij, 2016). Future research should continue 
exploring avenues of verbal baselining, specifically those that control for both the 
individual and the situation. 
Another point worth considering is that investigators in our study were naïve 
university students, who likely did not have previous experience in conducting 
credibility assessments. This lack of experience and training may have impaired their 
ability to make accurate veracity decisions, and perhaps different results would be 
obtained if the same experiment was conducted with seasoned police or intelligence 
officers, particularly those who have experience with baselining techniques. Although, 
lie detection accuracy is typically not better for professional lie-detectors (e.g., police 
officers) than it is for laypersons (Bond & DePaulo, 2006) and the results of the current 
study therefore may extend beyond the laboratory to professional credibility assessors. 
This avenue should be tested with future research. 
5.5.2 Conclusion 
In sum, I did not find evidence that the within-statement baseline technique can 
enhance deception detection accuracy. The type of verbal baselining tested in this study 
thus appears to be most effective when the comparable truth baseline is established 
prior to the investigative portion of the statement. Future research should prioritise 
verbal baselining techniques that account for both the individual and the situation.  
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6.1 General Discussion 
To date, most deception research experimentally presumes that veracity is a 
dichotomous factor. This is despite the growing body of evidence that truthful and 
deceptive information often exist within the same statement (e.g., Leins et al., 2013, 
2017; Nahari, 2018a; Nahari & Vrij, 2015). Accordingly, the overarching aim of the 
current thesis was to provide an empirical examination of lies that are embedded into 
truthful statements. In particular, the studies conducted within this thesis explored three 
factors: (i) how individuals who describe themselves to be good liars use strategies to 
successfully evade detection, (ii) to what extent embedded lies affect the verbal quality 
of statements, and (iii) if embedded lies can be exploited to facilitate lie detection within 
statements. A key aim of this research was to address concerns regarding the potential 
threat of embedded lies to the reliability and diagnostic accuracy of criteria derived 
from commonly used verbal credibility assessment tools, such as detail richness.  
This discussion section provides an overview of the key findings and a 
consideration of the theoretical and practical implications. Some of the limitations of 
the current research are presented as well as avenues for future research.  
6.1.1 Summary of Findings 
 To address the first aim of my research, this thesis began by exploring how self-
reported good liars use strategies to successfully evade detection. Meta-analytic 
findings indicate that the success of uncovering a deceptive interaction depends more 
on the liar than on the lie detector (e.g., Bond & DePaulo, 2008). Yet, little is known 
about what enables good liars to evade detection. Thus, the primary aim of the research 
presented in Chapter 2 was to explore the lie prevalence and deception strategies of 
self-reported skilled liars. My results replicated earlier research that a minority of 
individuals account for the majority of lies told in daily life, and I found evidence that 
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these prolific liars also consider themselves good liars. Importantly, I also observed that 
self-reported good liars use verbal strategies of deception, with their most common 
strategy being to embed lies into truthful stories. This chapter highlighted the 
importance of developing strategy-based interventions that account for the strategic 
embedding of lies, particularly by skilled liars. 
 Next, I examined how embedded lies may affect the verbal quality of 
statements. Chapter 3 reported an experimental examination of how interviewees 
strategically regulate the information they provide when their accounts contain both 
truths and lies. I found that interviewees calibrate the richness of detail provided in the 
first element of their statement based on the veracity of the following element, such that 
elements followed by a lie were less detailed than elements followed by a truth. 
Moreover, I showed that lies become more detailed when they are flanked by truthful 
information compared to when they are flanked by other lies, meaning that interviewees 
also calibrate their lies according to both the preceding and the following element. The 
findings reported in this chapter suggest that when statements contain both truthful and 
deceptive components, liars are able to strategically calibrate the richness of detail.  
Given the calibration evidence, the following study (Chapter 4 of this thesis) 
manipulated statements to contain lies embedded into truthful statements. I then 
investigated whether embedded lies differed qualitatively compared to full fabrications. 
This study revealed that lies embedded in otherwise truthful statements did not differ 
from lies embedded in deceptive accounts in terms of, for example, the richness of 
detail and verifiability of information. Moreover, I showed that embedded lies could be 
distinguished from truthful statements based on detail richness and statement quality 
(i.e., clarity and plausibility). Based on these findings, verbal credibility assessment 
Chapter 6 
111 
 
tools (e.g., CBCA and RM) that rely on the verbal content measured in this study appear 
to be robust against the embedding of lies.  
 Chapter 5 addressed the final aim of this thesis: Understanding if embedded lies 
can be exploited to facilitate lie detection within statements. I expanded on earlier 
research on the baseline technique by exploring whether introducing a within-statement 
verbal baseline comparison could enhance discriminatory accuracy between lies and 
truths. The results suggested that instructing participants to make a within-statement 
baseline comparison did not improve the accuracy of deception detection. This chapter 
thus informed our understanding of within-statement lie detection, with applied 
relevance given police officers’ potential reliance on similar techniques during 
investigations. 
6.1.2 Insights for Detecting Deception  
6.1.2.1 Truths and lies within statements. The findings of the current research 
lend support to the small body of earlier work showing that, when given the 
opportunity, liars will incorporate as much truthful information as possible into their 
accounts (e.g., Leins et al., 2013, 2017; Nahari, 2018a; Nahari & Vrij, 2015; Nahari et 
al., 2014b; Vrij, 2008; Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010). In theory, if liars draw on their 
memory traces of truthful previous experiences to report perceptual and contextual 
information, then their statements may resemble those of truth-telling interviewees. In 
turn, this could affect verbal credibility assessment tools that are derived by the 
assumption that lies have different content patterns than do truths (e.g., CBCA and 
RM). This thesis provided evidence that self-reported good liars report embedding their 
lies as a strategy for successfully deceiving (Chapter 2). I also showed that when lies 
are flanked by truthful information, they become more detailed (relative to when they 
are flanked by more deceptive information; Chapter 3). A promising finding – that 
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speaks to the robustness of verbal veracity assessment tools such as CBCA and RM 
against embedded lies – was that lies embedded in truthful stories did not differ 
qualitatively from lies that were incorporated into fully fabricated statements on a 
number of cues (e.g., detail richness and verifiability of information; Chapter 4). This 
finding strengthens earlier work showing that verbal lie detection tools are still effective 
even when liars incorporate previous experiences (Gnisci et al., 2010; Valois et al., 
2019), which has relevance for deception scholars and legal professionals alike. 
 Two of my experimental studies involved the production of lies. I instructed 
participants to fabricate their stories (Chapters 3 and 4), yet I found evidence that their 
lies were blended with truthful information. In Chapter 3, participants across veracity 
conditions reported to have strategically included truthful details that they had drawn 
from previous experiences and/or memory, meaning that I had deceptive statements 
that were likely a combination of truths and lies. Similarly, in Chapter 4, the self-
reported truthfulness ratings revealed that liars instructed to fabricate their entire 
account reported still including some truthful information, and the embedded liars 
reported that their general statement was mostly truthful, but still included some lies. 
These findings, although somewhat difficult to disentangle in an experimental sense, 
contribute further evidence that liars provide statements that are a blend of truths and 
lies. 
It is possible that a clearer instruction to invent their stories entirely from 
imagination could have made more explicit that lies should not be drawn from previous 
experiences. However, one may wonder what effect such an explicit instruction would 
result in. It may resemble the well-known observation that when asked to not think of 
a pink elephant, people will almost invariably think of a pink elephant once their 
attention has been drawn to it (e.g., Lane, Groisman, & Ferreira, 2006). This example 
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serves to illustrate that people may not have total control over what thoughts come to 
mind. Although many theories of deception have presumed that lies and truths result 
from different production processes (e.g., the theoretical groundwork for CBCA and 
RM), it is also possible that lies are typically built from variations of the truth or a 
related episodic memory of an event, either personally or vicariously experienced 
(Walcyzk, Harris, Duck, & Mulay, 2014). This paradigm would suggest that instead of 
liars carefully selecting units of information to include in their lies, lies might be 
constructed from the most readily accessible information within their working and/or 
long-term memory (McCornack, Morrison, Paik, Wisner, & Zhu, 2014). Indeed, some 
have argued that truths and lies stem from the same speech production system 
(Mohamed et al., 2006; Walczyk et al., 2014). Thus, more generally, when we ask 
participants to lie in our experiments, they may simply draw on the first thing that comes 
to mind, which is likely to be a previous experience.  
Given the prevalence at which liars admit to including truthful information 
within their deceptive reports, in combination with previous research findings (Leins et 
al., 2013) and those presented in this thesis, it is feasible that researchers have already 
been inadvertently examining embedded lies. That is, rather than comparing the extent 
to which truthful statements differ from deceptive statements, perhaps we have been 
investigating the differences between truthful accounts and partial lies that are under 
the guise of complete fabrications. This also offers a possible explanation as to why lies 
and truths are notoriously difficult to differentiate. If guilty suspects provide statements 
that are predominantly truthful, with only a few self-incriminating aspects modified, 
then it further complicates the credibility assessors’ task (Gnisci et al., 2010; Vrij, 
2008a). Even so, supposing that deception research has already been examining lies 
that are embedded with truth, it stands to reason that the findings from the general 
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deception literature also pertain to embedded lies. For example, it was previously 
shown that CBCA and RM are effective tools as, with appropriate training, evaluators’ 
accuracy rates increase from chance level to between 65% and 80% (Vrij, 2008a). 
Indeed, this finding may be the product of studies that were distinguishing truthful 
statements from deceptive statements that contained truthful information. If that is the 
case, I can speculate that these tools may be effective whether the lie has been invented 
entirely or based upon a previous truthful experience. 
In fact, research from this thesis demonstrated that embedded lies do not differ 
qualitatively from full fabrications, at least on a subset of criteria (Chapter 4). These 
lies embedded in otherwise truthful statements could be distinguished from truths 
embedded in truthful statements, which is comparable to the results of a previous study 
that examined how lies differ when they are invented or based on previous experience 
(Gnisci et al., 2010). In both studies (i.e., Chapter 4 of this thesis and Gnisci et al.’s 
2010 experiment), even when liars incorporated truthful, previously experienced 
information into their fabrications, differences still existed between the deceptive and 
truthful elements. Similarly, in their unpublished work, Valois and colleagues (2019) 
examined whether CBCA and RM techniques could differentiate both fully and 
partially deceptive accounts from truthful accounts. They found that both tools were 
still effective even when interviewees incorporated truthful events into fabricated 
accounts.  
If previous deception studies have already encompassed embedded lies, it 
brings into question the relevance of this doctoral research. The purpose of my line of 
research was to empirically investigate the extent to which the strategic embedding of 
lies influences the verbal behaviours of liars, to define the qualitative manifestations of 
this strategy, and to introduce possible ways to exploit these manifestations to increase 
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lie detection accuracy. My discussion will now turn to the latter two factors: Defining 
and exploiting the qualitative manifestation of embedded lies. 
6.1.2.2 An extension to the consistency framework. Much of the research 
presented in this thesis is grounded in the idea that liars are highly concerned with 
maintaining consistency within their statements (e.g., Deeb et al., 2017, 2018; Hartwig 
et al., 2010). Whilst the majority of previous research regarding consistency has 
referred to factual content, Deeb et al. (2017) provided empirical evidence that liars’ 
attempts to maintain consistency generalise to other situations (i.e., including fewer 
repetitions in specific parts of their interview). Moreover, Leins et al. (2017) provided 
anecdotal evidence that liars’ draw on previous experiences to report statements 
detailed in, for example, spatial information. The results of my first experiment 
(Chapter 3) contributed further evidence that liars’ attempts to maintain consistency 
extend beyond the factual content and can influence the richness of detail provided. A 
notable finding was that liars calibrated the detail richness of their lies to be consistent 
with that of their truths.  
However, when I extended the paradigm to include lies that were embedded into 
truthful information (Chapter 4), the pattern of consistency faded. That is, the lack of 
difference between the two types of lies suggested that embedded liars were not able to 
maintain consistency within the truthful and fabricated components of their statements, 
since the lies did not become more detailed to mirror the truths. Moreover, the truthful 
(non-target) portions of the statements were similarly rich in detail, regardless of 
whether the statement was entirely truthful or contained an embedded lie. It is possible 
that, if liars had specific knowledge of the criteria indicative of truthfulness, they may 
have been better able to produce a fabricated element that was comparable in detail and 
quality to the truthful component.  
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The research conducted in this thesis attempted to define the qualitative 
manifestations of the embedding strategy through the lens of consistency. Taking these 
findings together, I found contradictory evidence regarding how liars manage the 
consistency of details between truths and lies within statements. A possible explanation 
as to why I observed the consistency effects in Chapter 3, but not in Chapter 4, relates 
to the cognitive load of liars. In the first experiment (Chapter 3), I examined the effect 
of two elements immediately following each other, whereas my next study (Chapter 4) 
examined a more true-to-life scenario in which a lie was embedded into an otherwise 
truthful alibi statement. It may have been easier for liars to calibrate the richness of 
details they provided when they could compartmentalise their reports about the two 
distinct, and brief, tasks (Chapter 3). In contrast, it may have been more cognitively 
demanding for liars to monitor the information they provided throughout a longer, more 
dynamic statement (Chapter 4). This additional cognitive load could have impaired 
liars’ ability to strategically regulate the consistency of details between their truths and 
lies. Still, this pattern of results goes against common sense, as it would presumably be 
easier for liars to draw on their truthful memories when embedding a lie into their 
otherwise autobiographical memory versus when reporting a scripted task. 
Nonetheless, if the additional cognitive pressure of selectively drawing from memory 
traces does weaken liars’ ability to maintain consistency within statements, it could 
mean that real-world liars are unable to provide high quality, consistently detailed 
accounts when using embedded lies. This would contribute additional support to the 
reliability of verbal credibility assessment tools for distinguishing both fully and 
partially fabricated accounts from truthful accounts. 
Another possible explanation is that I am observing the “decline effect,” 
whereby early empirical investigations show the strong presence of a phenomenon, but 
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later studies show diminishing or nonexistent effects (Schooler, 2011). This would not 
be entirely unsurprising given the replication crisis currently topical in the field of 
psychological science (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). Still, future research should 
continue exploring this extension of the consistency framework, given that both liars 
and legal professionals associate consistency with veracity (e.g., Deeb et al., 2017; 
Hartwig et al., 2010; Vredeveldt et al., 2014). Advancing our knowledge on 
consistency, or other potential qualitative indicators of embedded lies, is beneficial for 
designing strategy-based methods for exploiting these types of lies.  
6.1.2.3 Exploiting embedded lies to facilitate deception detection. Research 
conducted in this thesis was, to my knowledge, the first to examine whether introducing 
a baseline comparison that was derived from multiple different parts of an interviewees’ 
statement could facilitate the detection of lies (Chapter 5). My paradigm provided an 
individual-level comparison and simultaneously allowed the opportunity to test 
whether embedded lies could be exploited to facilitate lie detection. Contrary to my 
hypothesis, I found that participants who were instructed to use a within-statement 
comparable baseline did not outperform the control group in terms of lie-truth 
discrimination accuracy. This is in opposition to the findings of the only previous study 
to examine how the comparable truth baseline affects observers’ judgement accuracy 
(Caso et al., 2019).  
An important factor to consider is that the paradigm I tested, while controlling 
for variation at the individual level, did not control for varying events throughout the 
statement. A preferable method of verbal baselining is to generate baseline comparisons 
that control for both the individual and the situation (Vrij, 2016). Examples of this type 
of baselining could be to first have interviewees freely recall an event in chronological 
order and then to have them recall the same event in reverse order (Vrij, Leal, Mann, & 
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Fisher, 2012), or to obtain a free recall, administer a Model Statement, and then obtain 
a second statement of the same event (Leal et al., 2018). With these types of 
comparisons, investigators can look for deviations in the types of details (e.g., 
reminiscences, contradictions, complications or peripheral information) provided in the 
second statement, relative to the initial, baseline statement (Vrij, 2016; Vrij, Leal, & 
Fisher, 2018). Additional within-subjects alternatives could be to evaluate the 
proportion of verifiable details (Nahari et al., 2014b; Vrij, 2016) or complications (Vrij, 
Leal, Jupe, & Harvey, 2018) during an interviewees’ statement regarding an event. 
Future research should continue exploring avenues of verbal baselining that control for 
both the individual and the situation.  
The rationale for believing that such baseline comparisons could help to exploit 
embedded lies relates to my consistency framework. It is possible to manipulate the 
cognitive load or cognitive flexibility of liars, for instance, by changing the report mode 
(e.g., Leins, Fisher, Vrij, Leal, & Mann, 2011) or employing the reverse-order 
technique (e.g., Vrij et al., 2017). Such methods have shown to enhance deception 
detection based on statement consistency (Leins, Fisher, & Vrij, 2012; Vrij, 2016). 
Specifically, introducing unanticipated changes in question format – such as asking 
suspects for an oral account and then for a sketch (Leins et al., 2012; Leins, Fisher, Vrij, 
Leal, & Mann, 2011) or asking for a reverse order narration after a chronological report 
– reduces the levels of consistency in liars’ statements more than in truth-tellers’ 
statements.  
These techniques aid truth-tellers in retrieving additional information about an 
event as they remember it from a different perspective, so called reminiscences (e.g., 
Leins et al., 2012). In contrast, realising that consistent accounts are more likely to be 
perceived as credible, liars are likely to repeat their first statement without adding any 
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new information (e.g., Vrij, 2016). Moreover, the complexity of reporting information 
in reverse order or via drawings may also generate more errors from liars in the form 
of contradictions between the two statements (Vrij et al., 2012). Thus, using within-
subjects comparisons that exploit liars’ attempts at maintaining consistency show 
promise as an avenue for deception detection, and it would be highly useful for future 
research to test these comparisons explicitly with embedded lies. 
6.1.3 Practical Implications  
The main practical implications from this thesis relate to the use of verbal 
credibility assessment tools and within-statement methods of deception detection. 
Based on the research conducted in this thesis, several recommendations can be offered 
to practitioners who conduct credibility assessments.  
CBCA is one of the most widely used credibility assessment techniques 
worldwide, and can be used as evidence in some courts in North America and in 
European countries such as Germany and Sweden (Verschuere, Vrij, & Granhag, 2015). 
In the absence of evidence that embedded lies may jeopardise the efficacy of verbal 
veracity assessment techniques (e.g., Chapter 4 of this thesis; Gnsici et al., 2010; Valois 
et al., 2019), my tentative recommendation is for legal practitioners to continue using 
these tools as an investigative aid. This recommendation comes with two caveats. First, 
practitioners should be particularly cautious making verbal credibility assessments 
during circumstances in which interviewees could easily draw upon truthful previous 
experiences. Although embedded lies may not render tools such as CBCA and RM 
entirely ineffective, these lies do have the potential to interfere with classificatory 
accuracy. Second, practitioners should prioritise richness of detail (i.e., the level of 
detail or amount of specific information included in a statement) as a cue to deception 
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during statement analysis as this is one of the only robustly validated cues within the 
literature (e.g., Luke, 2019).  
Another practical implication relates to within-statement lie detection. 
Practitioners have repeatedly made valid requests for lie detection techniques to 
incorporate within-subjects comparisons; however, such comparisons are not very 
prevalent in the non-verbal and verbal lie detection fields (see Vrij, 2016 for a 
discussion). Evidence in this thesis (Chapter 5) showed that a within-statement verbal 
baseline comparison may not be an effective lie detection tool. This finding has applied 
relevance given police officers’ potential reliance on similar techniques during 
investigations (e.g., Ewens et al., 2014; Frank et al., 2006; Inbau et al., 2013; Russano 
et al., 2014). Based on these results, I would caution investigators from drawing 
comparisons between corroborated and uncorroborated portions of an interviewee’s 
account in the same manner that I did. Instead, I recommend that practitioners utilise 
methods of baselining that control for both the individual and the situation, as outlined 
above.  
6.1.4 Methodological Considerations  
The research conducted in this thesis pertains to a specific type of embedded 
lie. To gain insight into liars’ verbal behaviour and strategies when providing a mixture 
of truthful and deceptive information, I was particularly interested in examining 
deceptive events that were incorporated into truthful stories. This differs from other 
variations of embedded lies that may involve, for example, the omission of critical 
information without the offer of an alternative explanation, or embedded lies that 
contain only a small deceptive fragment (such as the date an activity occurred, or a 
substitution of the perpetrator) whilst the remainder of the account remains truthful. In 
these latter variations of embedded lies, the interviewee does not provide a substantial 
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lie and it thus becomes difficult to evaluate content-based cues within the truthful and 
deceptive portions of their statement. The extent to which these types of embedded lies 
may influence verbal lie detection tools thus remains unknown. I could speculate that 
these sorts of embedded lies are particularly problematic since the statements are 
realistically nearly entirely truthful. In another vein, mixed veracity statements are not 
solely provided by guilty individuals trying to evade detection. Innocent interviewees 
may also incorporate lies into their otherwise truthful stories for a variety of reasons, 
such as impression management (e.g., Colwell et al., 2018; Clemens & Grolig, 2019). 
Lying by innocent suspects might lead to statement inconsistencies that are interpreted 
by investigators as cues to deception, thereby increasing their risk of being wrongfully 
assessed as guilty for a crime they did not commit. Future research should expand upon 
the research conducted in this thesis to account for various other types of embedded 
lies, including those from both the perspectives of guilty and innocent interviewees.  
Two of my three experiments relied heavily on the verbal coding of statements. 
Although this is a favored methodology in verbal deception research, it is not without 
limitation. Guidelines exist for coding content-based cues, but there are a number of 
degrees of freedom afforded to researchers’ development and execution of their own 
coding schemes. With this freedom comes the potential for a lack of consistency 
between different deception labs. In my studies, I reported moderate to high inter-rater 
reliability, suggesting that the consistency between raters was sound. However, there is 
still a possibility that different researchers may have drawn different conclusions from 
the same data set, had their coding criteria differed. This is a problem that relates to 
verbal lie detection research in general, and future work should develop more stringent 
and transparent guidelines for content-based coding that would help alleviate these 
issues. Researchers have proposed several ways to improve consistency in this field: (i) 
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by requiring laboratories to specify their coding schemes and to make these, and other 
training materials, publically available; (ii) by organizing a cross-laboratory 
collaboration to examine the reliability and validity of various coding methodologies; 
and (iii) by searching for ways to combine automated scoring systems with human-
driven, contextually-based methods (Nahari et al., 2019). Doing so would increase the 
reliability and generalisability of content-based deception research. 
A focus of the current thesis was on interviewees’ strategies. I conducted 
extensive qualitative coding and analyses to open-ended responses from participants in 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4. My intention was to conduct a broad exploration of people’s 
strategies in a variety of contexts, to inform our understanding of liars’ metacognitions 
about deceiving. In theory, these insights could then be exploited in strategy-based lie 
detection techniques. However, this research method yielded less informative data than 
expected. Although I obtained a wide variety of responses at the individual level, my 
coding process required the reduction of responses into a practical number of categories 
that could be submitted to statistical procedures and that would produce meaningful 
results. This methodology led to the elimination of the more nuanced and informative 
units of data, and instead generated broader, less insightful categories of strategies. The 
data from my multiple-response questions regarding strategy use, however, were more 
informative and aligned to the behavioural data. Future research should prioritise 
directed questions regarding interviewees’ strategies, and different qualitative coding 
methodologies may also be preferred. 
More generally, there are constraints to the generalisability of the experimental 
research conducted within this thesis (Chapters 3, 4, and 5). In particular, my 
experiments relied on samples of motivated university students. A drawback of this 
sample is that the findings may not be representative of the population in general, and 
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therefore may not generalise beyond academic settings to legal contexts. Another 
common criticism of laboratory-based deception research is that researchers typically 
instruct people to lie, whereas in real-life, people presumably elect whether to lie or tell 
the truth as well as the topics of those reports (e.g., Kanwisher, 2009). Despite the 
artificiality of laboratory experiments, the primary advantage of this research 
methodology is the internal validity – that is, the ability to draw causal conclusions. To 
complement this work, future research should attempt to address these generalisability 
concerns by expanding to more ecologically valid scenarios that, for example, examine 
the verbal patterns and strategies of experienced criminals and involve designs in which 
interviewees can autonomously decide whether or not to lie, the topic of their report, 
and how and when to deliver their lie during their statements. 
6.1.5 Overview of Future Research  
The research presented in this thesis is intended as a starting point, which should 
be expanded to contexts that more closely resemble real-life credibility assessments; 
for instance, when statements have lies and truths dispersed throughout or during more 
dynamic interview scenarios. Various concepts could be explored in further studies to 
help develop our understanding of embedded lies. Some of these future research ideas 
have been addressed in the current chapter, and others have been provided in the 
discussion sections of Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5. Bringing together the findings of this 
thesis, I will provide several final suggestions for future work on this topic. 
The research conducted within this thesis revealed an important finding for 
deception researchers: Verbal credibility assessment tools that are based on the criteria 
measured in this research, appear to be robust against the embedding of lies. According 
to my research findings, it seems that although liars may attempt to maintain 
consistency in terms of the verbal quality of their truths and lies, their ability to do so 
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may not be strong enough to undermine the theoretical foundations of tools such as 
CBCA and RM. Additional research is necessary to replicate these results, and should 
extend these findings by evaluating the full set of CBCA and RM criteria, by 
incorporating more realistic crime simulations, and by testing professional lie detectors’ 
ability to distinguish between partially and fully fabricated lies using the complete 
CBCA and RM protocols.  
In this thesis, I have raised the suggestion that deception researchers may have 
already been examining embedded lies. Underlying most verbal lie detection research 
is the assumption that lies and truths stem from different production processes (e.g., the 
theoretical groundwork for CBCA and RM). Instead, lies might be constructed in a 
process similar to that of truths – by drawing on readily accessible information in 
memory. Future research should further investigate precisely how liars draw on their 
memory traces to produce embedded lies. Insight on this topic could be informative not 
only for developing ways to exploit such lies, but to also spur new theoretical ideas to 
account for differences between truths and lies, even if both production processes relate 
to truthful previous experiences. 
Much of the research in this thesis examined detail richness. Deception 
researchers acknowledge that cues to deception are generally weak but that a handful 
of cues can significantly distinguish between truthful and deceptive messages (DePaulo 
et al., 2003; Hartwig & Bond, 2011). However, the estimated effect sizes of deception 
cues may be artificially inflated by publication bias, low power, and small numbers of 
estimates (Luke, 2019). One of the only cues to deception that has a trustworthy body 
of evidence is the level of detail within a statement (Luke, 2019). Researchers have also 
reported the level of detail as a significant determinant of veracity when considering 
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partially or fully fabricated statements (Nahari et al., 2012). A general recommendation 
is for researchers to continue emphasising the level of detail as a cue to deception. 
 The research conducted in this thesis also exemplified the importance of digging 
deeper into the strategic embedding of lies for the purposes of lie detection. Being aware 
of interviewees’ strategy use is the first step towards altering and exploiting it. As such, 
this thesis calls for an increased focus on the development of lie detection methods that 
aim to exploit interviewees’ strategic inclusion of truths and lies within statements. For 
instance, it is possible that applying empirically validated strategy-based techniques to 
smaller units of analysis within a single statement could be an effective step towards 
detecting and exploiting embedded lies. Recent research tested the efficacy of a Theme-
Selection approach to detecting which part of a statement included a lie, finding that 
this within-subjects measure yielded stronger results than examining typical between-
subjects differences of liars’ and truth-tellers’ entire interviews (Palena et al., 2019). 
Similarly, drawing from the computational linguistics field, Bachenko et al. (2008) 
developed a tagging system that discriminated between deceptive and non-deceptive 
passages within a written narrative. Deception researchers should focus their efforts on 
developments of this kind since they could allow for investigators to pinpoint deceptive 
hotspots within a statement, which would be highly advantageous for informing where 
to devote their investigative efforts. The recognition of deceptive hotspots, or potential 
signs of deception within a statement, could also encourage the acquisition of additional 
information (i.e., by further questioning, considering alternative scenarios, or focused 
investigative efforts to obtain evidence), thereby reducing the tendency to immediately 
interpret symptoms of deception as indicative of guilt (Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010). 
A general recommendation, therefore, is for both researchers and practitioners 
to move away from making global judgements of veracity; that is, deciding if an 
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interviewee in the case at hand is honest versus deceptive, or guilty versus innocent. 
Instead, lie detectors would benefit from a shift towards making discrete deception 
judgements, whereby the veracity of individual details is evaluated over the course of 
a statement (e.g., Leins et al., 2017). This type of evaluation is necessary to reflect the 
strategic behaviours of liars who interweave truths and lies, as evidenced by the 
research conducted in this thesis. 
6.1.6 Conclusion 
 Across three experiments and one survey, this thesis examined how 
interviewees’ strategic inclusion of truthful and deceptive information within a single 
account may affect statement quality, and the subsequent effects for methods of verbal 
lie detection. I found that liars strategically maintain consistency regarding the quality 
of information provided between truths and lies within their statement; however, their 
attempts at maintaining consistency do not appear to jeopardise the efficacy of several 
criteria derived from content-based verbal credibility assessment tools. This thesis 
emphasises that lie detectors should exploit liars’ attempts at maintaining consistency 
by utilising methods of verbal baselining that control for both the individual and the 
situation. More generally, this thesis suggests that future research should broaden the 
discourse of deception from a truth-lie dichotomy to instead reflect that the amount of 
truthful and deceptive information within statements exists on a continuum. 
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1. Questionnaire Definitions 
After providing informed consent, and prior to beginning the questionnaire, 
participants were provided the following set of definitions, which they were asked to 
read carefully and to keep in mind while making responses throughout the 
questionnaire: (1) “To lie (i.e., deceive) is to successfully or unsuccessfully make a false 
statement (to another person), without forewarning, with the intention that the 
statement will be believed to be true (by the other person); misremembering is not the 
same as lying; a successful lie means that the intended false-belief has been produced, 
whereas an unsuccessful lie means that the intended false-belief has not been 
produced.” (2) “Strategies for telling lies (i.e., strategies of deception) refer to the self-
regulatory method/s that an individual may use to increase their chances of telling a 
successful lie.” 
During the questionnaire, participants were asked to indicate how many lies, of 
several types, they had told within the past 24 hours. I described each of the options as 
follows: White lies (Lies of this type occur when someone makes an inconsequential 
false statement with the purpose of easing social interactions), Exaggerations (Lies of 
this type occur when someone intentionally makes a statement that reports something 
as being better or worse than it really is), Omissions/Concealment (Lies of this type 
occur when someone intentionally withholds information, with the purpose of harming 
or disadvantaging the receiver for the liar’s own benefit), Commission/ Fabrications 
(Lies of this type occur when false information is intentionally presented as if it was 
true, with the purpose of harming or disadvantaging the receiver for the liar’s own 
benefit), and Embedded lies (Lies of this type occur when a statement contains one or 
more lies that are incorporated into an otherwise truthful story, for the liar’s own 
benefit).  
 
153 
 
As well, during the questionnaire participants were asked to rate on a 10-point 
Likert scale (1 – not important to 10 – very important) how important they consider 
verbal and nonverbal strategies of deception to be for getting away with a lie. I 
described verbal strategies as: “Relating to the control of an individual’s speech to say 
things that give a credible impression and avoid raising suspicion of possible 
deception” and nonverbal strategies of deception as: “Relating to the control of an 
individual’s behaviour to display body language that gives a credible impression and 
avoids raising suspicion of possible deception”. 
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Appendix B: Supplementary materials (Chapter 3; Study II) 
 
1.  Instruction Letters One and Two by Condition 
2. Structured Interview Question Format 
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1. Instruction Letters One and Two by Condition11 
Instruction Letter One. The specific instructions participants received depended on 
their conditions, as follows: 
 
 
Lie-Lie condition: 
Dear Participant: 
 
I. For the next twenty to thirty-five minutes, please exit the research room and make yourself busy (e.g., 
study, get a coffee). Once that time is up, please return to the room and you will then receive your next 
instructions.  
 
 
Truth-Lie condition: 
Dear Participant: 
 
I. Please complete the following task: 
 
 Your assignment is to help develop a promotional flyer for __ located in __. Using the camera 
provided, please make your way to the __ and take photos that can be included on the flyer to promote 
the café. Please avoid taking photos of the customers.  
II. Please report back to the experimenter in between twenty to thirty-five minutes. You will then receive 
your next       instructions.  
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Information regarding specific locations has been removed to allow for a blinded review.   
Truth-Truth condition: 
Dear Participant: 
 
I. Please complete the following two tasks: 
 
 Task A: Your assignment is to help develop a promotional flyer for __ located in __. Using the 
camera provided, please make your way to the __ and take photos that can be included on the flyer to 
promote the café. Please avoid taking photos of the customers. After doing so, please complete Task 
B. 
 
 Task B: Your assignment is to go to the bus stop __ located at __ to search for Michelle (photo 
attached), who will be arriving by bus sometime today. Please use the paper and pen provided to write 
down the information for any buses that arrive and/or depart during your time. If you see Michelle 
arrive, please take a photo of her using the camera provided. Wait at the bus stop for a minimum of 
five minutes, and then return to the research room, regardless of whether you find Michelle or not. 
 
II. Please report back to the experimenter in between twenty to thirty-five minutes. You will then 
receive your next instructions. 
 
Lie-Truth condition: 
Dear Participant: 
 
I. Please complete the following task: 
 
 Your assignment is to go to the bus stop __ located at __ to search for Michelle (photo attached), who 
will be arriving by bus sometime today. Please use the paper and pen provided to write down the 
information for any buses that arrive and/or depart during your time. If you see Michelle arrive, please 
take a photo of her using the camera provided. Wait at the bus stop for a minimum of five minutes, and 
then return to the research room, regardless of whether you find Michelle or not. 
 
II. Please report back to the experimenter in between twenty to thirty-five minutes. You will then receive 
your next instructions.  
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Instruction Letter Two.  
 
 
 
Truth-Truth condition: 
Dear Participant: 
 
I. For the next phase of this experiment, you will be interviewed by the researcher about the tasks you 
have completed. Please report your memories truthfully and with as much detail as possible. Please 
report and answer questions based on having completed both of the following tasks: 
 
 Task A: Your assignment is to help develop a promotional flyer for __ located in __. Using the camera 
provided, please make your way to the __ and take photos that can be included on the flyer to promote 
the café. Please avoid taking photos of the customers. After doing so, please complete Task B. 
 
 Task B: Your assignment is to go to the bus stop __ located at __ to search for Michelle (photo 
attached), who will be arriving by bus sometime today. Please use the paper and pen provided to write 
down the information for any buses that arrive and/or depart during your time. If you see Michelle 
arrive, please take a photo of her using the camera provided. Wait at the bus stop for a minimum of five 
minutes, and then return to the research room, regardless of if you find Michelle or not. 
 
II. Without using the photos or written document, you must convince the interviewer that you completed 
both Task A and Task B. If you are highly convincing and the interviewer does not suspect you are 
fabricating your reports, you will be entered into a raffle for the chance to win a 50€ VVV voucher. If 
you fail to convince the interviewer, you will be required to stay an additional twenty minutes to 
provide a written account of your statements.  
 
You have ten minutes to prepare your statements.  Please do not write any notes. 
 
Lie-Lie condition: 
Dear Participant: 
 
I. For the next phase of this experiment, you will be interviewed by the researcher. Please report and 
answer questions with as much detail as possible, as if you had completed both of the following tasks: 
 
 Task A:  Your assignment is to help develop a promotional flyer for __ located in __. Using the camera 
provided, please make your way to __ and take photos that can be included on the flyer to promote the 
café. Please avoid taking photos of the customers.  
 
 Task B:   Your assignment is to go to the bus stop __ located at __ to search for Michelle (photo 
attached), who will be arriving by bus sometime today. Please use the paper and pen provided to write 
down the information for any buses that arrive and/or depart during your time. If you see Michelle 
arrive, please take a photo of her using the camera provided. Wait at the bus stop for a minimum of five 
minutes, and then return to the research room, regardless of if you find Michelle or not.  
 
II. You must convince the interviewer that you completed both Task A and Task B.  If you are highly 
convincing and the interviewer does not suspect you are fabricating your reports, you will be entered 
into a raffle for the chance to win a 50€ VVV voucher. If you fail to convince the interviewer, you will 
be required to stay an additional twenty minutes to provide a written account of your activities over the 
past hour. 
 
You have ten minutes to prepare your statement.  Please do not write any notes. 
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Truth-Lie condition: 
Dear Participant: 
 
I. For the next phase of this experiment, you will be interviewed by the researcher about the task you 
completed. Please report your memories truthfully and with as much detail as possible. In addition to 
reporting about the task you did complete, you must also report that you completed Task B. Therefore, 
please report and answer questions as if you had completed both of the following tasks: 
 
 Task A: Your assignment is to help develop a promotional flyer for __ located in __. Using the camera 
provided, please make your way to __ and take photos that can be included on the flyer to promote the 
café. Please avoid taking photos of the customers. After doing so, please complete Task B. 
 
 Task B: Your assignment is to go to the bus stop __ located at __ to search for Michelle (photo 
attached), who will be arriving by bus sometime today. Please use the paper and pen provided to write 
down the information for any buses that arrive and/or depart during your time. If you see Michelle 
arrive, please take a photo of her using the camera provided. Wait at the bus stop for a minimum of five 
minutes, and then return to the research room, regardless of if you find Michelle or not. 
 
II. Without using the photos or written document, you must convince the interviewer that you completed 
both Task A and Task B. If you are highly convincing and the interviewer does not suspect you are 
fabricating your reports, you will be entered into a raffle for the chance to win a 50€ VVV voucher. If 
you fail to convince the interviewer, you will be required to stay an additional twenty minutes to 
provide a written account of your statements.  
 
You have ten minutes to prepare your statements. Please do not write any notes. 
Lie-Truth condition: 
Dear Participant: 
 
I. For the next phase of this experiment, you will be interviewed by the researcher about the task you 
completed. Please report your memories truthfully and with as much detail as possible. In addition to 
reporting about the task you did complete, you must also report that you completed Task A. Therefore, 
please report and answer questions as if you had completed both of the following tasks: 
 
 Task A: Your assignment is to help develop a promotional flyer for __ located in __. Using the camera 
provided, please make your way to __ and take photos that can be included on the flyer to promote the 
café. Please avoid taking photos of the customers.  
 
 Task B: Your assignment is to go to the bus stop __ located at __ to search for Michelle (photo 
attached), who will be arriving by bus sometime today. Please use the paper and pen provided to write 
down the information for any buses that arrive and/or depart during your time. If you see Michelle 
arrive, please take a photo of her using the camera provided. Wait at the bus stop for a minimum of five 
minutes, and then return to the research room, regardless of if you find Michelle or not. 
 
II. Without using the photos or written document, you must convince the interviewer that you completed 
both Task A and Task B. If you are highly convincing and the interviewer does not suspect you are 
fabricating your reports, you will be entered into a raffle for the chance to win a 50€ VVV voucher. If 
you fail to convince the interviewer, you will be required to stay an additional twenty minutes to 
provide a written account of your statements.  
 
You have ten minutes to prepare your statements. Please do not write any notes. 
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2. Structured Interview Question Format 
Structured Interview Format. Participants were interviewed according to the 
following format: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Structured Interview Format: 
PART ONE: (Task A) 
I’ll ask you to begin by providing a free recall of what you did for Task A and then I will ask you some 
specific questions. 
1. In as much detail as possible, please walk me through exactly what you did from the moment you 
left this room to the moment you finished Task A.  
 
2. What else can you tell me about this task? 
 
3. How long did this task take you? 
 
4. Did you find this task difficult? 
 
5. Did anything unexpected happen or perhaps something that didn’t go as planned? 
 
6. Without showing me the camera or notes, please describe what I will see when I look at them. 
 
PART TWO: (Task B) 
I’ll now ask you to provide a free recall of what you did for Task B and then I will ask you some specific 
questions. 
1. In as much detail as possible, please walk me through exactly what you did from the moment you 
finished Task B to the moment you walked back to this room. 
 
2. What else can you tell me about this task? 
 
3. How long did this task take you? 
 
4. Did you find this task difficult? 
 
5. Did anything unexpected happen or perhaps something that didn’t go as planned? 
 
7. Without showing me the camera or notes, please describe what I will see when I look at them. 
 
PART THREE: (Task A and B) 
1. Please think back over the entire assignment, and try to remember if there are any other details that 
you may have missed. 
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Appendix C: Supplementary materials (Chapter 4; Study III) 
 
1. Instruction Letters to Participants 
2. Structured Interview Format 
3. Coding Description: Verbal Content Analysis 
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1. Instruction Letters to Participants12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 The blank spaces were filled in by the lead researcher based on the selected alibi activity and date. 
Truth-Teller Condition: 
 
Dear Participant, 
 
 
I. Please imagine that you have been called into a police station as a suspect in a violent 
burglary that occurred on ____[DATE]____ between approximately 1-3pm. The police 
have reason to believe that you may have been involved, so they have requested that you 
provide an alibi statement for your whereabouts on this day.  
 
II. You are innocent of the crime in question; therefore, your task is to convince the 
interviewer of your innocence by providing a truthful alibi. Read the following instructions 
carefully: 
 
 Think back to the day that you completed the following activity/activities:  
 
_____________________________[ACTIVITY]_____________________________. 
Please report exactly what you did on this day (from morning to evening), being sure to 
include the activity/activities between 1-3pm. 
 
III. During your interview, please provide a truthful statement and answer questions with as 
much detail as possible, including time stamps wherever possible. If you are highly 
convincing and the interviewer does not suspect you are lying, you will be entered into a 
raffle for the chance to win a 50£ voucher. If you fail to convince the interviewer, you will 
be required to stay an additional twenty minutes to provide a written account of your 
statement.  
 
You have up to ten minutes to prepare your statement.  Please do not write any notes. 
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Fabricated Liar Condition: 
 
Dear Participant, 
 
 
I. Please imagine that you have been called into a police station as a suspect in a violent 
burglary that occurred on ____[DATE]____  between approximately 1-3pm. The police 
have reason to believe that you may have been involved, so they have requested that you 
provide an alibi statement for your whereabouts on this day. 
  
II. You are guilty of the crime in question, and your task is to try and convince the 
interviewer that you are innocent by providing a completely deceptive alibi.  
Read the following instructions carefully: 
 
 Please do not report what you actually did on ____[DATE]____ ; rather, make up a 
false statement to explain what you did that day (from morning to evening), including 
the deceptive story that you completed the following activity/activities from 
approximately 1-3pm: 
 
_____________________________[ACTIVITY]_____________________________. 
 
III. During your interview, please report and answer questions with as much detail as 
possible, including time stamps wherever possible. If you are highly convincing and the 
interviewer does not suspect you are lying, you will be entered into a raffle for the 
chance to win a 50£ voucher. If you fail to convince the interviewer, you will be 
required to stay an additional twenty minutes to provide a written account of your 
statement.  
 
You have up to ten minutes to prepare your statement.  Please do not write any notes. 
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Embedded Liar Condition: 
 
Dear Participant, 
 
 
I. Please imagine that you have been called into a police station as a suspect in a 
violent burglary that occurred on____[DATE]____ between approximately 1-3pm. 
The police have reason to believe that you may have been involved, so they have 
requested that you provide an alibi statement for your whereabouts on this day. 
  
II. You are guilty of the crime in question, and your task is to try and convince the 
interviewer that you are innocent by providing a partially deceptive alibi.  
Read the following instructions carefully: 
 
 Please truthfully report what you actually did on ____[DATE]____  (from morning to 
evening), and you must also incorporate into this truthful statement the deceptive 
story that you completed the following activity/activities from approximately 1-3pm: 
_____________________________[ACTIVITY]_____________________________. 
 
III. During your interview, please report and answer questions with as much detail as 
possible, including time stamps wherever possible. If you are highly convincing and the 
interviewer does not suspect you are lying, you will be entered into a raffle for the 
chance to win a 50£ voucher. If you fail to convince the interviewer, you will be 
required to stay an additional twenty minutes to provide a written account of your 
statement.  
 
You have up to ten minutes to prepare your statement.  Please do not write any notes. 
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2. Structured Interview Format 
The interviewer began by stating that her goal was to obtain as much information as 
possible and to determine how credible the participant’s alibi was. She instructed the 
participant to report as many details as possible, even if s/he did not think they were 
important. She advised the participant to include time stamps wherever possible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 The specific day that participants were questioned about was determined based on the event they had 
been matched to. 
Structured Interview Format: 
 
1. In as much detail as possible, please walk me through everything that you 
did – from morning to evening – ____[DATE]____ .13 
 
2. What else can you tell me about that day? 
 
3. Being as detailed as possible, please tell me what you were doing from 
approximately 1 to 3pm. 
 
4. On this day, did anything unexpected happen or perhaps something that 
didn’t go as planned? 
 
5. Please think back over the entire day, and try to remember if there are any 
other details that you may have forgotten or missed. 
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3. Coding Description: Verbal Content Analysis 
Coding. Verbal content analysis. The video recorded interviews were 
transcribed verbatim. The Principal Investigator who has expertise with verbal 
statement analysis extensively trained a second coder, who was blind to the 
experimental conditions, to assess statements for several cues. First, statements were 
assessed for the richness of detail by coding the presence of: i) spatial information: 
Information about locations (e.g., “At Wetherspoon pub”) or the spatial arrangement of 
people and/or objects (e.g., “Sitting in the row behind my friend”); ii) temporal 
information: Information about when the activities or event happened (e.g., “It was 
6:00pm”), duration of an activity (e.g., “We were in the restaurant for one hour”), or an 
explicit description of a sequence of events (e.g., “I started to do revision notes after I 
finished eating dinner”); and iii) perceptual information: Information about what the 
interviewee saw (e.g., “I saw him sitting at the bar”), smelled (e.g., “It smelled like my 
roommate had made coffee”), heard (e.g., “He ordered a glass of wine”), tasted (e.g., 
“The gelato was sweet), or felt (e.g., “The sunshine felt really warm”) during their 
statement. The coding scheme was derived from the RM literature (Johnson & Raye, 
1981) and similar schemes have been used in number of deception studies (e.g., Nahari, 
2018a). The richness of detail score represents the sum total of the frequency of 
occurrences of spatial, temporal, and/or perceptual details.  
Next, we coded for the verifiability of detail by examining statements for 
activities that met the following criteria: i) they were documented and therefore 
potentially checkable (e.g., receipt of purchase), ii) they were carried out together with 
(an) other identified person(s), rather than alone or with a stranger who could not easily 
be identified (e.g., study group meeting with specifically named individuals), iii) they 
pertained to something that was witnessed by (an) other identified person(s) (e.g., 
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having your professor arrive late to an exam), iv) they were reported as being recorded 
by the interviewee (e.g., leaving a voicemail), v) they used technology (e.g., use of a 
phone or computer), or vi) they could potentially be checked by blood analysis and 
medical tests (e.g., drinking alcohol). The verifiability of detail score represents the sum 
total of the frequency of occurrence of all details that met one or more criteria to be 
considered verifiable. These criteria were drawn from the VA literature (Boskovic, 
Bogaard, Merckelbach, Vrij & Hope, 2017; Nahari et al., 2014a, 2014b). I did not 
include the information protocol, which is part of the complete VA procedure, because 
it was outside of the scope of the current study. 
The overall statement quality was also assessed by evaluating i) the clarity and 
vividness of the statement on a 3-point Likert scale, where 0 is not at all clear and vivid; 
1 is somewhat clear and vivid, and 2 is very clear and vivid. Evaluators were given the 
following prompt: “Do you have a clear, vivid idea of what the interviewee did that day 
or is it vague and dim?” The second component of statement quality was evaluated by 
ii) the plausibility of the statement, again measured on a 3-point Likert scale (i.e., 0 – 
not at all plausible, 1 – somewhat plausible, and 2 – very plausible). Evaluators were 
told to consider the following: “Does the interviewees’ statement make plausible, 
realistic sense and follow a logical structure or is it unrealistic and non-logical?” The 
statement quality variable represents the combined total of both the clarity and 
plausibility scores. Both of these cues relate to the RM literature and have been 
examined in a number of other studies (e.g., DePaulo et al., 2003; Johnson & Raye, 
1981; Leal et al., 2015; Sporer & Küpper, 1995; Zhou et al., 2004).  
Statements were assessed for the presence of complications, or rather, 
occurrences (caused by the interviewee, a third person, or another situational factor) 
that make a situation more difficult than necessary, often characterised by disrupted 
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activity, failing efforts, failures to progress and activity, suddenly appearing people 
and/or obstacles, etcetera (e.g., missing the bus or making an unplanned detour during 
a trip). This cue was originally based on CBCA literature (Steller & Köhnken, 1989), 
but the more comprehensive definition was derived from Vrij, Leal, Jupe, & Harvey 
(2018). Evaluators also coded for common knowledge details, which are statements that 
strongly invoke common stereotypical knowledge about everyday events with an 
absence of personalised, experienced, or unique information (e.g., “We went to pick up 
food at the store”), and self-handicapping strategies, relating to the presence of explicit 
or implicit justifications made by the interviewee for why they cannot provide certain 
information (e.g., “My friend chose the restaurant, so I can’t remember the name”). In 
line with previous research (e.g., Vrij, Leal, Jupe et al., 2018), I calculated the 
proportion of complications by computing a total score (number of complications + 
number of common knowledge details + number of self-handicapping strategies) and 
dividing the number of complications by this total score. Scores above .50 specify that 
the participants reported more complications than the sum total of common knowledge 
details and self-handicapping strategies, while scores below .50 indicate that the 
participants reported more common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies 
(when summed) than complications. The coding scheme for these criteria was modelled 
after the work of Vrij, Leal, Mann, et al., 2017 in particular (cf. Sporer, 2016; Volbert 
& Steller, 2014; Vrij, Leal, Jupe et al., 2018). 
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Appendix D: Supplementary materials (Chapter 5; Study IV) 
 
 
1. Experimental Instructions 
2. Cues to Veracity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
168 
 
1. Experimental Instructions 
Please imagine yourself in the role of a district detective in the Criminal Investigation 
Department of the Limburg Police. You are the lead detective for an investigation into 
a violent burglary that occurred approximately one week ago. Your colleague just 
finished interviewing a suspect, and your job is to review the interview statement and 
to assess the suspect’s credibility. The interviewee has provided an alibi statement for 
the entire day in question, from morning to evening, but the critical period of time (i.e., 
the “statement of interest”) that you are most interested in is from 1:00pm to 3:00pm.  
Your task is to read the statement carefully and to make a decision about the 
truthfulness of the critical statement of interest (i.e., the highlighted information, the 
period of time from 1:00pm to 3:00pm). You will then respond to several questions 
regarding your decision. 
 
It is extremely important that your decision is correct, if not, either the perpetrator gets 
away with the crime OR you may send an innocent person to jail. Plus, if you make the 
correct decisions regarding truthfulness, you will be entered into a raffle to win €50 … 
 
Additional instruction for Baseline-present condition:  
As the lead investigator, you have access to other sources of information for 
this case. This evidence confirms that the “general” alibi statement before 
1:00pm and after 3:00pm is truthful. Please use this knowledge to compare 
the “general” part of the interviewees’ alibi to the “statement of interest from 
1:00pm to 3:00pm).” Try to identify any patterns or changes in the verbal 
content between the general alibi and the statement of interest that may 
indicate how credible the suspect’s story from 1:00pm to 3:00pm is. 
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2. Cues to Veracity 
I also explored participants’ self-reported cues to perceived deception (open-
ended and multiple-response). Participants gave an open-ended description of the 
verbal cues used to form their veracity judgement, and finally, participants identified 
which verbal cues they used from set of listed content-based cues (e.g., the verifiability 
of details, consistency within the statement, etcetera). 
Coding. A wide variety of responses were obtained in response to the question: 
“What verbal cues did you use to decide whether the critical element of the 
interviewee’s statement (1:00pm to 3:00pm) was truthful or deceptive?” To condense 
these data, responses were assigned to specific verbal cues such as “Quantity of details”, 
“Contradictions and inconsistencies”, “Unexpected complications”, or “Lack of 
conviction/memory”. The complete list consisted of 41 cues and was derived from 
CBCA and RM literature as well as similar veracity-cue lists used by Bogaard and 
colleagues (2016, 2018), Vrij and colleagues (2006) and Akehurst and colleagues 
(1996). This coding scheme contained cues only regarding the content qualities of the 
statement and the speech characteristics that were identifiable in a written transcript. 
Additionally, a selection of data-driven verbal cues were included (e.g., “Differences 
between the baseline and critical element in terms of the type, or amount, of detail”). 
All responses were categorised according to the cues listed in Supplementary Table 3.   
To establish reliability, the Principal Investigator trained a Research Assistant, 
who was blind to the experimental conditions. Both individuals then coded all 
participants’ open-ended responses for the presence of these cues. The agreement 
between raters was excellent (see Supplementary Table 1 for the exact values). After 
establishing reliability between the two raters, I considered only the cues that both raters 
were in agreement upon; therefore, I only coded a cue as present when both raters 
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agreed upon its presence, when raters disagreed upon its presence; the cue was scored 
as absent. 
Supplementary Table 1 
Reliability statistics for qualitative coding of verbal cues  
Verbal Cue  Cohen’s 
Kappa (κ) 
Significance 
level (p) 
Percentage 
Agreemen
t  
1. Coherence  1.00 < .0005 100 
2. Clarity/vividness  1.00 < .0005 100 
3. Spontaneous corrections  0.949 < .0005 99.33 
4. Contradictions and inconsistency  0.899 < .0005 96.64 
5. Perceptual information  1.00 < .0005 100 
6. Emotions 1.00 < .0005 100 
7. Quantity of details  0.909 < .0005 99.33 
8. Spatial information  1.00 < .0005 100 
9. Unstructured production  0.878 < .0005 97.99 
10. Description of interaction  -- -- 100 
11. Temporal information  1.00 < .0005 100 
12. Extraneous information  1.00 < .0005 100 
13. Reproduction of conversation  - - 99.33 
14. Reconstructability of the 
statement  
-- -- 100 
15. Unusual details  1.00 < .0005 100 
16. Plausibility  0.902 < .0005 98.66 
17. Cognitive operations 0.661 < .0005 98.66 
18. Denial of allegation  -- -- 100 
19. Social introduction  1.00 < .0005 100 
20. Lack of conviction or memory  0.956 < .0005 99.33 
21. Main event of the statement  -- -- 100 
22. Objective versus subjective time  1.00 < .0005 100 
23. Missing information  1.00 < .0005 100 
24. First person singular, past tense  - - 99.33 
25. Use of pronouns  1.00 < .0005 100 
26. Changes in language  0.832 < .0005 98.66 
27. Length of the statement -- -- 100 
28. Self-references  -- -- 100 
29. Grammatical errors/changes 1.00 < .0005 100 
30. Repetitions 0.892 < .0005 99.33 
31. Clichés  -- -- 100 
32. Evasive responses  1.00 < .0005 100 
33. Unexpected complications 0.797 < .0005 99.33 
34. Self-deprecation -- -- 100 
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35. NA/ nonsense response 0.854 < .0005 99.33 
36. Filler words indicative of 
hesitations  
0.954 < .0005 99.33 
37. Providing un/verifiable details  0.938 < .0005 99.33 
38. Differences between baseline and 
critical period: Amount of detail 
0.893 < .0005 98.66 
39. Differences between baseline and 
critical period: Type of details 
0.878 < .0005 95.97 
40. Specific details/wording 
/phrasing 
0.793 < .0005 98.66 
41. Sentence structure  1.00 < .0005 100 
Note. The reliability values are computed on the raw data from both raters. Both raters 
agreed on the complete absence of eight cues and the k was not informative as both 
raters’ scores were constant values (labelled as --). Additionally, in two cases, one of 
the two raters scored the value as absent and again k was not informative (labelled as -
). When k was not informative, I instead report percentage agreement.  
 
Results 
Cues to Deception 
I also used descriptive statistics to explore the self-reported cues to deception 
used by participants. Supplementary Table 2 provides an overview of the coding of 
participants’ endorsement of these cues for the sample as a whole. The majority of 
participants reported using cues related to contradictions or inconsistencies, the 
presence of filler words, and the overall number of details. I was particularly interested 
in the verbal cues relating to comparisons between the general and critical elements of 
the statement. I conducted two chi-square tests for association between the two 
instruction groups and their endorsement of the strategies relating to content-based 
differences (type or amount of detail) between the baseline and critical period. These 
analyses revealed that participants, across Baseline-present and Baseline-absent 
instruction groups, did not significantly differ in their use of cues related to differences 
between the baseline and critical period in terms of the amount of details or the type of 
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details, χ2(1) = .53, p = .467 and χ2(1) = 1.51, p = .219. Both associations were weak, φ 
= .06 and .10, respectively. 
 
Supplementary Table 2 
 
  
Participants’ endorsement of verbal cues used for their deception judgement  
Item Total Frequency Relative 
Percentage 
Contradictions or inconsistencies  53 35.8 
Filler words indicative of hesitation 47 31.8 
Quantity of details 34 23.0 
Differences between baseline and critical period:  
   Type of detail 
19 12.8 
Repetitions  15 10.1 
Lack of conviction or memory 13 8.8 
Sentence structure  12 8.1 
Unstructured production  12 8.1 
Changes in language  12 8.1 
Missing information  12 8.1 
Spontaneous corrections 10 6.8 
Plausibility 10 6.8 
Temporal information  9 6.1 
Verifiability of information 8 5.4 
Differences between baseline and critical period:  
   Amount of detail 
8 5.4 
Coherence  7 4.7 
Extraneous information 7 4.7 
Specific details or phrasing 5 3.4 
Use of pronouns 5 3.4 
Clarity/vividness 4 2.7 
Unusual details 3 2.0 
Evasive responses 3 2.0 
Nonsense or not applicable responses 3 2.0 
Cognitive operations  2 1.4 
Grammatical errors 2 1.4 
Unexpected complications 2 1.4 
Spatial information 2 1.4 
Perceptual information 1 0.7 
Emotions 1 0.7 
Social introduction 1 0.7 
Objective versus subjective time  1 0.7 
Note. Although I used the 41 items in Appendix B to categorise the answers, only 31 
different items of this list were present within the answers of our respondents.  
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Finally, I explored participants’ cue endorsement from the list of predetermined 
cues provided (see Supplementary Figure 1). The most common cue was “Consistency 
within the statement,” reported by nearly 68% of participants. To test whether there 
was a difference in the endorsement of this cue between the two instruction groups, I 
conducted a chi-square test of independence, which revealed no statistically significant 
association between the groups, χ2(1) = .49, p = .482. This association was weak, φ = 
.06. Thus, participants across groups appear to have similarly relied on the consistency 
cue in their veracity decisions.  
 
 
Supplementary Figure 1. Participants’ endorsement of veracity cues from a set of 
predetermined choices. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  
 
Discussion 
Our qualitative data regarding participants’ use of verbal cues of deception 
provided only a weak indication of the use of a comparable baseline. Only a small 
percentage of participants reported using cues related to content-based differences 
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between the baseline and critical sections of the statements (13% of the sample 
endorsed verbal cues relating to differences between the baseline and critical period in 
terms of the type of detail and 5% for the amount of detail). This could indicate that our 
baseline instruction was not strong enough to motivate participants’ evaluation of 
statements based on verbal cues between the critical element and the comparable 
baseline section. It is also possible that the task of retrospectively reporting on higher-
order cognitions was too challenging or perhaps the vague nature of our question led to 
less accurate responses (see Ericsson and Simon, 1980 for a discussion).  
 
Supplementary Table 3 
Descriptions and sources of verbal content cues 
Verbal Cue  Description Source 
Coherence  Refers to the extent to which all elements 
of the statement are logical and make up a 
unified whole. 
CBCA 
Contradictions and 
inconsistency  
Refers to the extent to which a statement 
contains elements that contradict each 
other.  
CBCA 
Quantity of details  Refers to whether a statement is rich in 
detail and includes specific descriptions of 
place, time, persons, objects, and events. 
CBCA 
Unstructured production  Refers to the chronological order in which 
the statements is told. Are they told in the 
same order in which they occurred 
(chronological), or not (unstructured)?  
CBCA 
Unexpected complications Refers to occurrences (caused by the 
interviewee, a third person, or another 
situational factor) that make a situation 
more difficult than necessary, often 
characterised by disrupted activity, failing 
efforts, failures to progress and activity, 
suddenly appearing people and/or 
obstacles, etcetera. 
CBCA 
Unusual details  Refers to details of people, objects, or 
events that are unique, unexpected, or 
surprising but meaningful in the context.  
CBCA 
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*Description of interaction Refers to how action and reaction of the 
different actors presented in the statement 
are linked.  
CBCA 
*Reproduction of conversation Refers to whether parts of the conversation 
are reported in original form or if the 
different speakers are recognisable in the 
reproduced dialogs.  
CBCA 
Spatial information  Refers to information about locations or 
the spatial arrangement of people and/or 
objects. 
CBCA, 
RM 
Temporal information  Refers to information about when the event 
happened or explicitly describes a 
sequence of events. 
CBCA, 
RM 
Spontaneous corrections  Refers to corrections that are made or 
information that is added to material 
previously provided in the statement 
without having been prompted by the 
interviewer.  
CBCA, 
SCAN 
Extraneous information  Refers to irrelevant details that are related 
to the event, but not necessary to 
understand the event.  
CBCA, 
SCAN 
Lack of conviction or memory  Refers to when the writer is vague about 
certain elements within the statement when 
the writer admits he or she has forgotten 
something. 
CBCA, 
SCAN 
Emotions Refers to information that describes how 
the participant felt during an event and 
how these feelings develop and change 
throughout an event.  
CBCA, 
RM, 
SCAN 
Clarity/vividness  Refers to the extent to which a statement is 
clear, sharp, and vivid (instead of dim and 
vague). 
RM 
Perceptual information  Refers to the presence of sensory 
information in a statement. Does the 
statement include sensorial experiences 
such as sounds, smells, tastes, physical 
sensations, and visual details? 
RM 
*Reconstructability of the 
statement 
Refers to whether it is possible to 
reconstruct the event on the basis of the 
information given. 
RM 
Plausibility  Refers whether the story is plausible and 
realistic and makes sense. 
RM 
 
176 
 
Cognitive operations These cue descriptions of inferences are 
made by the participant based on existing 
knowledge.  
RM 
*Denial of allegation Refers to whether the examinee directly 
denies the allegation in the statement. 
SCAN 
Social introduction  Refers to how the persons described in the 
statement are introduced. People that are 
described within a statement should be 
introduced in an unambiguous way, 
usually by mentioning their name and role. 
SCAN 
*Main event of the statement Refers to the balance of the statement. In a 
truthful statement 20% is used to describe 
activities leading up to the event, the next 
50% to describe the actual event, and the 
final 30% to discuss what happened after 
the event. 
SCAN 
Objective versus subjective 
time  
Refers to how different time periods are 
covered in the statement. Objective time 
refers to the actual duration of events 
described, whereas subjective time refers 
to the number of words used describing 
these events. 
SCAN 
Missing information  Refers to phrases in the statement that 
indicate some information has been left 
out.  
SCAN 
*First person singular, past 
tense  
Refers to the format in which a statement 
is written.  
SCAN 
Use of pronouns  Refers to the use of pronouns in the 
statement.  
SCAN 
Changes in language  Refers to the change of terminology or 
vocabulary in the statement. 
SCAN 
*Length of the statement Refers to the length of the statement. Literatu
re-
based 
*Self-references Refers to the number of self-references 
made by the interviewee. 
Literatu
re-
based 
Grammatical errors/changes Refers to grammatical errors within the 
statement. Also refers to changes in 
grammar within the statement. 
Literatu
re-
based 
Repetitions Refers to the presence of word and or 
sentence repetition.  
Literatu
re-
based 
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*Clichés Refers to the presence of clichéd 
expressions within the statement. 
Literatu
re-
based 
Evasive responses  Refers to the presence of evasive or 
indirect responses by the interviewee.   
Literatu
re-
based 
*Self-deprecation Refers to the presence of the interviewee 
undervaluing himself or being excessively 
modest. 
Literatu
re-
based 
NA/ nonsense response Refers to statements that are not applicable 
to the verbal cues used, or that don’t make 
sense. 
Data-
driven 
Filler words  Refers to the presence of filler words that 
may indicate hesitation. 
Data-
driven 
Providing un/verifiable details  Refers to the presence of verifiable or 
unverifiable (checkable/uncheckable) 
information. 
Data-
driven 
Differences between baseline 
and critical period: Amount of 
detail 
Refers to the presence of differences 
regarding the amount of detail included in 
the general statement compared to the 
critical element from 1:00-3:00pm.  
Data-
driven 
Differences between baseline 
and critical period: Type of 
details 
Refers to the presence of differences 
regarding the type of detail included in the 
general statement compared to the critical 
element from 1:00-3:00pm.  
Data-
driven 
Specific details/wording 
/phrasing 
Refers to the inclusion of specific 
details/information or specific 
wording/phrasing. It also refers to a lack of 
specific detail/vagueness in the statement.  
Data-
driven 
Sentence structure  Refers to changes to sentence structure. 
Also refers to the way/style of reporting. 
Data-
driven 
Note. The items marked with an asterisks (*) were included in the coding list but were 
scored as absent based on the coding of both raters. SCAN refers to Scientific Content 
Analysis (Sapir, 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
178 
 
Appendix E - Ethical Approval 
The studies presented in this thesis were conducted under a research line granted to Brianna 
L. Verigin by the University of Maastricht’s Ethical Committee for Psychology (ECP) in 
2016. Below is the letter of favorable opinion for the research line under which each of the 
individual studies were conducted.14,15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 The ethical approval of Maastricht University’s ECP extends to cover the execution of a research project at the 
University of Portsmouth (Chapter 4; Study III). 
15 Each individual study within the research line received approval from Maastricht University ECP.  
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Appendix F – UPR16 Form 
 
 
